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Deprived of family and friends
Confined by iron stone walls
They feed me fear, anger, darkness, and hate.
So now I live without tears.
Who understands me when I say I refuse to give into darkness?
I refuse to give up because of the pain they have inflicted on me.
I refuse to let the anger control me.
I refuse to act on the hatred they forced upon my heart.
And I refuse to let these iron stone walls consume my soul.
Sincerely, “Human”
Anthony  
Self-portrait painting by Anthony Miranda
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Over the past few months, immigration 
detention practices around the world have 
been changing rapidly as state and civil 
society actors respond to manage the 
multiple impacts of COVID-19. In some 
cases, these changes have been positive, 
leading to stronger protection of the rights 
of non-citizens. In others, they have led 
to the increased marginalisation of and 
discrimination against non-citizens.
In collaborating with the Humanitarian and Development Research 
Initiative to produce this joint edited collection, the International 
Detention Coalition sought to provide a platform for our members 
and partners to discuss their experiences, actions and perspectives 
as the pandemic unfolded across the globe. The contributions are rich 
and diverse, showing the impact that COVID-19 has had on refugee, 
undocumented migrant and stateless communities around the world.
The contributions highlight a number of issues related to migrants, 
stateless persons and refugees experiencing (or at risk of) immigration 
detention – the closure of borders, restrictions on international and 
local travel, changes in status determination procedures for asylum 
seekers and refugees, new regulations concerning visitors and lawyers 
in detention facilities, the redistribution of detainees across different 
facilities, the introduction of quarantine and isolation procedures 
for those with COVID-19 symptoms, and the impacts of immigration 
detention practices on the mental health needs of detainees. The edited 
collection covers the response of civil society groups to immigration 
detention, highlighting increased concern about the detention of 
non-citizens expressed in rallies, petitions, and other forms of protest. 
It also reviews legal interventions that have led to the release of 
detainees – some, unfortunately, into destitution and homelessness.
The contributions also speak to rising levels of inequality. States with 
already weak healthcare systems before the pandemic struggle to 
manage rising caseloads. Civil society groups have had to cut back 
on their activities in the light of increased restrictions and health 
concerns; funding shortages have jeopardised the continuity and reach 
of their essential services. Migrants, stateless persons and refugees in 
overcrowded housing have been unable to practice physical distancing 
and, against rising xenophobia and racism, have been susceptible  
to scapegoating for the impact of COVID-19. In many contexts, the 
health and welfare of citizens has taken firm precedence over that  
of these groups.
COVID-19 does not discriminate, but laws, policies and practices 
concerning migration governance, immigration detention, and public 
healthcare shape the vulnerability of migrants, stateless persons and 
refugees to its spread and effects. The contributions in this joint edited 
collection highlight both positive and negative developments over 
the past year that need careful attention – and in some cases, urgent 
correction – for the health and wellbeing of all.
We extend our gratitude to the authors for their contributions,  
which have allowed the breadth of responses that are in this collection. 
We also thank HADRI, and in particular Dr. Melissa Phillips, who is 
also part of the IDC’s International Advisory Committee, for the 
opportunity to have collaborated on this important initiative.
ALICE NAH 
Chairperson of the Committee, IDC
FOREWORD FROM INTERNATIONAL DETENTION  
COALITION (IDC) 
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FOREWORD FROM HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT 
RESEARCH INITIATIVE (HADRI)
COVID-19 has exposed serious flaws in 
social, political and economic systems  
in states and territories across the world. 
As states have rediscovered sovereign 
powers to close borders and reduce 
movement, a number of groups of 
people have been especially vulnerable. 
As this joint edited collection shows, people in detention facilities are 
the most at risk of contracting COVID-19, and the contributions in 
this collection provide an important insight into the agendas behind, 
and narratives that underpin, state uses of immigration detention.
By placing the different responses of states to the issue of detention 
of migrants side-by-side, this report provides an accessible global 
snapshot of the situation of migrants in detention, and those at risk of 
detention, and a unique and important opportunity for comparison 
of state and civil society responses to COVID-19. Case studies such as 
those on Australia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia highlight the way in which 
some states have used discourses of ‘safety’, alongside perceptions 
of migrants as ‘vectors of infection’, to detain migrants, often in 
overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. In Australia, policies that 
detain asylum seekers off-shore build on older discourses of protecting 
Australians from a range of threats, including terrorism. Despite civil 
society advocacy for release of all detainees, the government has 
used COVID-19 to support its case for continuing its policy of offshore 
detention, now claiming asylum seekers are less likely to become 
infected on Nauru or Christmas Island. In other states, for example in 
Spain, the pandemic has prompted civil society groups to successfully 
pressure the national government to release detainees, who are now 
being supported by civil society groups. Clearly there are alternatives 
to immigration detention, including community-based programs.
The contributions in this report provide important insights into 
how states have used COVID-19 to police their borders, especially 
in terms of containing and managing immigrant bodies, and the 
generally poor conditions of immigration detention across the 
world. The contributions also shed light on why in these peculiar 
political and policy contexts, some groups of people have been 
and remain more vulnerable than others to immigration detention. 
This is particularly the case with respect to how states have 
implemented immigration detention as a means of managing 
flows of asylum seekers, refugees and migrant workers.
HADRI is proud to partner with International Detention Coalition 
(IDC) to compile this timely report, which has emerged from 
HADRI’s Migration and Diaspora research theme, led by Dr Melissa 
Phillips. It is a good example of how HADRI collaborations between 
scholars and practitioners provide evidence-based research and 
approaches to resilience in humanitarian and development practice.
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR NICHOLE GEORGEOU  
Director, HADRI
International Detention Coalition and Western Sydney University6
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IDC is a powerful global network of 400+ organisations, groups, 
individuals, as well as representatives of communities impacted by 
immigration detention, based in over 100 countries. IDC staff work 
across the world, nationally and regionally, in Africa, the Americas, Asia 
Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and at the global level.
IDC advocates to secure the human rights of people impacted by 
and at-risk of immigration detention. In partnership with civil society, 
UN agencies, and multiple levels of government, we strategically 
build movements, and influence law, policy and practices to reduce 
immigration detention and implement rights-based alternatives to 
detention (ATD).
For more information about IDC, see www.idcoalition.org
HADRI was established at Western Sydney University (WSU) in 2016 
with a globally unique approach to pursue research that highlights the 
complexity of international responses to conflicts and disasters, and the 
intersections between the multidimensional health and socio-economic 
and political aspects of complex emergencies.
HADRI aims to conduct research that:
 ≥ Bridges the academic and practice aspects of humanitarian response, 
rehabilitation and development.
 ≥ Informs policy decisions of government, international organisations, 
academics and other stakeholders.
 ≥ Ensures synergies, innovation and knowledge sharing and  
translation through collaboration with HADRI’s global partners and 
engagement with WSU’s undergraduate and postgraduate degrees  
in Humanitarian and Development Studies (HADS).
This report COVID-19 Impacts on Immigration Detention: Global 
Responses is the second collaboration from Humanitarian and 
Development Research Initiative (HADRI) affiliated scholars and 
practitioners on COVID-19, the first being the June 2020 publication 
of State Responses to COVID-19: a global snapshot at 1 June 2020.
ABOUT IDC ABOUT HADRI
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We commenced discussions about a joint edited collection in August, 
inspired by the success of HADRI’s State Responses to COVID-19:  
a Global Snapshot at 1 June 2020. Our initial conversations focused 
on a perceived gap in understanding how States and Civil Society 
had responded to those at risk of immigration detention and those 
in immigration detention during the COVID-19 pandemic. IDC and 
HADRI were keen to showcase what actions or policies different actors 
had taken towards refugee, undocumented migrant and stateless 
communities; whether these actions or policies led to any increase 
or reduction in the use of immigration detention; and what has been 
the impact on different groups typically at risk of, or in immigration 
detention.
The enthusiastic response we received from contributors was most 
encouraging. Despite their own busy workloads, including in many 
cases directly responding to people in immigration detention or living 
in countries where the pandemic was still at a critical stage, authors 
committed to be part of this edited collection which came with a very 
tight timeframe. We want to thank them for their willingness to take on 
this additional work and for responding to our requests for clarification 
or correction. As we have learnt, in many cases legal terms and 
processes do not necessarily translate from one context to another.
Eager to include creative pieces we are grateful to Christina Fialho,  
Co-Founder/Executive Director, Freedom for Immigrants for linking  
us to Anthony Miranda whose artwork features on our report cover. 
When approached for permission to use his work, Anthony replied:
Honestly I’m amazed that an organization wants to 
use my drawings! What can I say it would be nice  
to write a short story of my life!! I spent 5 years  
in detention center fighting for my right to stay in  
the US and they still deported me to “my” state!  
A State I never knew. And now I am forced to live 
on the other side away from my family! But you 
know what nothing stops me! Right now I am living 
in a tent I gave up the hot showers the cozy bed 
the warm food all that to follow a dream, a dream 
that I had in mind since I was detained. I’m building 
my own home with the help of my family but I am 
building everything by myself and I know I can do it. 
Because besides being an immigrant I am a person 
with dreams and goals and I never stop fighting.
We continue to be inspired by the stories behind the statistics 
that counter the increasing media rhetoric about refugee, 
undocumented migrant and stateless communities and 
hope this edited collection can challenge commonly held 
perceptions about the ‘need’ for immigration detention.
We would like to also thank the entire IDC team for their support in 
facilitating this edited collection and HADRI Director Associate Professor 
Nichole Georgeou for her guidance and advice on how to bring such an 
ambitious project to fruition. The editors appreciate the funding support 
provided by the School of Social Sciences, Western Sydney University.
In preparing this edited collection we undertook to proofread all 
submissions but due to the timeframes we did not check every 
hyperlink and reference, nor did we edit referencing styles for 
consistency. We apologise in advance for any errors and note 
that in the fast- changing world of immigration policy, the articles 
are accurate up to 15 September 2020. The diverse range of 
views in this report are the views and opinions of the authors 




HADRI/Western Sydney University 
Regional Advisor, International Detention Coalition
MIN JEE YAMADA PARK 
International Detention Coalition
A NOTE ON THIS REPORT
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The Australian Government has held firm to a position of mandatory 
immigration detention for many years despite regular attempts by civil 
society and the public to soften this hardline approach. Unfortunately, 
COVID-19 has now also failed to alter the Government’s resolve to utilise 
indefinite detention despite clear and obvious risks to the health of 
detainees throughout the pandemic.
This paper provides a summary of State and civil society activity in 
response to COVID-19 with specific reference to immigration detention 
in Australia. It does not have scope to explore offshore detention 
arrangements as these policies have remained unchanged and include 
jurisdiction of other governments.
STATE RESPONSES
Australia was quick to close borders following the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) declaration of an international pandemic in 
March 2020, and nationwide community lockdowns shortly followed 
for non-essential workers. The humanitarian program for refugee 
resettlement was suspended in mid-March due to cancellation of flights 
and closed borders and has remained suspended since. The reduction 
in international travel also saw a significant decrease in new arrivals and 
therefore minimal numbers of new cases of immigration detention. This 
was further assisted by a decision to offer extension of visas for those 
already in Australia and unable to leave.
As at 31 March 2020, there were 1,373 people in Australian immigration 
detention facilities including 512 asylum seekers, otherwise known as 
‘Illegal Maritime Arrivals’1. As at 31 May 2020 the total in detention had 
raised to 1,458 people and the number of asylum seekers had reduced 
to 505 people2. The balance of the Australian immigration detainees 
is primarily made up of visa cancellations due to breaches and visa 
overstays. Whilst more recent statistics are unavailable, it is apparent 
that detention practices remain unchanged despite the pandemic, with 
numbers in detention increasing rather than decreasing through the 
initial crisis. Despite this increase there does appear to be a continued 
practice of granting bridging visas3 for those who are eligible, yet these 
numbers have been very low.
Visitors to the detention facilities were suspended in late March 2020 
meaning that detention monitors and personal visitors could no longer 
attend detention facilities. In exchange, all detainees were given a  
$20 phone credit per week to remain in contact with the outside world 
and alternate arrangements were under negotiation for detention 












In early August 2020, the Australian Government confirmed that it 
would redistribute detainees across the detention network in order 
to minimise overcrowding and the risk of transmission. This included 
utilising the controversial option of Christmas Island detention facilities4 
for non-refugee detainees and deporting some New Zealand detainees 
to free up space to relocate people from more crowded facilities in the 
Eastern States. Refugee detainees and others with higher vulnerabilities 
have generally been kept in separate facilities to those who have been 
detained for criminal breaches of visa conditions. No COVID-19 cases 
have been detected in Australian immigration detention at the time  
of writing.
On 12 August 2020, the Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
(CDNA) released guidelines for the prevention, control and public 
health management of COVID-19 outbreaks in correctional and 
detention facilities in Australia5. This guideline highlights the high risk 
of rapid transmission in detention facilities due to the close proximity 
of detainees and therefore emphasises strategies to prevent the illness 
getting into detention facilities in the first place. This reflects what 
seems to be the primary approach of the Australian Government to 
protecting detainees from COVID-19 infection. Detainees who do display 
symptoms are subject to isolation.
Prior to and during the pandemic, the Australian Government has 
shown resolve in ensuring that its strict policies on migration are 
maintained despite legal and other challenges. This has included a 
narrative of protecting Australians first and upholding the immigration 
laws including detention. This approach has remained unchanged 
during COVID-19 and is evidenced by one case where the Federal Court 
ordered the Australian Government to remove a 68- year-old detainee 
from an immigration facility in Melbourne due to a substantial risk 
of COVID-19 infection. Rather than utilising an option of community 
release, the man was relocated to a less risky facility in Western 
Australia6.
CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES
Australian civil society has been active in raising concerns about the 
high risk of infection within detention and promoting the release of 
detainees7. This included several calls for the Australian Government to 
utilise existing alternatives such as community detention and bridging 
visas for those undergoing refugee status determination8. Concerns 
were also raised around overcrowding and risks to the broader 
community9.
DETENTION AT ALL COSTS:  
COVID-19 AND IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN AUSTRALIA
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The legal community has made a number of attempts to seek court10 
or administrative11 rulings in relation to detainees that are particularly 
vulnerable to COVID-19 infection. Whilst these cases have managed 
to demonstrate that people in detention are particularly vulnerable to 
COVID-19 infection and that the Australian Government owes a duty 
of care to these people12, the Government has persistently argued that 
risk of infection in detention is lower than in the community. They have 
also cited legal restrictions preventing releases from detention as a 
result of serious breaches of the law and adverse security assessments. 
Therefore, whilst legal pursuits have been successful in determining 
heightened COVID-19 infection risk in detention they have been 
unsuccessful in brokering releases from detention.
Calls for the urgent release of people seeking asylum, refugees and 
other non-citizens held in immigration detention centres began as 
soon as the magnitude and reach of the global health crisis associated 
with COVID-19 became clear.13 Public support for releasing low threat 
detainees has been high with petitions such as the #saferathome 
petition raising over 57,000 signatures14. Some doctors have been 
protesting outside detention for 300 nights as part of the Indefinite 
Sleepout to End Indefinite Detention campaign15 and public support 
has also been in the form of an open letter from doctors, academics 
and other professionals calling for releases16. Some refugee advocates 
have also ignored COVID-19 restrictions to protest against detention in 
Brisbane17 and several rallies have been held there.
Many health experts have identified detention centres as extremely 
high-risk places for both infection and onward transmission of COVID-19 
and have urged the Government to follow social distancing and health 
advice. They have also advocated for release where possible18. Health 
experts have also questioned the suitability of confinement or isolation 
as an infection management strategy in detention on the grounds that 
it could further traumatise refugee detainees19 as isolation conditions in 
detention are associated with detainees with severe behavioural issues. 
Additionally, conditions may be triggering for refugees who may have 
experienced previous trauma in similar settings.
Overall, Australian civil society has been persistent in raising public 
concerns about the plight of detainees, and in seeking to exercise both 













19 Human Rights for All Senate submission https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=46517825-312d-466f-9725-e874745de59d&subId=682951
CONCLUSION
Australia has clearly remained unwavering in its policy of mandatory 
detention despite the capacity and precedent for alternatives to be 
used. Although the Australian Government has shown willingness to 
follow the advice of public health experts in relation to the broader 
community, it has not heeded expert recommendations regarding 
people in detention. The preferred approach has been to focus on 
quarantine by keeping COVID-19 out of detention facilities and to utilise 
Christmas Island and other detention facilities throughout Australia to 
minimise overcrowding and risk of transmission.
Despite various attempts by civil society to utilise the law and public 
or moral pressure, the Government has chosen to maintain a hardline 
approach rather than seek an opportunity to show leniency in the 
interests of the health of detainees. This is, however, consistent with the 
lack of compassion shown to non-residents in the Australian community 
during the pandemic.
DAVID KEEGAN 
CEO, HOST International Ltd
ARASH BORDBAR 
Chair, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN)
International Detention Coalition and Western Sydney University12
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The Asia-Pacific region is home to roughly 3.5 million refugees,  
1.9 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 1.4 million stateless 
people. As COVID-19 continues to be the biggest threat to global health 
security, it is the most vulnerable among us that are disproportionately 
impacted by this global pandemic. Particularly, those populations 
under some form of confinement and restrictions, such as IDPs or 
refugees, are particularly vulnerable as they tend to lack basic access 
to healthcare and live in conditions that increase the risk of COVID-19 
infection. This is clearly seen in the examples of the irregular migrants in 
the IDP camps in Rakhine state, Myanmar and in the refugee camps in 
Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Experiencing a form of detention, these IDPs 
and refugees are mostly living in ‘closed’ camps, where they are under 
significant restrictions, especially on movement.
IDPS IN RAKHINE STATE, MYANMAR
Concerns have already been raised about Myanmar’s ability to manage 
the COVID-19 crisis given the state of its weak healthcare system, pre-
existing humanitarian caseloads and ongoing conflict.1 In Rakhine State 
itself, there are currently more than 210,000 IDPs living in various camps 
around the State, with most having lived there since 2012.2 While the 
Myanmar government launched its National Strategy on Resettlement 
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Closure of IDP Camps in 
November 2019, questions surrounding the safety, ease of movement, 
and livelihood sustainability of affected communities still remain.3 There 
have been reports from the ground that the resettled IDPs, particularly 
the Rohingya, still face many restrictions. These include the lack of 
choices of where they can relocate to, as well as being forced to live in 
crowded semi-permanent structures in sub-standard areas.4 Movement 
restrictions on those living in the camps have also increased with the 
current lockdown measures. Even IDPs in need of medical referrals to 
the State’s main hospital in the capital Sittwe have had trouble obtaining 
permission to leave their camps, with them being told to seek treatment 
in the camps instead.5
With the overcrowded conditions in these camps, a lack of health 
facilities as well as sanitation facilities, social distancing and other 
COVID-19 mitigation measures are almost impossible to implement. 
Although the government of Myanmar have instituted various measures 
– mobilising response teams for IDP camps to construct more sanitation 
facilities, conduct education sessions and distribute essential supplies, 
announcing a nationwide ceasefire agreement as well as instituting a 
1 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, “The Impact of COVID-19 on South-East Asia”, Policy Brief, July 2020, https://www.
unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/2020-07/SG-Policy-brief-COVID-19-and-South-East-Asia-30-July-2020.pdf
2 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs & United Nations Refugee Agency, “Humanitarian Situation in Rathedaung, Flash Update, 30 June 
2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Myanmar%20-%20Flash%20Update%20-%20Humanitarian%20situation%20in%20Rathedaung%20
%2830%20June%202020%29.pdf.
3 Global New Light of Myanmar, “Ministry unveils national strategy on resettlement of IDPs, camp closures”, Global New Light of Myanmar, 27 December 2019, https://
www.gnlm.com.mm/ministry-unveils-national-strategy-on-resettlement-of-idps-camp-closures/
4 CARE et.al, “Three Years On: Prospects for Durable Solutions and Justice Remain Elusive for Rohingya, 24 August 2020, https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/final-
statement-3-years-on-and-no-durable-solutions_08.20.2020.pdf
5 Nadia Hardman & Param-Preet Singh, “Pandemic Adds New Threat for Rohingyas in Myanmar”, Human Rights Watch, 29 May 2020, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2020/05/29/pandemic-adds-new-threat-rohingyas-myanmar
6 Kyaw San Wai, “Myanmar and COVID-19”, The Diplomat, 1 May 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/myanmar-and-covid-19/>.
7 Alice Debarre, “Delivering Healthcare amid Crisis: The Humanitarian Response in Myanmar”, International Peace Institute, February 2019, <https://www.ipinst.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/02/1902_Delivering-Healthcare-in-Myanmar.pdf> ; European Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar, “Healthcare Guide 2019”, October 
2019, <https://eurocham-myanmar.org/uploads/37f07-healthcare-guide-2019-web.pdf>.
8 OCHA, “Myanmar, Rakhine State: COVID-19 Situation Report No. 08”, Situation Report, 1 September 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
OCHA%20Myanmar%20-%20COVID-19%20Situation%20report%20No%208.pdf>.
9 Nyein Nyein, “At least 10 UN, INGO Workers Hit by COVID-19 in Myanmar’s Rakhine State”, The Irrawaddy, 28 August 2020, < https://www.irrawaddy.com/specials/
myanmar-covid-19/least-10-un-ingo-workers-hit-covid-19-myanmars-rakhine-state.html>.
10 Lawi Weng, “Myanmar Rebel Coalition Calls for Military to Extend Ceasefire to Rakhine”, The Irrawaddy, 11 May 2020, < https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/
myanmar-rebel-coalition-calls-military-extend-ceasefire-rakhine.html>.
11 Ibid. 
12 OCHA & UNHCR, “Humanitarian Situation in Rathedaung, Flash Update, 30 June 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Myanmar%20-%20
Flash%20Update%20-%20Humanitarian%20situation%20in%20Rathedaung%20%2830%20June%202020%29.pdf>.
13 Mizzima, “Military to extend ceasefire for one more month”, Mizzima, 25 August 2020, < http://www.mizzima.com/article/military-extend-ceasefire-one-more-month>.
14 OCHA, “Myanmar, Rakhine State: COVID-19 Situation Report No. 08”, Situation Report, 1 September 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
OCHA%20Myanmar%20-%20COVID-19%20Situation%20report%20No%208.pdf
15 Ibid.
lockdown of Rakhine state – the effects of these measures are limited 
due to several factors.6
One such factor is the lack of resources. One of Myanmar’s poorest 
states, Rakhine has limited testing and medical facilities with only one 
laboratory in Sittwe General Hospital and only nine health workers 
per 10,000 people in the state health system, far below the 22 
recommended by World Health Organisation and even the national 
average of 16.7 The provision of external humanitarian assistance to the 
people of these IDP camps have also seen reductions, with the Rakhine 
State Government only allowing essential life-saving humanitarian 
assistance such as those related to food assistance, COVID-19 response 
and water.8 Moreover, with some personnel from UN agencies, as well 
as other international organisations, having tested positive for the 
COVID-19, other organisations have also temporarily reduced their 
activities, further stretching resources in the field.9 As such, it should 
be of key importance that the Myanmar government end movement 
restrictions for the people living in the camps, or at the very least 
allocate additional space to alleviate overcrowding. They should also 
work together with humanitarian aid groups to ensure the provision of 
sufficient resources on the ground for a substantive COVID-19 response. 
COVID-19 mitigation measures in Rakhine State are also further 
complicated by its ongoing conflict between Myanmar’s military and the 
ethnic armed organisation, the Arakan Army (AA). Although the military 
announced a temporary national ceasefire in line with the UN Secretary-
General’s global appeal on 9 May 2020, it excludes “areas recognised 
as the base of terrorist organisations”.10 With the AA being designated 
a terrorist organisation in late March 2020, this effectively excludes the 
Rakhine State.11 The ongoing conflict in Northern Rakhine, as well as its 
relatively rural location, also means that humanitarian assistance to the 
area has been minimal.12 While Myanmar’s government has been dealing 
relatively well with COVID-19, the recent surge of local transmission 
cases in Rakhine should serve as a warning to avoid complacency.13
Although there have been no confirmed COVID-19 cases in the camps 
or other IDP sites at the time of writing, out of Myanmar’s 887 cases, 
409 have been reported across Rakhine – 393 of which were reported 
between 16 August and 1 September 2020.14 Moreover, with the 
continued delays in testing primary contacts of those who have tested 
positive for COVID-19, some of whom live in the IDP camps, it may only 
be a matter of time before the camps start seeing COVID-19 cases.15
STATE RESPONSES TO THE REFUGEE SITUATION DURING 
COVID-19: ROHINGYAS IN MYANMAR AND BANGLADESH
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ROHINGYA REFUGEES IN COX’S BAZAR, 
BANGLADESH
The largest refugee settlement in the world, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, 
houses around 900,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar.16 In all 
the 34 camps, tightly packed and overcrowded conditions render 
social distancing virtually impossible, placing their residents at a 
disproportionately high risk of contracting COVID-19. The Rohingya 
populations in these camps are also entirely reliant on humanitarian 
assistance, both local and international. However, this is currently 
hampered by travel restrictions implemented by the Government of 
Bangladesh.17 The movement of aid workers in and out of the camps 
is heavily restricted, while refugees are only allowed to travel to 
neighbouring camps but are not allowed to go to places further out 
like the city centre of Cox’s Bazar and other municipalities such as 
Chittagong.18
A study published in March 2020 by John Hopkins University 
researchers projected that, should there be an outbreak among the 
refugee community in Cox’s Bazar, the virus would first spread slowly 
before rapidly cascading within a year. Based on their models, a single 
case in Cox’s Bazar could lead to between 119 and 504 transmissions 
within a month, and up to 600,000 infections in a year.19 As of July 
2020, there have been around 60 COVID-19 cases reported in the 
camps, with five deaths.20
While the numbers have not gone up exponentially since the first case, 
the conditions for a serious outbreak are still present. This is due to 
several factors. Firstly, the average population density in a Rohingya 
refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar is about 40,000 people per square 
kilometre, which drastically increases the chances that the virus will 
spread quickly.21 Secondly, while the Bangladesh government has 
been working in tandem with national and international aid agencies 
to improve healthcare infrastructure and services in the camps, the 
camps are still woefully unequipped to deal with the pandemic.22 Due to 
government under-investment, the health sector in Bangladesh suffers 
from inadequate quality of healthcare service and paucity of essential 
equipment.23 Intensive care capacity is still lacking, and COVID-19 
testing capacity is still very low in Cox’s Bazar.24 As of 10 June 2020, 
there is only one testing laboratory in the entire Cox’s Bazar, catering to 
both host communities and refugees.25
16 Hasina Akhter, “Opinion: From Cox’s Bazar – How to Address Refugee Needs Amid Covid-19”, Devex, 2020, https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-from-cox-s-
bazar-how-to-address-refugee-needs-amid-covid-19-97840
17 Humanitarian Response.Info, “2020 Covid-19 Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis – April to December”, 2020, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/
en/operations/bangladesh/document/2020-covid-19-response-plan-rohingya-humanitarian-crisis-april
18 Ro Yassin Abdoumonab, “Amid Coronavirus, a Rohingya Refugee Reflects on Camp Life Under Lockdown”, UNHCR, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/ph/19911-amid-
coronavirus-a-rohingya-refugee-reflects-on-camp-life-under-lockdown.html
19 Shaun Truelove, Orit Abrahim, Chiara Altare, Andrew Azman, and Paul Spiegel, “Novel Coronavirus: Projecting the Impact in Rohingya Refugee Camps and Beyond”, 
2020, https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/john_hopkins_study_rohingya_refugee_camp_covid19_20200318.pdf
20 Azm Anas, “Rohingya Scapegoated as Bangladesh Battles COVID-19”, Nikkei Asian Review, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Rohingya-
scapegoated-as-Bangladesh-battles-COVID-19
21 Mohammad Mainul Islam and MD Yeasir Yunus, “Rohinya Refugees at High Risk of Covid-19 in Bangladesh”, The Lancet. Global Health, 2020, https://www.thelancet.
com/pdfs/journals/langlo/PIIS2214-109X(20)30282-5.pdf
22 Saleh Ahmad, “Coronavirus Closes in on Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh’s Cramped Unprepared Camps”, The Conversation, 2020, https://theconversation.com/
coronavirus-closes-in-on-rohingya-refugees-in-bangladeshs-cramped-unprepared-camps-135147
23 Western Sydney University, “State Responses to COVID-19: A Global Snapshot at 1 June 2020”, 2020, https://researchdirect.westernsydney.edu.au/islandora/
object/uws%3A56288/datastream/PDF/view
24 Jenny Lei Ravelo, “As Covid-19 Deaths Rise in Cox’s Bazar, is Increased Testing Enough?”, Devex, 2020, https://www.devex.com/news/as-covid-19-deaths-rise-in-
cox-s-bazar-is-increased-testing-enough-97412
25 Ibid.
26 Azm Anas, “Covid-19 Fuels Tensions between Rohingya Refugees and Bangladeshi Hosts”, The New Humanitarian, 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/
news-feature/2020/07/27/Bangladesh-Rohingya-refugee-host-coronavirus-aid
27 “Coronavirus in the Rohingya Camps: Five Key Issues to Watch”, The New Humanitarian, 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/05/15/
coronavirus-rohingya-camps
The response has also been complicated by increasing distrust for and 
stigmatisation of Rohingya refugees. Since the onset of the pandemic, 
there has been a rise in anti-Rohingya hate speech and racism among 
the local population in Cox’s Bazar. Rohingya refugees have been 
accused of carrying the virus and siphoning resources away from 
local Bangladeshi communities.26 Societal stigmatisation would only 
compound the suffering of the Rohingya. As such, it is important that 
the Bangladesh government works together with aid agencies to create 
and promote campaigns to reduce the stigmatisation of the Rohingya 
by host communities in Cox’s Bazar.
Finally, Rohingya refugees need to be included in policy discussions 
as well as mitigation plans. This would give them a voice and enable 
policymakers to be culturally sensitive when planning and enacting 
response strategies. An example that highlights this need can be seen 
when the practice of ‘shielding’ – separating the elderly from their 
families as a form of social distancing – was met with pushback from 
the Rohingyas.27 Consultation with Rohingya representatives would 
have revealed that most Rohingyas are against the splitting up of 
multi-generational households, which then would have resulted in more 
culturally appropriate COVID-19 mitigation policies.
CONCLUSION
As COVID-19 continues to rage throughout the world, it is becoming 
ever clearer that each country, or indeed the world, is only as strong and 
prepared as its most vulnerable member. For the already movement-
restricted irregular migrants living in overcrowded camps, further 
confinement in camps – most of which already lack adequate healthcare 
and sanitation facilities during ‘normal’ times – may perhaps bring about 
an undesirable result. As such, an inclusive health-disaster response, one 
which takes into account the particular needs and vulnerabilities of each 
community, would be vital for the long-term eradication of COVID-19.
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Since Confederation in 1867, Canadian officials have called upon 
quarantine measures, and, later, immigration detention, to control, 
contain, manage, and eventually expel foreigners. A pattern of 
legislation marks potential and current immigrants with diseases or 
disabilities as liabilities burdening a fragile public health care system.1 
During COVID-19, this pattern continues with a national fear of foreign 
“infections” overriding the rights of newcomers and permanent 
residents – as well as their children, other dependents, and even people 
who “looked like immigrants”. Yet, these concerns were balanced 
against the threats posed by the detention centres themselves, thus 
leading to a reduction in detention.
The socio-legal understanding of the “cordon sanitaire” is helpful here. 
The original “sanitary cordon” or “health border” was a perimeter set up 
in France during the Middle Ages to control the outbreak of Black Death 
by preventing anyone from leaving and thus spreading the disease. 
Since then, and to various effects on stigmatized communities, cordons 
sanitaires have quarantined residents of Georgia, Texas, and Florida 
in the 1880s to contain yellow fever; Honolulu’s ‘Chinatown’ in 1900 to 
control a bubonic plague outbreak; and Poland during World War I to 
combat a typhus outbreak.2
We can extend this idea to capture the border as a safeguard not to 
contain disease but to repel it. Popular discourse associates migrants 
with bringing dangerousness, invasion, panic, and uncertainty, as 
well as carrying bio-medical risks and, inter alia, bio-security risks.3 
We can think here of Canadian and international media depicting or 
describing refugees and other migrants literally as infectious diseases, 
rising floodwaters, animals, or potential terrorists.4 By recognizing the 
power of the cordon sanitaire, we can unpack the idea of the border or 
detention centre as a literal and metaphorical bulwark against pollution 
or harm.
But what happens when the threat emanates not from migrants but 
from the conditions of their confinements? The federal Government of 
Canada instituted a national quarantine and called for de-carceration 
of prisons and detention centres. How will this impact the power of 
the cordon sanitaire, the future of migration control, and public and 
government thinking about the acceptability of incarcerating migrants 
in the first place? This is the legal, social, and policy experiment that 
Canada confronts as it grapples with COVID-19.
1 Coyte, P. & Thavorn, K. 2010. When does an immigrant with HIV represent an excessive demand on Canadian health or social services? Aporia 2(3), 6-17; Mosoff, 
Judith. 1998. “Excessive Demand on the Canadian Conscience: Disability, Family, and Immigration.” Manitoba Law Journal 26 (02):149 – 180; Niles, Chavon A. 2018. 
“Who gets in? The Price of Acceptance in Canada.” Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis 7 (01):148 – 162; Wilton, Robert, Stine Hansen, and Edward Hall. 2017. 
“Disabled People, Medical Inadmissibility, and the Differential Politics of Immigration.” The Canadian Geographer 61 (03):389 - 400.
2 Kaplan Hoffman, Rachel, and Keith Hoffman. 2015. “Ethical Considerations in the Use of Cordons Sanitaires.” Clinical Correlations. Available online at https://www.
clinicalcorrelations.org/2015/02/19/ethical-considerations-in-the-use-of-cordons-sanitaires/
3 Gill, Nick. 2011. “Whose “No Borders”? Achieving Border Liberalization for the Right Reasons.” Refuge 26 (2):107 – 120; Lawlor, Andrea, and Erin Tolley. 2017. 
“Deciding Who’s Legitimate: News Media Framing of Immigrants and Refugees.” International Journal of Communication 11:967 - 991.
4 Cisneros, J. David. 2008. “Contaminated Communities: The Metaphor of “Immigrant as Pollutant” in Media Representations of Immigration.” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 
11 (04):569 – 601; Esses, Victoria M., Stelian Medianu, and Andrea S. Lawson. 2013. “Uncertainty, Threat, and the Role of the Media in Promoting the Dehumanization 
of Immigrants and Refugees.” Journal of Social Issues 69 (3):518-536; Mountz, Alison. 2004. “Embodying the nation-state: Canada’s response to human smuggling.”  
Political Geography 23 (3):323 - 345.
5 Canada Border Services Agency. 2020. “Annual Detention Statistics - 2012-2019” Government of Canada, online:https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/
detent/stat-2012-2019-eng.html
6 Durrani, Tebasum. 2020. “Why immigration holding centres could become COVID-19 hot spots.” Last Modified 30 March, accessed 05 April. https://www.tvo.org/
article/why-immigration-holding-centres-could-become-covid-19-hot-spots.
7 Gros, Hanna, and Samer Muscati. 2020. “Canada’s immigration detainees at higher risk in pandemic.” Last Modified 23 March, accessed 03 April. https://
ottawacitizen.com/opinion/columnists/gros-and-muscati-canadas-immigration-detainees-at-risk-in-pandemic/.s
8 Silverman, Stephanie J. 2018. “Electronically monitoring migrants treats them like criminals.” Last Modified 25 January, accessed 05 May. https://theconversation.
com/electronically-monitoring-migrants-treats-them-like-criminals-90521.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN CANADA
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) Section 55 vests 
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers with the discretionary 
power to detain. The CBSA assists the Ministry of Immigration, Refugees 
and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and the Immigration Division (ID) of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board to make decisions on admissibility. 
CBSA officers can stop migrants for questioning, take breath and blood 
samples, and search, arrest, and detain people without warrants.
During the 2018-19 fiscal year, the CBSA officially detained 8,781 foreign 
nationals, with an average of 342 people detained each day.5 With an 
average time in detention of 13.8 days but a median length of 1 day, we 
can see that some people are detained for extremely long periods. Most 
detention is “back-end” or pre-removal, and takes place in Ontario. 
In 2018-19, 85 per cent of immigration detainees were held because 
they were deemed to be unlikely to appear for an immigration or 
admissibility hearing.6 IRPA S27 empowers ID adjudicators to conduct 
routine hearings to review the grounds for every detention until the 
case is concluded through release or removal from Canada. IRPA S38 
prohibits entrance to immigrants posing dangers or significant financial 
costs to public health.
CBSA detains in its own detention facilities known as immigration 
holding centres (IHCs) as well as in police cells and provincial prisons. 
The IHCs are located near international airports in Toronto, Montreal, 
and a new facility is being constructed near Vancouver. Categorized 
as medium-security facilities, IHCs tend to have poor ventilation, lack 
hygiene products, and provide limited access to medical care.7 Since 
detainees share rooms and eat meals together, it is difficult to socially 
distance in the IHCs. Likewise, despite international rules prohibiting 
“co-mingling”, detainees incarcerated in provincial prisons often share 
the common area, cells, and units with inmates.
In 2016, the Liberal Government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 
pledged $138 million to “transform” the detention estate over five years 
through the so-called National Immigration Detention Framework 
(NIDF). The NIDF has expanded “alternatives to detention” programs, 
including the problematic deployment of electronic ankle shackles and 
biometric voice-recognition check-in systems.8
CANADA: THE CORDON SANITAIRE AND  
THE SHIFTING THREATS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
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A COVID-19 CORDON SANITAIRE?
As of 4 September 2020, there have been 130,744 confirmed cases 
of COVID-19 in Canada, including 9,140 fatalities. There have been 
6,660,999 tests administered. On 21 March 2020, in response to a 
rising transmission rate in Canada (including the infection of the Prime 
Minister’s wife after a trip to London), the Government of Canada 
implemented a restriction on all discretionary travel at the Canada-U.S. 
border. Using emergency powers available under the Quarantine Act9, 
the Government issued two broad-reaching “travel bans” for foreign 
nationals who want to enter Canada. Orders in Council10 require a 14-day 
mandatory self-isolation and quarantine for all persons entering Canada, 
whether citizens or not. There is little to no caselaw and it seems that 
there have never been any court challenges to the Quarantine Act.11
On 17 March 2020, CBSA was officially detaining 353 people across its 
IHCs and in provincial jails. The population of IHC detainees fell quickly 
to 98 people (25 March) then 64 people (1 April) then 30 people (19 
April). As of 19 April, 117 detainees were in provincial jails, corresponding 
with their categorization as “high-risk” detainees. One staff member 
at the Toronto IHC tested positive for COVID-19, and one inmate at a 
federal prison in Laval has died from the disease.12
The Canadian case study shows a willingness to reduce detention 
and acknowledgement that prison health is public health: COVID-19 
endangers not only detainees but also guards and staff, healthcare 
workers, legal advocates, and other visitors who bring droplets in to 
and out of the detention facilities. It is unclear how all of COVID-19 will 
impact longer-term CBSA, IRCC, and ID decision-making on whom to 
detain, and whom to welcome across the cordon sanitaire. Immigration 
processing is slowed, and claims for refugee protection are decreased. 
The IRCC has announced that its offices will not interview refugee 
claimants in person, or process refugee protection claimant document 
renewals.13 Yet, IRCC recently announced an immediate pathway to 
permanent residence for 1,000 refugee claimants employed as essential 
workers.14 Particularly when the country is geographically isolated and 
its government virtually closes the land borders, national focus shifts 
from the cordon sanitaire to the facilities used to contain and “manage” 
immigrant bodies.
DR. STEPHANIE J. SILVERMAN 




11 Mcnab, Aidan, and Sergio Karas. 2020. “The Quarantine Act and other laws governing ports of entry during the COVID-19 pandemic.” Last Modified 28 February, 
accessed 02 September. https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/immigration/the-quarantine-act-and-other-laws-governing-ports-of-entry-during-
the-covid-19-pandemic/326860.
12 CBC News. 2020. “Laval inmate dies after contracting COVID-19 as Quebec prisons deal with outbreaks.” Last Modified 06 Mauy, accessed 01 September.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-laval-inmate-covid19-1.5557590.
13 Government of Canada. 2020. “Coronavirus disease (COVID-19): Refugees, asylum claimants, sponsors and PRRA applicants.” Last Modified 31 July, accessed 02 
September. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/coronavirus-covid19/refugees.html.
14 Harris, Colin. 2020. “Some asylum seekers who cared for patients in pandemic to get permanent residency.” Last Modified 14 August, accessed 18 August.  
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/asylum-seekers-guardian-angels-covid-19-permanent-residency-1.5686176.
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INTRODUCTION
Ethiopia reported its first COVID-19 cases on 13 March 20201. In response, 
the Ethiopian government established a Ministerial Coordination 
Committee and by 8 April, the Prime Minister, Abyi Ahmed, declared a  
5 months state of emergency in accordance with the provisions of Article 
93 of the Federal Constitution2. 
The state of emergency declaration allowed the Ethiopian Government 
to impose lockdown conditions on the population. Hence, as of 16 March 
2020, schools and institutions of higher learning were closed for  
15 days and government employees were directed to work from home. 
In addition, from 20 March all persons entering the country were 
subjected to 14 days mandatory quarantine. Restaurants and night clubs 
were closed, all sporting events were banned and all movement across 
land borders, except for cargo and essential goods, was suspended.3 
Also, the Ethiopian Federal Attorney General issued a release order 
of over 4,000 prisoners including foreigners held on drug trafficking 
charges4 who were ordered to be deported to their countries.5




As part of the response, the 29 August 2020 general elections were 
postponed.6 The postponement has been contested and become  
the source of much political tension within Ethiopia especially since 
Tigray region (North Ethiopia) has decided to hold its own separate 
elections on 9 September 2020.7 As part of a USD 1.6 billion Ethiopia 
emergency response plan, the Ethiopian government introduced a 
specific COVID-19 emergency response with strong support for the 
health sector as well as measures to protect the economy and ensure 
social protection.8
The spread of COVID-19 impacted the lives of many Ethiopians as well 
as refugee populations residing in the country. According to the UNHCR, 
refugees in East African countries “are particularly vulnerable to the 
1 https://qz.com/africa/1818041/coronavirus-kenya-ghana-and-ethiopia-confirmed-first-cases/0
2 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (1995). Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, available at: https://www.refworld.org/
docid/3ae6b5a84.html [accessed 2 September 2020]
3 COMESA. (2020). COVID-19 In COMESA Measures in Place in Member States. Retrieved from https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/covid-19/regional/ 
3264-covid-19-response-measures-in-comesa/file.html
4 https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/ethiopia-release-inmates-curb-coronavirus-spread
5 Ethiopian Monitor. (2020). Ethiopia to Release 4,110 Prisoners Early to Reduce COVID-19 Risk. Ethiopian Monitor. Retrieved from: https://ethiopianmonitor.
com/2020/03/25/ethiopia-to-release-4110-prisoners-early-to-reduce-covid-19-risk/






8 https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/936/summary; African Development Group. (2020). African Economic Outlook 2020 (Supplement) Amid COVID-19. African 
Development Bank. Retrieved from https://t.co/Sb9JAw8GnT?amp=1 




11 UNHCR Ethiopia, 30 April 2020; Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia Tigray and Afar Regions. Situation Update 
12 UNHCR Ethiopia, 03 April,2020; Update on the impact of COVID – 19 on refugees
13 UNHCR Ethiopia, Refugees and Asylum Seekers as of 31 July 2020 
14 UN Human Rights Council. (2020). Human rights situation in Eritrea. A/HRC/44/23. Retrieved from https://eritreahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ 
UN-Special-Rapporteurs-Report-2020.pdf 
15 UNHCR Ethiopia, 30 April 2020; Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia Tigray and Afar Regions. Situation Update UNHCR Ethiopia, 3 April 2020, Update on the Impact  
of COVID-19 on Refugees, Eritrea Hub, Retrieved from https://eritreahub.org/important-statement-from-un-refugee-agency-on-eritreans-in-ethiopia
virus, both in refugee camps and in urban areas” as they have to live “in 
crowded conditions, without adequate access to water and sanitation 
facilities, and with precarious livelihoods and food security”.9 Measures 
adopted to prevent spread of the virus, such as closure of the borders, 
and restrictions of movement, have particularly affected Eritrean 
refugees residing in the North of Ethiopia. Alongside with the movement 
ban, a policy decision ending the prima facie recognition of refugee 
status of Eritreans exacerbated their protection needs.10 
COVID-19 BORDER CLOSURE AND  
THE IMPACT ON ERITREAN REFUGEES 
For the period January to March 2020, UNHCR reported 9,463 new 
asylum seekers from Eritrea and an average of 3,000 new arrivals per 
month in the first quarter of 2020. 11 Already in April 2020, 423 Eritrean 
asylum seekers were held under quarantine in a border reception centre, 
Endabaguna, that has been converted for the purpose.12 
Because of the lockdown measures implemented by the Ethiopian 
government to contain spread of COVID-19, as of 24 March 2020, the 
Administration for Refugees & Returnee Affairs (ARRA) suspended 
refugee reception, registration, and screening activities. Additionally, 
non-governmental organisations put on hold non-health related refugee 
camp activities. In Tigray region, where Eritrean refugees are located, 
the regional state government supplemented the measures of the 
Federal government by imposing a total movement ban.
Following the Ethiopian government’s COVID-19 declaration of 
emergency and lockdown as well as the travel ban imposed by the 
Tigray regional state, UNHCR reports indicate that there were no new 
asylum seekers arriving from Eritrea or any other location. It is only in 
July 2020 that UNHCR reported the arrival of 56 new asylum seekers 
in Ethiopia. 13 However, the un-official cross-border movement remains 
undocumented. As the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in Eritrea, Daniela Kravetz, informed, several unregistered 
recently arrived Eritreans were seen by locals living without shelter and 
support.14 The UNHCR also stated that as of 24 March,15 it has no access 
to the Ethiopia – Eritrea border area (in Tigray region) but that it does 
have access to the Endabaguna quarantine station. However, at present 
there is no public update on the quarantine situation in the border areas.
COVID-19, IN BETWEEN POLICY CHANGE – THE UNCERTAIN 
SITUATION OF ERITREAN REFUGEES IN ETHIOPIA
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ERITREAN REFUGEE STATUS IN ETHIOPIA 
Already prior to the COVID-19 lockdown measures, Eritrean refugees 
and new asylum seekers were experiencing confusion and distress due 
to key policy shifts by the Ethiopian government on the recognition 
modality of their refugee status. For years, the Ethiopian government 
granted all Eritrean asylum seekers prima facie refugee status as a 
group. However, since late January of this year, the Federal government 
started to apply an ‘exclusion criteria’ preventing a large number of 
Eritrean asylum seekers from obtaining recognition as refugees. The 
exclusion criteria includes the following categories: (i) unaccompanied 
and separated minors.16; (ii) persons within the age of conscription 
in Eritrea; (iii) persons who access Ethiopia to seek medical care; (iv) 
persons who have crossed the border on repeated occasions, regardless 
of whether or not they have sought asylum in Ethiopia before; and (v) 
persons wishing to reunite with family members in a third country.17
Though Ethiopia and Eritrea have been engaged in a peace process 
since June 2018, to date there is no evidence that the Eritrean 
government is undertaking any reforms of the policies of national 
service and militarised education that are linked with human rights 
violations and are the major cause of young Eritreans fleeing the 
country.18 Since 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in Eritrea continues to report that in Eritrea “[there is] 
no accountability for continuing and past human rights violations and 
crimes against humanity.”19 In 2019, the Special Rapporteur reported 
that “despite the improved regional climate for peace and security, the 
human rights situation in Eritrea remains unchanged.”20 It is therefore a 
matter of concern that the Ethiopian government changed its open door 
policy toward Eritrean asylum seekers and is now applying exclusion 
criteria without following official procedures, as stipulated in their 
2019 Refugee Proclamation21. The reasons for this policy decision are 
unknown. It is however clear that Eritreans without access to asylum 
procedures are at greater risk to human rights violations, detention, 
exposure to human trafficking and expulsion to Eritrea.
The Ethiopian Government’s decision to end prima facie recognition 
of refugee status of Eritreans in combination with the application of 
the movement and quarantine restrictions, means that newly arrived 
Eritrean asylum seekers (including unaccompanied minors) are at 
greater risk of being detained. The exact practices of immigration 
detention of migrants in Ethiopia are unknown although according to 
the Global Detention Project, “there have been occasional reports of 
16 Human Rights Watch, 21 Aprils 2020; Ethiopia: Unaccompanied Eritrean Children at Risk; https://www.hrw.org/node/341087/printable/print; 
17 Habte Hagos; 28 March 2020; Eritrea Focus – Urgent: Ethiopia adopts new criteria excluding Eritrean Refugees – https://eritreahub.org/urgent-ethiopia-adopts-
new-criteria-excluding-eritrean-refugees
18 Van Reisen, M., & Estefanos, M. (2017). The exodus from Eritrea and who is benefiting. Human Trafficking and Trauma in the Digital Era: The Ongoing Tragedy of 
the Trade in Refugees from Eritrea. Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 95-158.; Van Reisen, M., Saba, M., & Smits, K. (2019). ‘Sons of Isaias’: Slavery and Indefinite 
National Service in Eritrea. Connected and Mobile: Migration and Human Trafficking in Africa.
19 UN Human Rights Council (2018). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea. Retrieved from: https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/38/50 
20 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24721&LangID=E
21 The Federal Democratic Republic Of Ethiopia. (2019). Refugee Proclamation No. 1110/2019. Federal Negarit Gazette. Retrieved from https://hopr.gov.et/
documents/20181/94381/REFUGEES+PROCLAMATION/fc2e0847-ba23-49a5-972b-4e70bd5d34ec?version=1.0
22 The Global Detention Project, 20 August 2020, Ethiopia Immigration Detention Profile, Retrieved from https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/
ethiopia#covid-19-updates 
23 UN Human Rights Council. (2020). Human rights situation in Eritrea. A/HRC/44/23. Retrieved from https://eritreahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ 
UN-Special-Rapporteurs-Report-2020.pdf 
24 Human Rights Watch, 21 Aprils 2020; Ethiopia: Unaccompanied Eritrean Children at Risk; https://www.hrw.org/node/341087/printable/print; Habte Hagos;  
28 March 2020; Eritrea Focus – Urgent: Ethiopia adopts new criteria excluding Eritrean Refugees – https://eritreahub.org/urgent-ethiopia-adopts-new-criteria-
excluding-eritrean-refugees Melicherova, K. (2020). Closure of Hitsats refugee camp in Ethiopia. EEPA. Retrieved from: https://www.eepa.be/?p=3672 
25 Eritrea Focus. (2020). Ethiopia: Open Letter to PM Abiy on closing Refugee Camps for 18,000 Eritreans. Eritrea Hub. Retrieved from: https://eritreahub.org/ethiopia-
open-letter-to-pm-abiy-on-closing-refugee-camps-for-18000-eritreans 
26 UNHCR Ethiopia, 30 April 2020; Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia Tigray and Afar Regions. Situation Update .Human Rights Watch, 21 Aprils 2020; Ethiopia: 
Unaccompanied Eritrean Children at Risk; https://www.hrw.org/node/341087/printable/print;
authorities arresting and deporting migrants as they pass through the 
country”.22 According to Daniela Kravetz, the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, in several cases asylum 
seekers were turned away or told to go back to Eritrea by border and 
immigration staff members.23 Return of people who left Eritrea without 
permission means persecution, detention or imprisonment by the state 
authorities. 
Refusal to register asylum seekers leaves them without access to basic 
services and protection, particularly amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. In 
addition, Eritreans being denied refugee status recognition on a prima 
facie basis in Ethiopia may decide to undertake further secondary 
migration to other countries further afield, hence increasing their 
exposure and vulnerability to COVID-19 and human trafficking. 
PROPOSED CLOSURE OF HITSATS  
REFUGEE CAMP IN TIGRAY, ETHIOPIA
The situation of Eritrean refugees was further jeopardised by the 
decision of the Ethiopian government to close Hitsats refugee 
camp. In March 2020, in the middle of the COVID- 19 pandemic, the 
Administration for Refugees & Returnee Affairs (ARRA) verbally 
informed Hitsast refugees of the directive of the Federal Government to 
close the camp. There was no formal written notice from the Ethiopian 
government. The estimated population of Hitsast refugee camp at the 
time of the notice was 11,000 refugees. There was no prior structural 
preparation either at Hitsats or any of the receiving refugee camps 
in Tigray, all of which are overcrowded, underserviced and are not 
prepared to receive the additional population.24
The proposed closure of Hitsas camp generated protest from the 
refugees in the camp as well as Eritrean Human Rights organisations25 
who engaged in an advocacy campaign with the Ethiopian Prime 
Minister, donors, and regional bodies to highlight the danger of the 
closure of the refugee camp during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
advocacy campaign highlighted that the unprepared mass movement 
of refugees amid the world pandemic is unprecedented and would 
endanger refugees as well as local communities. UNHCR, Eritrean Human 
Rights organisations, as well as other organisations such as Human 
Rights Watch, continue advocacy campaigns against the closure of the 
camp while requesting the Government to respect the rights of refugees 
and asylum seekers and abide by the Principle of do-no-harm.26
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CONCLUSION
As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded in Ethiopia over the past months, 
Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers found themselves caught 
between radical policy changes which brought greater uncertainty 
and concerns and the distress and uncertainty brought about by the 
pandemic. Both the radical policy change and the COVID-19 measures, 
intensified protection risks for Eritreans which exposes them to the 
lack of legal protection in Ethiopia and enhances risk of detention. The 
vulnerability of this population was increased by the application of 
severe and potentially dangerous exclusion criteriaon to the individual 
refugee status determination for Eritreans as well as the suspension 
of reception, registration, and screening of asylum seekers because 
of the COVID-19 lockdown. In addition, the decision to close Hitsats 
refugee camp caused further outrage and frustration among refugees 
residing in the camp. Thus, in the case of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, 
COVID-19 is exposing their ongoing institutional, social, and political 
vulnerabilities, including vulnerabilities to detention.
KRISTINA MELICHEROVA 
PhD candidate at Tilburg University  
The Netherlands and Mekelle University, Ethiopia
MAKEDA SABA 
PhD candidate at Tilburg University  
The Netherlands and Tangaza University College, Kenya
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LEFT IN LIMBO? EUROPE’S STATELESS  
POPULATIONS IN A GLOBAL PANDEMIC
Stateless people we work with often tell us they feel ‘invisible’, like 
they don’t exist. Angela from Azerbaijan, who was detained in the 
Netherlands after being refused asylum and then released into limbo, 
said, “the documents I do have tell me I’m of ‘unknown nationality’. 
Officially I still don’t exist”. Or Farid, from Pakistan, detained in Poland, 
who said: “The waiting is the worst part… it’s like you don’t have any 
control any more… you wait for someone else to tell you who you are  
and what your country is”. 
Working in this area, we repeatedly find that statelessness is ignored, 
misunderstood, and left out of law and policy frameworks, denying 
stateless people basic rights and services. These legal, policy and 
practice gaps can put stateless people at particular risk of immigration 
detention. With no legal route to protection, a residence permit, or 
nationality where they live, and no other country to which they can go, 
stateless people can find themselves stuck in legal limbo. In 2017, the 
work of our members across Europe helped shine a light on the stories 
of many of these men, women, and children like Angela and Farid, who 
are left locked in limbo through no fault of their own.1 
Across Europe, there are more than half a million people living with no 
nationality, with no recourse to the rights and protections that being a 
citizen of somewhere confers. They are members of minority groups, 
refugees, migrants, individuals with hopes, dreams, and aspirations just 
like everyone else. Some have moved across borders; some have always 
lived in the same place while borders have moved around them. Some 
fall victim to gaps or conflicts in nationality laws, and some to deliberate 
policies of deprivation or denial of nationality. Stateless people and 
people at risk of statelessness in Europe have many and different 
aspects to their identities, but all lack a State to turn to in times of crisis.
When European governments started to impose varying degrees 
of lockdowns and states of emergency as COVID-19 cases rose 
dramatically in spring 2020, ENS reached out to our members to find 
out how the pandemic was impacting on their work and the stateless 
people they work with.2 In May, we organised a series of online 
conversations with stateless activists and representatives of affected 
communities across Europe to hear how the pandemic was impacting 
on them and what responses they wanted to see. These discussions 
were worked up into a position paper,3 providing a starting point for 
the views and experiences of people affected by statelessness to be 
prioritised and reflected in decision-making during COID-19 and beyond. 
We continue to work with this group and our wider membership to 
monitor the fast-moving regional picture as we learn more every day 
about how responses to the pandemic are affecting stateless people 
across the region. Our members (over 150 civil society organisations and 
individual experts in 41 European countries), have had to adapt fast to 
be able to continue to provide vital services, juggling working virtually 
with the need to reach the most marginalised populations who may 
have limited access to internet or phones. They have faced the closure 
of competent authorities, procedural delays, disruption of court cases, 
and a reduction in access to the people they support in detention and 
reception centres. They have also faced an impact on their own funds 
and future fundraising opportunities, as well as difficulty getting traction 




4 With the support of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, ENS is currently carrying out a scoping study to improve understanding of the nexus between health rights 
and statelessness to be published in early 2021
At the height of the pandemic in Europe, stateless activists and 
advocates told us that COVID-19 was having a specific social, economic, 
and health impact on them and their communities. Even amidst a 
public health crisis, they told us stateless people continued to face 
barriers to accessing healthcare, an increase in homelessness, and 
loss of income. Access to aid packages is reliant on identification 
documents in some countries, access to education during lockdowns 
is reliant on parents having the language and IT literacy to support 
their children. Immigration and court procedures faced significant 
delays in many countries, and access to lifeline legal advice and 
support was limited. Information on COVID-19 measures and impacts 
was not always translated or accessible to stateless people. Romani 
activists in particular reported an increase in antigypsyism, institutional 
discrimination, racial profiling and racist attacks, as well as the impact 
of increased police powers in some countries being to heighten the risk 
of people being detained or sanctioned for having irregular residence 
status or lacking identification documents.
Concerns about the state response towards people at risk of or held in 
immigration detention during the COVID-19 lockdowns were raised by 
our members in the UK, Sweden, Poland, Malta, France, Bulgaria, and 
Belgium, among others. They condemned the conditions inside places 
of detention during the pandemic, the lack of adequate healthcare 
and personal protective equipment, instances of the use of solitary 
confinement as a COVID-19 ‘prevention’ mechanism, as well as the lack 
of access to legal advice, support services and visits. In the UK, Sweden, 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Spain, it was reported that at 
least some people were released from detention due to COVID-19 
measures, but in some cases our members said people were then not 
provided with adequate support and accommodation, leaving them at 
risk of destitution and homelessness. 
Nonetheless, our members also reported some positive developments. 
As well as releasing people from detention, some other encouraging 
State practices were highlighted, including countries that extended 
residence permits or made it policy to take no punitive action 
against people whose permits expired during the lockdown period 
(e.g. Ukraine, Portugal, Poland). Members in Portugal, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Albania, Ireland, Malta, and Serbia, all reported 
that governments had explicitly increased rights to access public 
services (in some cases only COVID-related services) for stateless 
or undocumented people. In Ireland and Belgium, a firewall to 
prevent health services from sharing information with immigration 
authorities was introduced to facilitate access to healthcare.
The pandemic has exposed the urgent need for European States to  
put in place comprehensive legal and policy frameworks to protect  
and operationalise the rights of stateless people. It has also exposed  
gaps in knowledge and a need for more participatory research to  
understand how stateless people are being impacted, including those 
affected by immigration enforcement and detention policies.4 Whether 
States are willing to recognise it or not, stateless people exist, they  
are here in Europe, and they are calling for their rights to be upheld,  
and to be involved in the development of responses to COVID-19.  
At the same time, a handful of States have demonstrated that 
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positive and inclusive responses to the pandemic are viable 
and beneficial, by extending healthcare, socio-economic, and 
residence rights to marginalised populations, introducing 
firewalls to prevent data-sharing with immigration authorities, 
releasing people from immigration detention, and taking steps 
to guarantee a minimum basic income. If such measures are 
possible during a pandemic, why not in the longer-term too?
NINA MURRAY 
Head of Policy & Research 
European Network on Statelessness
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In this article, we discuss the Hong Kong S.A.R. government’s COVID-19 
response in relation to irregular migrants and asylum seekers. We 
provide a brief background on Hong Kong’s legal and policy framework 
on immigration detention and then go on to highlight the neglect of 
disadvantaged migrants within the Hong Kong government’s response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic. We argue that the pandemic has thrown into 
sharp relief the lack of transparency about immigration detention as well 
as the vulnerabilities of disadvantaged migrant groups in Hong Kong.
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK  
ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION
Hong Kong is a special administrative region of the People’s Republic 
of China with a population of 7.5 million1. As an international financial 
centre and regional travel hub with a liberal visa regime, Hong Kong 
hosts significant numbers of short-term visitors as well as white-collar 
and less privileged migrants2.
Notwithstanding the significant number of migrants transiting through 
or living in Hong Kong in myriad circumstances, Hong Kong has a thin 
policy framework on refugees, forced migration, and human trafficking. 
It is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention3 or the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons4 or the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families5. It is a party to the Convention against 
Torture6 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights7, 
and its obligations under these treaties have prompted the system 
currently in place to evaluate non-refoulement claims by migrants. 
Since 2014, the Hong Kong government has administered the Unified 
Screening Mechanism (‘USM’) for evaluating whether non-refoulement 
claimants would be at risk of torture, persecution, ill-treatment or 
arbitrary deprivation of life if returned to their countries of origin8.
1 Census and Statistics Department, Government of the Hong Kong S.A.R. Available at https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20.jsp.
2 Government of the Hong Kong S.A.R., The Facts: Immigration. Available at https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/immigration.pdf.
3 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, 137. 
4 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, G.A. res. 55/25, annex II, 55 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol.I) (2001).
5 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 18 December 1990, A/RES/45/158,
6 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1465, 85.
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, 171.
8 Immigration Department, Government of the Hong Kong S.A.R. Notice to Persons Making Non-refoulement Claims. Available at https://www.immd.gov.hk/pdf/
notice_non-refoulement_claim_en.pdf. This reform was put in place as the result of a series of judicial review decisions.
9 This includes 17,777 cases determined by the Immigration Department at first instance and 13747 cases determined by the Torture Claims Appeal Board on appeal 
since April 2014. Sources for these statistics include: Secretary for Security, ‘LCQ9: Non-refoulement claims’ (20 May 2020). Available at: https://www.info.gov.hk/
gia/general/202005/20/P2020052000659.htm; Immigration Department, “Statistics on Non-refoulement Claim”. Available at: https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/
facts/enforcement.html; and email reply to Justice Centre Hong Kong’s access to information request from the Security Bureau dated 13 August 2020.
10 Immigration Department, “Statistics on Non-refoulement Claim”.
11 UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=VDc5; Home Office, United Kingdom, ‘How many people do we grant 
asylum or protection to?’, 21 May 2020 (asylum grant rate of 54% in the year ending March 2020). Available at https://tinyurl.com/y3nmfe8j. 
12 Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115).
13 See for example, Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115) Sections 19(1), 26, 27, 42, and 53(1A)(b).
14 This observation is based upon Justice Centre’s experience advising vulnerable migrants, anecdotal feedback from immigration lawyers, as well as publicly 
available information on legal proceedings. See also the government’s recent observations in this regard, available at https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/press/press-
releases/20200813.html.
15 Government of Hong Kong, The Facts: Immigration. Available at https://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/immigration.pdf.
16 Immigration Department, Government of HKSAR, ‘Appendix 13 – Enforcement Branch Statistics’ in Annual Report 2016 (Government of HKSAR 2016). Available 
at https://www.immd.gov.hk/publications/a_report_2016/en/appendices-13.html; Immigration Department, Government of HKSAR, ‘Response to Justice Centre 
request under the Code on Access to Information’. Available at https://accessinfo.hk/en/request/immigration_detention. 
17 Hong Kong Correctional Services website.
The USM process is protracted and the rate of success extremely low. 
Between the USM’s commencement in March 2014 to June 2020, 
only 192 out of 31,524 cases have been substantiated; this means the 
substantiation rate under the USM is 0.6 percent9. The top five countries 
of origin for substantiated claimants are Pakistan, Yemen, Rwanda, 
Egypt and Sri Lanka10. By way of comparison, the rate of substantiation 
for asylum claims ranges from 25 to 60 percent in many high-income 
countries11. While awaiting the outcome of their claims, protection 
claimants receive a subsistence allowance and limited access to public 
services, but are barred from working. This extended, indeterminate 
precariousness means that some protection claimants might end up 
working informally in order to support their families, pay for healthcare 
or meet other expenses.
Such individuals, along with other low-income migrants who breach 
immigration rules, risk detention within Hong Kong’s stringent 
immigration detention regime. The Immigration Ordinance (Cap 
115)12 specifies a number of criminal offences related to breaching 
immigration rules and grants immigration and police officials wide 
powers of detention13. It is important to note that immigration detention 
in Hong Kong is purely administrative and is not automatically subject to 
judicial scrutiny. An individual seeking to contest the decision to detain 
them would need to apply to the High Court for habeas corpus. Most 
detainees face formidable economic and linguistic barriers in applying 
for habeas corpus. Experience so far suggests that even the few who 
manage to apply are very unlikely to secure a decision in their favour14.
Official figures indicate that 10,053 people were detained in 201915. The 
number of detainees hovered between 10,000 and 11,000 between 
2014 to 201616. This is comparable to (and in some years higher than) 
the number of prison inmates in Hong Kong in the same year17. Despite 
these high numbers, the immigration detention system in Hong Kong 
is startlingly opaque. There is very little publicly available information 
about the detainee population, detention conditions, and rates and 
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conditions of bail and deportation18. Further, the detention regime in 
Hong Kong lacks a robust external monitoring mechanism19.
Refugees, asylum seekers and forced migrants are particularly 
vulnerable to immigration detention under the Immigration Ordinance’s 
wide powers. For example, they may have entered Hong Kong illegally 
or travelled with forged identification documents. Notably, asylum 
seekers can only commence their USM claims when they are subject 
or liable to removal from Hong Kong20. This means people wanting 
to seek asylum must first overstay their visas, thereby committing an 
immigration offence, which increases their likelihood of being detained. 
As of 31 May 2020, at least 79 out of the 399 detainees at the Castle 
Peak Bay Immigration Centre (CIC), which is the major detention facility, 
were asylum seekers21.
As we discuss below, the COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced even 
further the need for greater disclosure and monitoring in relation to 
immigration detention.
THE RESPONSE TO COVID-19
Since the first confirmed case of COVID-19 was reported on 23 January 
2020, the Hong Kong government’s response to the pandemic has 
been generally agile and successful. The number of confirmed cases 
and deaths remained relatively low: as of 9 September 2020, there are 
4,896 confirmed cases and 99 deaths22. Despite this, the Government 
has taken no concerted efforts to ensure the safety of refugees, asylum 
seekers and other vulnerable migrants amid the pandemic. While at 
the time of writing no major outbreaks have been reported in these 
communities, two detainees at the CIC tested positive for COVID-19 in 
mid-August and early September23.
Civil society groups have long expressed concerns about the 
substandard conditions at immigration detention centres, including 
poor hygiene, crowded environments and lack of access to healthcare24. 
The contribution by the CIC Concern Group in this volume highlights 
the urgent need for transparency about conditions in detention25. 
18 See, for example, the official reply to access to information requests in this regard: https://accessinfo.hk/en/request/immigration_detention_
informatio#incoming-1324 and https://accessinfo.hk/en/request/immigration_detention_2#incoming-1323.
19 Justices of the Peace are permitted to visit immigration detention centres, but there is little public information about the nature or findings of these visits.
20 Immigration Ordinance, Section 37W(1). 
21 Immigration Department, Statistics on immigration detention: 2014-2019, 5 June 2020. Available at: https://accessinfo.hk/en/request/statistics_on_immigration_
detent#incoming-1384. At the time of writing we are unable to confirm whether the figure provided by the Immigration Department includes asylum seekers who 
have filed judicial review challenges against rejections of their asylum claims. 
22 Government of the Hong Kong S.A.R. “Covid-19 Situation Dashboard”. Available at: https://chp-dashboard.geodata.gov.hk/covid-19/en.html. 
23 Immigration Department, “A person transferred from Pik Uk Prison to Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre for detention tests positive for Covid-19”. 6 September 
2020. Available at: https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/press/press-releases/20200906.html; Immigration Department, “A detainee detained at Castle Peak Bay 
Immigration Centre tested positive for Covid-19”. 19 August 2020. Available at: https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/press/press-releases/20200819b.html. 
24 Westbrook, Laura, “Coronavirus: Hong Kong lawyers, lawmakers flag hygiene issues at detention centre, but Immigration says health measures in place”  
South China Morning Post, 16 April 2020. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/health-environment/article/3081544/coronavirus-hong-kong-
lawyers-lawmakers-flag and Cheng, Olivia 鄭祉愉, “Hong Kong’s Refugees: The Invisible Wall 看不見的難民” Ming Pao Weekly 明報周刊Volume 2517, 4 February 
2017 (In Chinese).
25 ‘Immigration detainees on weeks-long hunger strike’, RTHK, 20 July 2020, Available at https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1538868-20200720.htm.
26 See Grange, Mariette & Mazcher, Izabella, ‘Immigration Detention under International Human Rights Law: The Legal Framework and the Litmus Test of Human Rights 
Treaty Body Monitoring’ in Flynn, Michael J. & Flynn, Matthew. Challenging Immigration Detention: Academics, Activists and Policy-makers. Edward Elgar 2017, 269-
271.
27 R v Governor of Durham Prison, ex p Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704, affirmed by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Ghulam Rbani v Director of Immigration 
(2014) 17 HKCFAR 138.
28 Secretary for Security, “LCQ12: Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre”, 17 June 2020. Available at: https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202006/17/P2020061700461.
htm.
29 Recognizance is similar to bail or bond except that it is granted by an immigration or police officer, and there is no judicial oversight of this process. See Immigration 
Ordinance, Section 36. “Fernando Cheung et al. meet with Immigration to discuss CIC Hunger Strike, criticises the Immigration for exercising wide powers without 
transparency 青山灣羈留者絕食抗議一個月　張超雄等晤入境處　斥權力過大欠透明” Stand News立場新聞 , 28 July 2020 (In Chinese). Available at: https://bit.
ly/3klxTZw. 
30 Immigration Ordinance, Section 36.
Regrettably, the Immigration Department has provided little information 
on measures taken to monitor and mitigate the impact of COVID-19 
in detention facilities. The lack of effective complaints and monitoring 
mechanisms means that independent scrutiny is not possible.
In contrast to some other immigration regimes, Hong Kong does 
not have detailed operational guidelines on identifying individuals 
unsuitable for detention. This means the needs of people suffering from 
injury, trauma or other health conditions might not be appropriately 
recognised. The risks attendant upon this are heightened during the 
current pandemic. It is, of course, vital to identify and protect individuals 
who might be immunocompromised in any way. In addition, it is also 
important to recognise and address that the well-documented mental 
health toll of the pandemic is likely to be intensified by custodialisation. 
Thus far, it is unclear if the immigration authorities in Hong Kong have 
implemented safeguards in this regard.
Moreover, it is also unclear whether the Government has reviewed its 
immigration detention policies in relation to detention thresholds and 
duration during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ongoing border closures and 
interruption to international flights create the risk of extended periods 
of detention. International law as well as common law principles prohibit 
disproportionate periods of immigration detention26. For example, 
Hardial Singh establishes that immigration detention beyond short 
periods is only justifiable where there is a prospect of removal within a 
reasonable time 27. The Immigration Department has confirmed that, as 
at June 2020, 70 detainees at the CIC are asylum seekers with rejected 
claims who are pending removal28. While there are reports that some 
detainees have since been released on recognizance29, the lack of a 
transparent review mechanism makes it difficult to ensure individuals 
are not subject to potentially arbitrary detention.
People who are released on recognizance in lieu of detention are 
required to regularly report to the authorities in person30. The need to 
travel – often considerable distances and on public transport – for the 
purposes of reporting puts people at risk and is against the public health 
advice to stay at home and practice social distancing. Upon enquiry, 
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the Immigration Department stated that it has arranged to temporarily 
relax the reporting frequency of recognizance form holders to not more 
than once every eight weeks since 13 February 202031. However, reports 
from affected individuals suggest this measure was not communicated 
clearly to them, and many are left confused about their reporting 
requirements32.
Immigration detention aside, refugees, asylum seekers and forced 
migrants have been largely excluded from the Government’s social 
security response. Crucially, these communities face significant barriers 
in accessing healthcare. Refugees and asylum seekers are not eligible 
to access public health facilities at a subsidised price. While they may 
apply for medical fee waivers, most are unaware of this mechanism as 
there is a lack of information about its availability. People with insecure 
immigration status, such as asylum seekers who are unable to register 
their USM claims or victims of trafficking who may have entered Hong 
Kong illegally, are further disincentivised from seeking medical care 
for fear of legal ramifications and costs. Adding to these concerns 
are language and cultural differences, as well as poor health literacy. 
Overall, there is no clear information on how refugees, asylum seekers 
and irregular migrants can safely access medical services if they 
develop COVID-19 symptoms.
Law and policy in relation to refugees, asylum seekers and other 
vulnerable migrants in Hong Kong continues to have significant gaps. 
Systemic shortfalls in relation to the rights and welfare of vulnerable 
migrants in ordinary times have been exacerbated under the 
extraordinary circumstances of a global pandemic.
SURABHI CHOPRA 
Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong
RACHEL LI 
Justice Centre Hong Kong
31 Letter from the Security Bureau to the Refugee Concern Network, 22 May 2020.
32 Based upon feedback from non-refoulement claimants received by Justice Centre Hong Kong staff. 
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Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region located at the edge 
of Southern China, with a dense population of 7.5 million. It is home 
to 530,000 ethnic minorities from the Philippines, Indonesia, India, 
Nepal and other Asian countries1. Given its proximity to China, the city 
experienced the first wave of COVID-19 outbreak as early as 23 January 
2020, and there were over 4,800 confirmed cases by 4 September 2020.
People without right of abode in Hong Kong, such as overstayers, ‘illegal 
workers’ and prisoners with foreign nationalities who had finished 
their sentences, were detained in CIC, i.e. Castle Peak Bay Immigration 
Centre. Usually around 200-400 were detained at a given time. Some 
were soon released on recognizance paper and received a minimal 
monthly subsidy to survive in the city. Some remained in CIC, awaiting 
deportation back to their country of origin or the result of their non-
refoulement claim (a.k.a. torture claim2) applications or appeals; either 
way they could be detained for prolonged periods of time, as there 
was no clearly defined ‘jail term’ in CIC. The authorities justified some 
unusually long detentions by the detainees’ supposed threat to public 
order or high chance of abscondment3.
Since 29 June 2020, a peak of 28 male CIC detainees from India, 
Pakistan, Nigeria, Zambia and Benin took part in an indefinite hunger 
strike. They protested against being detained indefinitely, some for over 
5 months and even up to 2 years, with no end in sight. 11 strikers entered 
their 70th day of hunger strike on 7 September. 15 female detainees 
reportedly conducted a brief hunger strike in solidarity in August as well.
Hunger strikes have unfortunately been common among desperate 
detainees. Prolonged detention, without meaningful activity or 
work and no contact with sunlight, has been physically and mentally 
torturous. Many reported that ‘CIC is worse than prison’. In addition, 
detainees reported appalling hygiene conditions, with frequently 
blocked toilets and showers, swarms of rats and cockroaches, crowded 
common areas, shared buckets of drinking water, no place to dry 
clothes, and poor ventilation.
A newly admitted detainee was tested positive for COVID-19 on 
18 August 2020, another on 5 September. The cases reflected the 
vulnerability of detainees in times of a pandemic. This article will detail 
the threats posed by COVID-19 to detainees, and the ground-breaking 
actions taken by a civil society initiative, CIC Detainees’ Right Concern 
Group, as well as their impacts.
HOW COVID-19 THREATENED CIC DETAINEES
The lack of proper outbreak-prevention policies in CIC was exposed 
when a confirmed case was publicised. On 16 August 2020, a Thai 
overstayer, alongside 3 other new entrants, was separated from most 
detainees in an ‘isolation cell’. He was identified as COVID-19 positive on 
18 August and taken to the hospital4. However, detainees reported that 
officers who handled his detention moved freely around CIC before the 
1 There were also around 60,000 people categorised as ‘white’. Source: Census and Statistics Department of HKSAR Government. ‘Hong Kong 2016 Population  
By-census – Thematic Report: Ethnic Minorities’. Retrieved from https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp459.jsp?productCode=B1120100 (3 Sep 2020)
2 Hong Kong did not sign the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, so recognised UN refugees can only await relocation to a third country.
3 See Immigration Department of HKSAR Government (2012, Dec), ‘Policy for detention pending final determination of the claimant’s torture claim’, Retrieved from 
https://www.immd.gov.hk/pdf/Detention_policy_en.pdf (3 Sep 2020)
4 Immigration Department (2020, August 19), ‘A detainee detained at Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre tested positive for COVID-19 19 August 2020’. Retrieved 
from https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/press/press-releases/20200819b.html (3 Sep 2020)
5 Immigration Department (2020, September 6), ‘A person transferred from Pik Uk Prison to Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre for detention tests positive for 
COVID-19’. Retrieved from https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/press/press-releases/20200906.html (11 Sep 2020)
discovery. It was mere luck that a full-blown outbreak did not follow. All 
detainees were asked to conduct a COVID-19 test the next day.
CIC concern group volunteer witnessed staff in full protective gear 
coming in and out of CIC on 19 August 2020
A second COVID-19-positive case, a 22-year-old Thai male transferred 
from Pik Uk Prison to CIC for detention, emerged on 5 September5. In 
particular, this detainee used to work in the Prison’s Laundry Workshop 
Complex that served the city’s public hospitals. The next morning, the 
CIC Concern Group discovered that all visits to CIC had been suspended 
until further notice.
The CIC concern group only discovered that all visits to CIC had been 
suspended until further notice on 6 September 2020, outside the gates 
of CIC.
ORGANISING FOR CHANGE: HOW WE SUPPORTED COVID-19 – 
STRUCK AND HUNGER STRIKING DETAINEES IN HONG KONG
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From their phone calls to the Group, detainees expressed that 
uncertainty about their own and one another’s health and future had 
been a great source of stress. One of them reported that all detainees 
were immediately tested for COVID-19, while around 30 close contacts 
to the confirmed case simply ‘disappeared’ for isolation purposes.
Moreover, detainees reported a lack of protective gear and sanitation 
products in CIC. A detainee who was transferred from prison in early 
2020 recounted not being allowed to bring his own facial masks along 
and that it took a week-long collective complaint by detainees in April 
– when the second-wave outbreak in the city started to wane – for CIC 
to start supplying facial masks once a day. There was also no supply of 
alcohol gel and wet tissues for disinfection. Detainees relied on handouts 
from visitors (only if they had any). Only 3 packs of wet tissues – 10 pieces 
each – were allowed monthly. Many of them complained that banning 
visits meant they were denied even daily essentials like soap and clothes.
It is easy to overlook that the stoppage of international flights also 
unfairly extended detainees’ period of detention. Since 6 September 
2020, detainees reported that several people had their planned 
deportation that week suddenly delayed until further notice. Ex-
detainees surveyed by the CIC Concern Group in May 2020 reported 
that groups of 40-50 Thai and groups of mainland Chinese were unable 
to get deported for months, which led to severe overcrowding in the 
facilities. According to the Immigration Department, until 15 June 2020, 
around 35 CIC detainees were awaiting international flights6.
Some detainees, including migrant domestic workers fired due to the 
pandemic, explained that they were detained precisely because their 
country went into lockdown, such that they were forced to overstay, 
being unable to return. Even though the authorities detain on the basis 
that they can deport within a reasonable timeframe, in practice they 
could not do so and detention became prolonged. In light of this, Human 
right lawyers the Group consulted in private said that the pandemic 
arguably constituted a reason for the release of detainees.
CIC CONCERN GROUP TO  
AMPLIFY DETAINEES’ VOICES
CIC Detainees’ Rights Concern Group is a voluntary alliance formed by 
friends of Yuli Riswati, an Indonesian migrant worker who was unjustly 
detained in CIC in November 20197. Since then, the Concern Group 
actively engaged ex-detainees, detainees’ visitors, local lawmakers, 
human rights lawyers and NGOs, the media and volunteers. The group 
conducted surveys outside CIC since May 2020, gathered ex-detainees 
and exposed inhumane detention conditions publicly.
Public awareness and media attention surged further after the Group 
publicised the hunger strike on its second day and staged small-scale 
protests on the 7th and 17th day of strike, despite the government’s 
restrictions on outdoor group gatherings of over 4 and later 2 people. 
Father Franco Mella, a seasoned activist who had supported migrants’ 
rights in Hong Kong for decades, staged a 50-hour hunger strike in 
solidarity in mid-August. Solidarity action outside CIC – visible to 
detainees through their windows – were also staged intermittently, 
which helped boosting the morale of detainees.
6 Immigration Department of the HKSAR Government (2020, Jun 29). Letter in reply to legislator Shiu Ka-chun (in Chinese). Reference: L/M (5) in ImmD CIC/
OPS/4/12(C) Pt.1
7 See (2020, July 13), ‘Violent Strip Search, Denied Medication – Former Detainees Speak Out against Abuse in Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre’. Stand News. 
Retrieved from https://www.thestandnews.com/society/violent-strip-search-denied-medication-former-detainees-speak-out-against-abuse-in-castle-peak-bay-
immigration-centre/ (3 Sep 2020)
8am (6 September 2020) Sunday Protest with Franco Mella’s singing for 
all detainees in CIC. The protest lasted for an hour, and detainees waved 
towels outside the bars and shouted ‘Freedom now’ back throughout.
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The Group also began visiting hunger strikers frequently and built a 
trusted relationship with them, and their families and friends. Thus, 
timely updates were received.
AUTHORITIES IN DENIAL –  
BUT RESPONDING SLUGGISHLY
Given intense pressure from the public and hunger strikers, top 
Immigration Department officials invited the Group and lawmakers to 
meet on 28 July and 9 August 2020. They reported that each striker’s 
case had been reviewed by the department Director, and four of the 
28 strikers had been released. Yet, they denied charges of indefinite 
detention and abuse by officers, and offered poor explanations for the 
long-deficient hygiene and medical conditions.
When pressed about the unjustifiable practice of detention during 
the pandemic, the Department replied that their communication with 
consulates for identity documents and flight arrangements, as well as 
successful deportation of isolated detainees continued, so the pandemic 
did not pose a significant obstacle to the deportation process. The 
group disagreed and later made urgent appeals to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
On 12 August, the Immigration Department issued an unusually strong-
worded statement, denying the existence of indefinite detention at all8. 
Despite this hardened stance, there seem to be changes inside CIC due 
to intense civil society monitoring: some detainees reported receiving 
more active reviews of the grounds for their detention.
CIC Concern Group believes that civil society initiatives can play 
the simple yet important role of addressing the huge information 
asymmetry that exist regarding immigration detention situation, 
especially during COVID-19. Detainees need reliable sources of 
support for basic material and legal needs, and channels to make 
their complaints heard. Citizens need to be informed about the way 
their government treats detainees discreetly. By persistently doing 
these simple things while building stronger grassroot and civil society 
alliances, we can make a difference.
ANNA TSUI 
Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre Detainees’ Rights Concern Group
8 HKSAR Government (2020, Aug 12), ‘Immigration Department strongly condemns unfounded allegations against Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre by online 
media’. Retrieved from https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202008/13/P2020081300599.htm?fontSize=1 (3 Sep 2020)
8am (6 September 2020) Sunday Protest. The protest lasted for an hour, 
and detainees waved towels outside the bars and shouted ‘Freedom 
now’ back throughout.
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INTRODUCTION
As of early September 2020, India recorded the world’s second-highest 
COVID-19 cases after the United States. The latest figures indicate that 
the subcontinent has over 5.6 million1 cases, with an average of 80,000 
new cases being recorded every day. When the pandemic first hit the 
subcontinent in early March 2020, the government imposed one of the 
strictest and longest lockdowns in the world, which continued until the 
end of May 2020 with very few relaxations. In mid-March, the Supreme 
Court directed States to set up ‘High Powered Committees’ to consider 
releasing prisoners facing a maximum sentence of up to seven years on 
bail and parole. This was in acknowledgement of the fact that prisons in 
particular could potentially become hotspots for the spread of the virus 
owing to overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, and lack of medical 
facilities. The Supreme Court also relaxed the conditions for their 
release, stating that detainees would only have to furnish a bond of  
Rs 5,000 (USD 67) with two sureties. 
In April 2020, the Supreme Court further directed the government 
to release “illegal foreigners” who have been under detention for 
over two years in the State of Assam (a North-Eastern State of India), 
an epicentre for immigration detentions in India. Releases would be 
conditional on detainees recording their biometrics and fingerprints, 
and reporting periodically at the nearest police station. The court also 
reduced the surety (or bail) amount to Rs 5000 (USD 67) from Rs 
100,000 (USD 1360). Despite the circumstances that compelled the 
Court to issue the directive, it has been widely welcomed by human 
rights activists and is considered a positive step towards reforming 
immigration detention practices in India. 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN INDIA
In the Indian context, “illegal foreigner” detainees often include refugees 
(who are yet to access the asylum process for a formal determination 
of their legal status) and/or survivors of trafficking who are subject to 
indefinite detention without access to asylum systems or humanitarian 
protections under domestic and international laws. India has a strong 
track record of hosting refugees, particularly in light of its assistance 
to Tibetan and Sri Lankan refugees, however, it does not have a law 
for asylum management. In fact, the law does not recognise refugees 
as a separate category of foreigners who are in need of international 
protection. Therefore, they invariably fall within the purview of the 1946 
Foreigners Act and the 1967 Passport Act that allow the State wide 
powers to arrest a “foreigner” (defined as a non-citizen) for illegal entry 
or prolonged stay. In light of this, refugees in India are at a heightened 
risk of being subject to detention and deportation with very limited 
avenues to access justice systems. Typically, the sentences in such cases 
is detention for up to five years and/or a fine. The only relief in such 
cases has come through the courts which, through judicial activism, 
have treated refugees as a distinct group in need of asylum and have 
upheld the principle of non-refoulement.2
1 Coronavirus Cases in India, World O Meter, available at: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/india/ (accessed as on September 23, 2020). 
2 Non-refoulement is a customary international law principle that guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm. 
3 See, Article 9 of the United Nations International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which India has signed and ratified. 
4 Defending Human Rights in Courts and Beyond, November 28, 2019, available at: https://cjp.org.in/ambiguous-guidelines-for-model-detention-camps-raise-
questions/ (accessed on September 23, 2020). 
In India, immigration detention is not different from criminal detention, 
since immigration violations are treated as criminal acts. In effect, 
immigration detainees are often kept in regular prisons, which is a 
violation of their rights under international law.3 Under domestic law, 
migration-related detention can either be custodial or administrative. 
The former is used as a measure to secure appearance before a judicial 
body for the purposes of criminal prosecution. The latter is used in 
cases involving unidentified aliens/foreigners who are residing illegally 
in the country, as a measure prior to deportation. Over the years, courts 
in India have made attempts to ensure that detainees have access to 
basic constitutional protections, particularly those enshrined under 
Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) which includes right to live 
with human dignity, access to medical facilities, a fair trial and legal aid 
through court orders. With these directives, detainees in theory would 
also have protection against torture and ill-treatment while in custody, 
and the right to bail during the pendency of their appeal. 
With regard to administrative detention centres, on January 2019, 
the Indian government released the Model Detention Centre Manual 
that requires States to ensure basic standards of protection, which 
includes access to essential services, medical facilities, and other 
adequate infrastructure. However, despite these guidelines, a number 
of administrative detention centres are still operated out of makeshift 
facilities within local prisons and there have also been reports of 
death of detainees due to poor living conditions and lack of adequate 
infrastructure.4 Further, due to the unavailability of timely, quality 
legal aid, poor mechanisms to review detainee’s legal status, as well 
as an inability to carry out deportations to home countries, several 
immigration detainees languish in detention centres for indefinite 
periods of time.  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Over the years, the situation has worsened with the introduction 
of ad hoc executive policies pertaining to refugee management 
and citizenship. In 2017, the government issued an executive order 
directing all enforcement authorities across the country to detect, 
detain, and deport refugees originating from the Rakhine State of 
Myanmar. This was followed by the drive to implement the National 
Register for Citizenship (NRC) policy in Assam which aims to 
document legal citizens of India and identify, detain and deport 
“illegal migrants”. Large immigration detention camps have been 
set up across India to detain those who were unable to prove their 
Indian citizenship. As of January 2020, a total of ten immigration 
detention centres are operational in the country, out of which 
six are in Assam. Latest media reports indicate that more such 
centres are likely to come up in Assam, Punjab, and Karnataka. 
INDIA: IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION
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In December 2019, India witnessed public outrage and large scale 
protests over the implementation of the NRC and a controversial 
citizenship law (that allows all non-Muslim religious minority groups 
from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan to acquire citizenship), both 
of which are widely regarded as being unconstitutional and against 
India’s secular values. These developments have made immigration 
detention one of the most pressing political issues in the country. 
As mentioned, with the advent of the global pandemic, the situation 
escalated further as thousands of immigration detainees, who had been 
kept in detention centres indefinitely without access to legal remedies, 
were at a heightened risk of infection.
CONCLUSION
Latest data5 indicates that since March 2020, over 8,500 COVID-19 
cases have been detected within various prison facilities across India. 
India has over 1,401 prisons in the country, which, according to 2018 
National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data, were packed with around 
450,000 people, nearly 60,000 over the sanctioned capacity. Following 
the Supreme Court directives, over 61,000 detainees have been 
released, of which over 350 are foreigners from immigration detention 
centres in Assam.6 Following their release, all detainees were required to 
undergo a COVID-19 test and a mandatory 14-day quarantine. In light of 
the spike in COVID-19 cases across the country, State governments and 
courts have also started extending the interim bail of those released, 
to prevent the possible spread of the virus by those returning to jail 
after the expiry of their bail or parole period. For example, in August 
2020, the Delhi High Court extended the interim bail of 2,901 undertrial 
prisoners by 45 days to de-congest jails. 
With regard to foreign detainees, reports indicate that there are still 
nearly 500 inmates who remain in the detention centres in Assam. 
While, it is not clear as to why they were not eligible for release based 
on the court’s directive, it can be inferred that this group would include 
detainees who were unable to pay the surety amount or had not served 
two years in detention. While the decision to release some categories of 
detainees to prevent congestion in prisons is a welcomed move, it is still 
a reactive and a temporary measure. There is no clarity on the status of 
the released detainees. Will they face re-detention once the pandemic 
is in control? What will happen to detainees who have served their full 
sentence? What will be their legal status in India? 
5 State Wise Prison Response to COVID 19 Pandemic in India, available at: https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/content/stateut-wise-prisons-response-to-covid-19-
pandemic-in-india (accessed on September 23, 2020). 
6 Assam: 350 detention camp inmates released on bail during Covid-19 pandemic, says Centre, New Indian Express, September 21, 2020, available at:  
https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2020/sep/21/assam-350detention-campinmates-released-on-bail-during-covid-19-pandemic-sayscentre- 
2200003.html (accessed on September 23, 2020). 
7 1.29 lakh people declared foreigners in Assam, 6 deported: Govt, The Hindustan Times, December 10, 2020, available at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/1-29-lakh-people-declared-foreigners-in-assam-only-6-deported-govt/story-M3sMhUjODQfwd4y4SughrN.html (accessed on September 23, 2020). 
As per data from October 2019, there are nearly 130,0007 “illegal 
foreigners” in India with minimal chance of repatriation. In light of this, 
we need long term solutions for the management of this group which 
is in line with India’s constitutional and democratic ethos. The courts 
have to step in to de-legitimise the practice of indefinite detention of 
individuals created by the current legal lacunae. Further, the courts 
should also issue uniform guidelines for the protection of vulnerable 
groups like refugees, survivors of trafficking and other persecuted 
groups by ensuring that there are systems in place to process their 
asylum claims, provide legal representation, issue legal documentation, 
and facilitate access to protection services. With respect to the current 
pandemic, there has to be clarity on the legal procedure that will be 
followed for those who have been released and those still in detention, 
once the situation normalises. 
ROSHNI SHANKER 
Founder and Executive Director 
Migration and Asylum Project (M.A.P)
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COVID-19 IN INDONESIA
Indonesia has been witnessing a steady, if not rapid, increase in 
COVID-19 cases since March 2020. By mid-September, the additional 
number of cases reached an all-time high, hovering above 3,800 new 
cases daily. Indonesia’s struggle with COVID-19 has been criticized due 
to the low rate of testing and lack of contact tracing, raising suspicions 
of under-reported cases and contagions.1 The inadequacy in testing and 
contact tracing is combined with a relatively low number of healthcare 
facilities and professionals.2 As of September 2020, COVID-19 patients 
are filling up 80% of Jakarta’s hospital beds and, with the current rate, 
will possibly exceed the city’s capacity.3
On the other hand, the government has been swaying in implementing 
preventive policies due to their adverse economic impact. After 
implementing large-scale social distancing (Pembatasan Sosial Berskala 
Besar/PSBB) to contain the virus’ spread at the end of March, the 
government introduced the ‘New Normal’ policies to return activities 
back to as much as they were before the pandemic.4 However, 
on 14 September 2020, a surge of cases after the ‘New Normal’ 
implementation pushed the Jakarta municipal government to close the 
city back into a lockdown.5
IMMIGRATION POLICIES DURING COVID-19
Since Indonesia enacted a COVID-19 emergency in March 2020, the 
immigration authority has been taking special measures to curb, 
monitor, and control people’s movements across the border. The earliest 
COVID-19 related measure can be traced back to early February where 
the Director General of Immigration circulated a direction to limit 
the visa issuance for visitors from COVID-19 impacted regions.6 The 
Immigration Directorate gradually adjusted their policies in congruity 
with the national direction.
The Immigration Directorate’s COVID-19 concerns not only lie with the 
movement of people but also the immigration detention centers under 
their purview. Overall, Indonesia has acknowledged the risks within 
detention facilities and went as far as releasing tens of thousands of 
petty crime offenders to avoid the risk of contagion in prison. 7 However, 









6 Directorate General of Immigration instruction no. IMI-0954.GR.01.01, 5 February 2020
7 https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-releases-30000-prisoners-as-covid19-cases-double-in-a-week
8 UNHCR (2014). Beyond detention: a global strategy to support governments to end the detention of asylum-seekers and refugees; Missbach, A. (2017). 
Accommodating Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Indonesia: From Immigration Detention to Containment in “Alternatives to Detention”. Refuge: Canada’s Journal 
on Refugees, 33(2), 32-44.
9 Directorate General of Immigration instruction no. IMI-UM.01.01-2827, 30 July 2018
10 30 people (June 2019) eight people (June 2020), UNHCR Indonesia Monthly Data
11 SUAKA received two reports in 2020 from people of Jordan and Syria origin that directly referred to and handled by UNHCR.
12 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/09/300-rohingya-ashore-aceh-months-sea-200907051150987.html
13 https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/largest-rohingya-group-arrive-indonesia-2015-receives-support-north-aceh




In the case of refugees and asylum seekers, immigration detention 
has been relatively less of a concern. The campaign on alternatives to 
immigration detention for asylum seekers gained traction in Indonesia 
by 2017.8 The Director General of Immigration further reaffirmed this 
direction by guiding detention centers to divert refugees to temporary 
shelters allocated by local governments.9 Over the years, Indonesia 
has been observing a lower number of asylum seekers and refugees in 
detention centres. As of June 2020, less than one percent (eight people) 
of the overall refugee population in Indonesia remain detained.10 It 
should be noted that while the number of asylum seekers and refugees 
in immigration detention centers is fairly low, SUAKA received several 
reports of asylum seekers being held at the international zone in 
Soekarno-Hatta international airport.11
ALTERNATIVE TO DETENTION  
AND ASYLUM SEEKERS
During the pandemic, the Indonesian government, International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR are confronted with the 
reality that living conditions in the alternatives to detention are still far 
from adequate. The decision to confine refugees in temporary shelters 
potentially holds imminent COVID-19 risks. One of the most recent 
examples can be found in the local government’s shelter for asylum 
seekers and refugees in Aceh and Kalideres.
Upon their arrival in Aceh early September, Rohingya asylum seekers 
were directed to a temporary shelter managed by the Aceh local 
government.12 The vocational training center in Lhokseumawe sheltered 
around three hundred people, three times its actual capacity. Regarding 
COVID-19 concerns, IOM assisted the local government to provide 
rapid tests for the arrivals.13 However, by 13 September 2020, three 
Rohingya refugees died due to respiratory illness before swab tests 
were administered.14 Refugees in the Kalideres shelter are facing similar 
limitations during the pandemic. The supposedly temporary facility 
has been housing around 200 refugees since last year.15 The scarcity of 
clean water and space has rendered them helpless in fulfilling even the 
basic prevention measures: washing hands and physical distancing.16
INDONESIA: QUESTIONING ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION  
IN TIME OF PANDEMIC
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BEYOND DETENTION
Although under a less onerous regime, immigration still governs 
refugees outside of institutions, even during the pandemic.17 As 
Antje Missbach noted, while refugees in Indonesia are not detained, 
the alternative forms of detention do not nullify the containment of 
refugees.18 The restriction of freedom is also evident in the enforcement 
of immigration policies toward all facets of refugees’ lives, particularly 
limitations on sustenance-seeking activities. Ironically, as economic 
activities are slowing down during the pandemic, immigration officials’ 
scrutiny over refugees’ livelihood has also decreased.
In this period of insecurity, the disjunction between immigration 
enforcement and Indonesia’s efforts to ensure refugees’ health and 
wellbeing becomes all the more apparent. Despite the fact that half  
of Indonesia’s refugee population settled in the Greater Jakarta area, 
one of the most impacted regions in Indonesia, refugees are still 
struggling to access COVID-19 tests. In a recent interview with Mozhgan 
Moaref, a human rights and refugee advocate, she expressed the 
refugee community’s concerns over the inability to self-isolate and 
personally pay for COVID-19 tests.19 “We have always been in lockdown” 
she said, lamenting over the restrictive living conditions for refugees  
in Indonesia, far before the pandemic started.
IOM stated their engagement with the national authorities to ensure 
COVID-19 services are available for foreign nationals, including 
refugees.20 National regulation also stated that COVID-19 related 
healthcare expenses for patients are covered by the government. 
However, the coverage only applies to positive cases while the 
suspected cases, those who were in contact with positive ones, 
should cover the cost for their own tests.21 To provide a better 
picture, the PCR (polymerase chain reaction) test in Indonesia 
costs around one to two million Rupiah (70 to 140 USD), almost 
half the monthly minimum wage in Jakarta.22 Moreover, social 
assistance schemes to buffer the impact of economic downturns 
limit the assistance to people registered in the national social 
welfare database, excluding refugees and asylum seekers.2324
17 https://faktualnews.co/2020/08/28/petugas-rudenim-sidak-penampungan-imigran-di-sidoarjo/230873/
18 Missbach, A. (2017)
19 Mozhgan Moaref interview with Dr. Sal Clark, Swinburne University of Technology, in 10 September 2020. https://youtu.be/AHysFJcOwmw
20 https://www.iom.int/news/iom-ramps-response-covid-19-pandemic-refugees-indonesia
21 Minister of Health instruction HK.02.01/MENKES/295/2020, 24 April 2020
22 https://en.antaranews.com/news/135764/jakarta-sets-provincial-minimum-wage-for-2020
23 Minister of Social Affairs decision 54/HUK/2020, 16 April 2020
24 In a June meeting with the COVID-19 national cluster for vulnerable population that SUAKA attended, the government pledged the commitment to include asylum 
seekers and refugees as vulnerable group. However, there is no apparent changes to date.
25 https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/3/5e7103034/iom-unhcr-announce-temporary-suspension-resettlement-travel-refugees.html
LONGER WAIT, LONGER UNCERTAINTIES
The situation is worsened with curtailed refugee status processing 
and resettlement due to the pandemic. UNHCR Indonesia’s June 2020 
statistics showed a significant decrease (67%) of newly registered 
cases compared to June 2019. The decrease possibly indicates a slower 
case registration process due to the pandemic. While the correlation 
between the registration process and COVID-19 warrants further 
explanation from the respective agency, the delays in resettlement 
have been more apparent. IOM and UNHCR announced the temporary 
suspension of resettlement in March 2020.25 Compounded with the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the prolonged stay will undoubtedly continue to 
strain the refugee community in Indonesia.
SUMMARY
Indonesia is in a relatively better situation than many other countries  
as it ended immigration detention in practice before the pandemic –  
so does not have clusters in detention centers. However, the COVID-19 
pandemic laid bare the shortcomings of Indonesia’s alternatives to 
detention, especially for asylum seekers and refugees. The Government 
of Indonesia and related stakeholders should work in cultivating access 
to decent livelihoods, housing, and basic services for refugees not  
only to survive, but also sustain their lives. In the end, it is not only  
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On 24 June 2019, Sunny, a Nigerian detainee who spent 20 years of 
his life in Japan, died of starvation in the Omura Immigration Center in 
Nagasaki.1 Sunny’s tragic death resonated powerfully because he was 
one of the 200 hunger-striking detainees who challenged the notorious 
practice of indefinite immigration detention in a most desperate and 
self-harming manner.2 A year after Sunny’s death, the landscape of 
immigration detention has been significantly affected by the COVID-19 
pandemic. Japan has responded to the pandemic by releasing a large 
number of migrant detainees. Yet, the overall pattern of human rights 
violations of migrant detainees,3 as well as government dismissal of their 
life conditions does not appear to have shifted.
This article documents Japan’s recent measures against the COVID-19 
pandemic in the country’s 17 immigration detention facilities. The 
article also discusses the plight of detainees, as well as of provisionally 
released migrants. Since the mounting threat of the coronavirus in 
mid-April 2020, Japan’s Immigration Services Agency (ISA), the 
country’s sole government agency that manages and operationalizes 
migrant admissions, detention, and deportation, has implemented 
a set of pandemic-specific measures to reduce the potential risks 
of cluster infections in the immigration detention facilities. The 
overcrowded detention facilities that limit the physical mobility of 
detainees are seen as an immediate public health threat because 
detention violates Japan’s coronavirus prevention rules of “Three 
Cs” (closed spaces, crowded places, and close-contact setting).4 
Human rights lawyers argue that the immigration authorities should 
release detained migrants immediately since no detainee could be 
deported due to the travel bans in their countries of origin.5 This is a 
valid claim because immigration detention was originally designed 
as a temporary administrative non-punitive measure to ensure the 
removal of the migrant. As a response to the mounting criticisms of 
health violations in the detention facilities, ISA released a pandemic 
health guideline in early May.6 Two crucial measures included in the 
guideline are the reduction of the number of detained migrants by 
granting more provisional release permits,7 as well as the reduction 
of in-person contact among detainees in detention facilities.
1 https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASM8N64P3M8NUPQJ00P.html
2 https://www.amnesty.or.jp/news/2019/1008_8361.html
3 In this article, I use the term “migrant” to refer to a wide range of non-citizen residents who are indiscriminately subject to the control of domestic immigration laws 




7 http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13383320. Another measure was to limit the number of visitors, most of whom are family members and advocacy groups. For 
example, the East Japan Immigration Center (Ushiku Nyukan) suspended visitations of detainees between late April and early June.
8 https://mainichi.jp/articles/20191110/ddm/005/070/041000c
9 https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/200704/plt2007040019-n1.html Four main facilities house detainees in Japan. These are located in Tokyo, Ibaraki, Nagasaki, 
and Nagoya. The number of detained migrants in the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau was 200 in August 2020. https://mainichi.jp/articles/20200807/
k00/00m/040/224000c?pid=14612. The number of the East Japan Immigration Center (Ibaraki) was 100 in July 2020 (http://www011.upp.so-net.ne.jp/
ushikunokai/). The number of the Omura detention facility (Nagasaki) was 63 in April 2020 https://www.nishinippon.co.jp/item/n/598186/. Although I do not 
have data on the Nagoya detention facility, the estimated number of detained migrants was about 400 in early September 2020. Thus, two-thirds of the original 
detainees were released during the pandemic.
10 Members from Ushiku-no-kai regularly visit detained migrants, especially long-term detainees. They have been conducting detention visits since 1994.
11 During the height of the global COVID-19 pandemic in April 2020, major international human rights NGOs and international organizations including UNHCR jointly 
published a report to demand the immediate release of detained migrants and asylum-seekers from detention facilities (The Working Group on Alternatives to 
Immigration Detention, United Nations Network on Migration. 2020. COVID-19 & Immigration Detention: What Can Governments and Other Stakeholders Do?). 
https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/default/files/docs/un_network_on_migration_wg_atd_policy_brief_covid-19_and_immigration_detention.pdf)
12 Prior to the pandemic, there were four to five detainees sharing a room (http://www011.upp.so-net.ne.jp/ushikunokai/).
13 https://mainichi.jp/articles/20200807/k00/00m/040/224000c
14 http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13383320
Between April and August 2020, the number of detained migrants 
declined to nearly one-third of the original detainee population 
recorded prior to the pandemic. In June 2019, there were 1,253 migrants 
held in the country’s 17 immigration facilities.8 In early April 2020, 
three weeks after the World Health Organization’s declaration of the 
coronavirus as a pandemic on 12 March, the total number of detainees 
still remained at 1,130. However, by early July, the number significantly 
dropped to 518 and by early September, it declined further9. According 
to a local migrant advocacy group, Ushiku-no-kai, the East Japan 
(Higashi-Nihon) Immigration Center issued more than 170 provisional 
release approvals between 1 April and 15 June.10 Given the current travel 
restrictions and bans that are imposed by many countries in the Global 
South, those who obtained provisional release were technically granted 
a temporary exemption from deportation during the pandemic. Japan’s 
provisional release system is considered as an integral measure of non-
custodial alternatives to detention that the UN Network on Migration’s 
Working Group on Alternatives to Immigration Detention emphasizes.11
In addition to releasing a large number of detainees, in-person contact 
among detainees in these facilities has been significantly minimized. 
According to Ushiku-no-kai, by mid-July, detainees were no longer 
sharing their room with other detainees in the East Japan Immigration 
Center.12 Despite these health prevention measures, detained migrants 
are continuously exposed to the risks of potential cluster infections. The 
first case of a detainee being infected by COVID-19 was reported in the 
Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau in early August 2020.13
While recognizing the urgency of the current preventive and protection 
measures, as well as a certain degree of freedoms that long-term 
detainees are temporarily granted, it would seem that the current 
“flexible” measures are not grounded on the principle of respect of 
detainees’ inalienable human rights, especially the rights to life and 
freedom. These measures fail to recognize the inherent harms and 
excessive violence that Japan’s contemporary immigration detention 
system has produced. This is evident by the fact that those who are 
released are left without any government support or basic protection 
from increased health risks.14 According to Amigos (Kitakanto 
Iryosodankai), a migrant health support group, an increasing number 
of migrants under provisional release are desperately seeking support 
INDEFINITE IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND THE COVID-19 
PANDEMIC IN JAPAN
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for health services, food, and shelter.15 Many released migrants are also 
primary victims of the country’s mandatory and indefinite detention 
system. The United Nations calls indefinite detention as arbitrary 
detention, a notorious violation of international human rights law. Due 
to the protracted and repeated deprivation of liberty and freedom 
in detention, released migrants experience significant risks not just 
because of the pandemic but also because of the detention-specific 
health risks that these detained individuals were forced to endure. 
Depression, post-traumatic stress, high blood pressure, and strokes 
are disproportionately prevalent among long-term detainees.16 
Furthermore, due to protracted isolation and disconnection from 
outside communities, many released migrants face loss of kinship 
and community ties. They are also under constant surveillance of 
government agencies. What the COVID-19 pandemic clearly reveals are 
the prevailing vulnerabilities, especially the deprivation of the right to 
have rights, of both detained and temporarily released migrants.
The intensification of vulnerabilities of both detained and released 
migrants is rooted in Japan’s draconian detention policy. ISA has 
implemented an excessively inflexible and coercive policy that reinforces 
mandatory and indefinite immigration detention. Such an illiberal 
detention policy is tied to the hyper-criminalization of undocumented 
migrants and asylum-seekers, especially after Tokyo won the bid for 
the 2020 Olympic games (which were subsequently postponed due 
to the pandemic) in 2013.17 The statistical presence of “illegal aliens” 
was considered a great threat to public safety, especially in light of the 
country’s proclamation that it is “the safest country in the world.”18 On a 
wide range of indicators – provisional release approvals, approval rates 
of Special Permission to Stay, and indefinite detention – the conditions 
of migrant detainees worsened severely. The number of provisional 
release approvals declined by half between 2016 and 2018.19 The number 
of detained migrants receiving Special Permission to Stay (SPS), 
Japan’s de facto amnesty program, has also significantly declined. In 
2004, there were 13,239 undocumented migrants under deportation 
order who received SPS. However, only 1,255 undocumented migrants 
were granted SPS in 2017.20 In 2019, prior to the pandemic, the number 
of long-term detainees was at a record high. As a share of the total 
number of detained migrants in Japan, long-term detainees comprised 
50 percent: 679 out of 1253 detainees were held more than 6 months in 
June 2019.21 Furthermore, the number of detainees who were held more 
than 18 months increased from 238 in July 2018 to 393 in June 2019.22 
Overall, data indicate that the period leading up to the Olympics saw a 
sharp ratcheting up of punitive measures against detained migrants.
15 https://mainichi.jp/articles/20200422/k00/00m/040/316000c




19 https://www.toben.or.jp/message/pdf/200114ikensho.pdf Tokyo Bar Association, “A proposal to set an upper limit on the period of detention as well as to apply 
relevant international human rights norms to foreigners who are not able to be removed from the country,” January 2020, p.3 https://www.toben.or.jp/message/
pdf/200114ikensho.pdf.
20 Ministry of Justice, Japan. 2005. Immigration Control in Recent Years. page 59. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000007280.pdf Ministry of Justice, Japan. 2019. 
Immigration Control in Recent Years. page 66. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001241964.pdf
21 https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASM8N64P3M8NUPQJ00P.html; Tokyo Bar Association, January 2020 https://www.toben.or.jp/message/pdf/200114ikensho.pdf.





In June 2020, in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministry of 
Justice that governs ISA, released a proposal on immigration detention 
and deportation based on recommendations by the expert committee 
for the Justice Minister (Shiteki Kondankai).23 The expert committee 
was originally set up in October 2019 after the tragic death of the 
Nigerian detainee in June 2019 as well as the widespread hunger strikes 
by long-term detainees between June and September 2019.24 One of 
the most controversial proposals was the criminalization of long-term 
detainees, as well as of those who went missing after they obtained 
provisional release. Instead of recognizing the lack of due process and 
the unlawfulness of indefinite detention, the proposal blamed long-
term detainees’ “unwillingness to return home (kikoku kihi).” 25 The 
Japan Federation of Bar Associations was critical of this report, noting 
that long-term detainees’ own reasons for remaining in Japan were 
dismissed.26 The majority of these individuals are asylum-seekers who 
seek protection from potential political and social violence, as well as 
long-term residents who have already established close biological, 
kinship, and cultural ties to Japan’s local communities. The proposal 
by the Ministry of Justice ignores these compounded humanitarian 
concerns and ends up re-emphasizing Japan’s consistent lack of 
concern for the rights of migrants.
Thus, data on the excessive violence of indefinite detention prior to 
the pandemic, as well as the Ministry of Justice’s recent proposal to 
criminalize long-term detainees, strongly indicate that the government’s 
deep antipathy toward migrant detainees’ rights remains consistent. The 
government’s decision, at the height of the global pandemic, to release 
a large number of detained migrants should really be understood as a 
very small temporary measure, induced only by a uniquely devastating 
health crisis. In the absence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the pattern of 
treatment of migrant detainees, as witnessed by the death of Sunny, the 
Nigerian immigrant, has not fundamentally changed.
KAZUE TAKAMURA 
Institute for the Study of International Development 
McGill University
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BACKGROUND: MIGRATION DETENTION  
IN LIBYA
Long a destination country for migrant workers, Libya has also 
become a key transit country for those attempting to reach Europe 
via the Central Mediterranean Route. Since the early 2000s, Gaddafi’s 
government started a more active co-operation at tackling illegal 
migration across the Mediterranean. Under current Libyan law, irregular 
stay, entry, and departure have been criminalized and sanctioned with 
fines and imprisonment1. In practice, migrants and refugees are subject 
to arbitrary and indefinite detention upon disembarkation by the Libyan 
Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM)2.
In 2017 the European Union (EU) endorsed a new Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between Italy and Libya aimed at stemming 
irregular flows3. Italy committed to provide material support to the 
Libyan border police and assist in establishing so-called “temporary 
camps” under the management of the DCIM. In 2012, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had ruled that Italy’s practice of 
returning intercepted migrants to Libya was illegal4. Hence, the new 
MoU aims at strengthening the capacity of Libyan authorities to directly 
intercept irregular migrants5.
According to human rights groups, an increase in sea interceptions by 
the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) soon followed, contributing to a surge in 
detentions and overcrowding at DCIM facilities6. Refugees and migrants 
apprehended at sea are often automatically transferred to detention 
centres. Furthermore, there are additional informal centres controlled 
by local armed groups, where detainees are particularly vulnerable to 
being held for ransom or sold for forced labour7.
Existing reports have documented human rights violations and abuses 
within the country’s detention centres. In-depth interviews with 
refugees and migrants between 2016 and 2019 describe conditions of 
massive overcrowding, dire sanitary conditions as well as inadequate 
food and medical care8. Widespread abuses inflicted by guards and 
militia members are also documented.
1 Relevant provisions are contained in Law No. 6 (1987) Regulating Entry, Residence and Exit of Foreign Nationals to/from Libya, as amended by Law No. 2 (2004); and 
Law No. 19 (2010) on Combating Irregular Migration.
2 Amnesty International (2017). Libya’s dark web of collusion: Abuses against Europe-bound refugees and migrants. 
3 Uselli, S. (2017) Italy-Libya agreement: the Memorandum text. Associazione per gli studi giuridici sull’immigrazione (ASGI).
4 European Court of Human Rights (2012). Grand Chamber Judgment Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy.
5 Heller C. and Pezzani L. (2018) Mare Clausum. Italy and the EU’s undeclared operation to stem migration across the Mediterranean. Forensic Oceanography.
6 Human Rights Watch (2019). No escape from hell: EU policies contribute to abuse of migrants in Libya. 
7 UNOCHA (2020). 2020 Humanitarian Response Monitoring.
8 UNSMIL-OHCHR (2018). Desperate and dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya. 
9 Reuters (2020). Libya’s Tripoli government declares emergency, shuts down ports, airports.
10 UNHCR (2020). IOM, UNHCR announce temporary suspension of resettlement travel for refugees. Press Release. 
11 ANSAmed (2020). Libya: IOM, first migrant repatriation after 5-month pause.
COVID-19 RESPONSE IN LIBYA
As many other countries, Libya declared a state of emergency in 
response to the spread of COVID-19, which was followed by measures 
aimed at restricting movements9:
 ≥ 15 March – Closure of schools and “non-essential” businesses.
 ≥ 16 March – Closure of border crossing points via land and sea.
 ≥ 22 March – First curfew (6 PM to 6 AM) imposed.
 ≥ 24 March – First official COVID-19 case announced in Tripoli.
 ≥ 27 June – Complete lockdown in the South.
 ≥ 26 July – Misrata airport reopened for commercial flights from/to 
Istanbul.
 ≥ 3 August- Misrata airport temporarily closed; flights moved to Tripoli 
Mitiga airport.
 ≥ 31 August- High schools gradually reopen (primary and middle 
schools remain closed).
Source: WHO (2020).
On 17 March 2020 UNHCR halted third-country resettlement departures; 
evacuation flights were also suspended until August 202010. Given the 
closure of international borders, IOM also interrupted the voluntary 
humanitarian return programme for five months, resuming on 20 
August 2020 11.
COVID-19 IN LIBYA MAY INCREASE THE RISK OF DETENTION FOR 
MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
International Detention Coalition and Western Sydney University34
COVID-19 IMPACTS ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION: GLOBAL RESPONSES
In April 2020, Italy and Malta both declared their ports unsafe for 
disembarkation owing to the COVID-19 pandemic12. This added to 
logistical difficulties that led several NGOs to halt their search and 
rescue (SAR) operations. Further, the few operating vessels have been 
docked in ports for several weeks because of quarantine procedures13. 
As a result, between March and August, SAR operations along the 
Central Mediterranean Route have largely been suspended14.
The COVID-19 pandemic has also reduced the ability of humanitarian 
actors in Libya to provide assistance and carry out monitoring functions. 
On the one hand, access to detention centres has reportedly been 
inconsistent. On the other hand, the paucity of resources limited 
the Libyan National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC)’s capacity 
to perform medical checks at disembarkation points for returned 
migrants15.
MAIN IMPACT ON MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
The main impact of border closures and restricted mobility on 
migrants and refugees can be summarized as: (i) reduced economic 
opportunities and food security; (ii) increased irregular departures, 
interceptions and related detention; (iii) increased overcrowding of 
detention facilities and related health hazards.
Source: authors.
According to the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)16, 74 percent 
of migrants in Libya have limited or no access to health services, which 
makes them vulnerable to infectious diseases. Although more than 80 
percent of the migrants in Libya have access to water and sanitation, 
12 Tondo L. (2020). Italy declares own ports ‘unsafe’ to stop migrants arriving. The Guardian; Scicluna C. (2020). Malta says it can no longer rescue, accept migrants. 
Reuters.
13 Zander M. (2020). Coronavirus crisis hampering Mediterranean migrant rescues. Deutsche Welle; Reidy E. (2020). How COVID-19 halted NGO migrant rescues in the 
Mediterranean. The New Humanitarian. 
14 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2020). Press briefing note on Migrant rescues in the Mediterranean. 
15 United Nations Security Council (2020). Implementation of resolution 2491 (2019). Report of the Secretary-General S/2020/876.
16 IOM DTM (2019). Migrants Needs and Vulnerability Assessment.
17 Ibid.
18 See https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/ for a map of main Mediterranean Routes.
19 Frontex (2020). Detections of illegal border crossings.
20 IOM DTM (2020). Migrant Emergency Food Security Report.
21 IOM DTM (2020). COVID-19 Mobility Tracking #3.
22 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2020). Addressing Emerging Human Trafficking Trends and Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic. 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
23 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Africa (2020). Situation Report on International Migration 2019: The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration in the Context of the Arab Region.
24 United Nations Security Council (2020). Implementation of resolution 2491 (2019). Report of the Secretary-General S/2020/876.
25 See https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean.
26 UNHCR (2020). Update Libya (18 September 2020); UNHCR (2019). Update Libya (20 September 2019).
this is not the case in the South of the country where 43 percent of 
migrants reportedly do not have regular access to water or sanitation17. 
This exposes them to a higher risk of contracting COVID-19.
Closed borders, together with the deteriorating socio-economic 
situation in Libya and the lack of access to basic services, have made 
refugees and migrants in Libya more prone to seek the services of 
human smugglers. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
(Frontex) recorded 8,489 migrants irregularly crossing on the Central 
Mediterranean Route18 between January and June 2020, compared to 
only 3,872 during the first half of 2019 (+119%)19. One possible reason 
is that migrants in Libya reportedly faced stricter restrictions on 
mobility, declined livelihood opportunities and food security levels 
compromised20. According to IOM, the percentage of migrants reporting 
to be unemployed rose from 17% in last February to 29% in June 202021.
Travel restrictions and loss of economic opportunities may have 
exposed migrants to increased risk of trafficking, in particular women 
migrant workers22. As migrant domestic workers are not fully covered 
by national labour laws23, even when violations of rights are flagrant only 
a few are reported. Victims of abuses fear losing their jobs and therefore 
their permit to stay in the country (which could lead to detention and 
deportation). Reducing labour mobility and employment opportunities, 
the pandemic has also affected the willingness of migrant victims to 
report abuses perpetrated by their employers.
The formal policy of detention has remained in place in Libya. Between 
March and August 2020, about half of the refugees and migrants 
disembarked in Libya were transferred to detention centres managed by 
the DCIM24. As a likely consequence of COVID-19’s destabilizing effect 
in Libya, attempted sea crossings increased in 2020 compared to 2019. 
According to the IOM’s Missing Migrants Project, there have been 23,141 
attempts to cross the Mediterranean Sea in the first seven months of 
2020 (+103%), compared with 11,373 in the first seven months of 201925. 
As of 17 September2020, UNHCR reported 8,074 refugees and migrants 
were intercepted and returned to Libya (+21%), compared with 6,650 
during the same period in 201926.
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Source: IOM DTM Detention Centre Profile Generator (2020).
The overcrowding in many detention facilities in Libya – which already 
undermines hygiene, health, safety, and human dignity – within the 
COVID-19 context has posed additional challenges. Migrants deprived 
of their liberty are de facto unable to respect distancing measures to 
protect themselves from contracting the virus27. Further, detainees’ 
weak nutritional status and severe medical conditions, including 
tuberculosis, put them at greater risk of contracting COVID-1928.
In June and July 2020, more than 100 migrants and refugees rescued 
at sea after departing Libya tested positive for COVID-19, prompting 
concerns that the virus could be spreading among refugees and 
migrants in Libya29. Further, this heightens the risk of xenophobia and 
intolerance towards migrants, increasingly perceived as responsible 
for the spread of the virus. Misperceptions that migrants are vectors of 
communicable diseases are widespread even among health workers. 
This may result in additional limitations in accessing basic services, 
including health services30.
To conclude, COVID-19 and measures to contain its spread have 
taken a high toll on migrants and refugees in Libya. Besides direct 
health-related concerns because of specific vulnerable conditions, 
the pandemic is also having the two-fold adverse effect of disrupting 
employment opportunities in an already fragile context and exposing 
migrants to heightened risk of detention and abuse.
GABRIELE RESTELLI 
Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester
LINDA COTTONE 
PhD Candidate 
Public International Law and International Relations 
Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB)
27 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2020). COVID-19 and its human rights dimensions.
28 United Nations Security Council (2020). Implementation of resolution 2491 (2019). Report of the Secretary-General S/2020/876..
29 Ibid.
30 IOM (2020). Facts about Migration in Libya.
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INTRODUCTION
Malaysia confirmed its first positive COVID-19 case on 25 January 2020 
– two weeks before the World Health Organization (WHO) declared 
COVID-19 as a global pandemic. Since then, there was a rapid increase 
in positive COVID-19 cases reaching nearly 8,700 cases with 121 deaths 
by 30 June 2020. As experienced in other countries, precarious living 
conditions and poor access to health care and working conditions 
have contributed significantly to the rapid transmission of COVID-19, 
particularly among low-paid and unskilled migrant workers. In Malaysia, 
prior to the outbreak, some migrant workers were already living in 
cramped workers’ accommodation and unsanitary conditions, with poor 
access to healthcare, further exacerbated by lack of workers’ protection. 
The implementation of various phases of Malaysia’s Movement 
Control Orders (MCOs) and the way the government addressed the 
situation facing between 2 and 5 million migrant workers (including 
irregular migrants) had significant negative consequences on their 
already precarious living and working conditions. This article reviews 
the government’s response and the negative consequences towards 
migrant workers and concludes with key recommendations.
GOVERNMENT-INITIATED CONTROL ORDERS
Malaysia was one of the countries which took early prevention  
actions by implementing a series of MCO beginning on 18 March 2020. 
The figure below shows the different phases of the MCO until the end  
of 2020.1
Malaysian Economic Statistics Review, Vol.1/2020.
1 Department of Statistics, Malaysia (DOSM). 2020. Malaysian Economic Statistics Review, Vol.1/2020. https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/
pdfPrev&id=a2VhN3FvUnp5Y1c5ZmRIaENpSFkwQT09 
2 Ministry of Health (MOH). 7 May 2020 to 12 June 2020. Daily Update on COVID-19. Available at https://kpkesihatan.com 
3 CodeBlue. 23 March 2020. Health DG Says Free COVID-19 Tests, Treatment For Foreigners, After PM Says Payments Required. Available at https://codeblue.
galencentre.org/2020/03/23/health- dg-says-free-COVID-19-tests-treatment-for-foreigners-after-pm-says-payments- required/ 
4 The Star. 4 May 2020. Ismail Sabri: Compulsory COVID-19 tests for all foreign workers. Available at https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/05/04/ismail-
sabri-compulsory-COVID-19-tests-for-all-foreign-workers 
5 Malay Mail. 22 March 2020. Come forward so we can take care of you, Putrajaya says as 4,000 tabligh event attendees still untested. Available at https://www.
malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/03/22/come-forward-so-we-can- take-care-of-you-putrajaya-tells-tabligh-event-atten/1848976 
6 Malay Mail. 1 May 2020. Tenaganita condemns raids on undocumented migrants, refugees in Kuala Lumpur. Available at https://www.malaymail.com/news/
malaysia/2020/05/01/tenaganita-condemns-raids-on-undocumented-migrants-refugees-in-kuala-lumpur/1862190 
7 Malaysiakini. 2 May 2020. Arrested undocumented migrants were tested for COVID-19, no mistreatment. Available at https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/523677 
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSES AFFECTING 
MIGRANT WORKERS
When Malaysia recorded its first positive COVID-19 case on 25 January 
2020, the Ministry of Health (MOH) released a government circular, 
indicating that migrant workers were exempted from paying the 
outpatient fees to get COVID-19 tested at government facilities.2 
However, on 23 March 2020, the government announced that migrant 
workers should pay for testing and treatment fees related to COVID-
19.3 In early May 2020, the government once again announced that all 
migrant workers were required to undergo a COVID-19 swab test but 
the cost will be borne by the employers.4
On the issue of arrest and detention of undocumented immigrants, 
initially, the government on 22 March 2020 had given its assurance that 
it would not arrest and detain undocumented immigrants including 
those who were seeking care and medical tests at government health 
facilities.5 This commitment was made in response to the rising positive 
COVID-19 cases involving the Rohingya refugees.
However, on the eve of Labour Day, hundreds of undocumented 
migrant workers and refugees were arrested in a massive raid operation 
conducted in Kuala Lumpur. The raid was launched despite the earlier 
assurance that undocumented immigrants should have had nothing to 
fear to get COVID-19 tested. Several weeks later, additional operations 
were conducted in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, where thousands of 
undocumented workers and refugees, including women and children, 
were rounded-up and detained in immigration detention centres.
Migrant advocates such as Tenaganita and Refuge for Refugees had 
earlier voiced concern that the immigration raids were conducted 
“inhumanely”.6 In response to critiques from migrant advocates, the 
government denied it and stressed that migrant workers were treated 
humanely throughout the conduct of immigration raids and their 
detention.7
NEGATIVE POLICY CONSEQUENCES  
TO MIGRANT WORKERS
The chain of events and responses by the government have shown 
inconsistency and lack of coordination between different government 
agencies in handling issues concerning migrant workers. This had also 
prompted significant negative consequences facing migrant workers, 
not only to their health and well-being, but their hiring and immigration 
status in Malaysia. Several negative consequences are discussed below.
COVID-19 IN MALAYSIA: PUSHING MIGRANT WORKERS FURTHER 
AT THE MARGIN
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Immigration raids instil fear amongst undocumented migrant workers
Immigration raids conducted since 1 May 2020 had instilled fear among 
migrant workers, especially those without a valid travel document, to 
come forward to get COVID-19 tested. Because of this fear of being 
arrested, some undocumented migrants went into hiding and that 
hampered containment efforts by the MOH.8
Immigration detention centres are becoming COVID-19 hotspots
Between 1 and 25 May 2020, over 2,000 undocumented immigrants  
had been arrested and detained in various immigration detention 
centres. This caused a growing number of detainees in already  
crowded immigration detention centres. The Human Rights  
Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) cautioned that the lack of  
physical distancing coupled with the existing poor health system  
and hygienic practices in many detention centres increased the  
risk of a rapid COVID-19 outbreak.9
By 3 June 2020, about 4,908 COVID-19 samples had already been 
undertaken in four immigration detention centres in Kuala Lumpur, 
Selangor and Putrajaya. About 465 positive COVID-19 cases 
were identified among detainees (123 (India), 76 (Indonesia), 108 
(Bangladesh), 66 (Myanmar), 45 (Pakistan), 18 (China), 7 (Sri Lanka), 
5 (Nepal), 4 (Cambodia), 3 (Philippines), 2 (Egypt) and 4 (other 
countries).10 Importantly, the MOH reported that it still had more than 
one thousand detainees awaiting further results of their COVID-19 test. 
This had already indicated that more cases of COVID-19 were likely to 
be identified, and suggested that immigration detention centres were 
becoming COVID-19 ‘hotspots’.
Escalating positive COVID-19 cases outside immigration detention
While the overall number of active cases of COVID-19 saw a declining 
trend between May and June 2020, the new positive COVID-19 cases 
among non-citizens, especially the migrant worker population, had 
escalated tremendously. From 7 May to 12 June 2020, the number 
of COVID-19 positive non-citizens rose from 9 to 1,413 cases. This 
constitutes about 72 per cent of the total positive COVID-19 cases 
recorded during the same period. To put it differently, more than two 
out of every three new COVID-19 infections recorded over this period 
were non-citizens.
Emerging COVID-19 clusters
Similarly, the period between May and June 2020 saw a growing 
number of new COVID-19 clusters involving different groups of 
migrant workers. These include, amongst others, four immigration 
detention centre clusters in Bukit Jalil, Semenyih, Sepang and Putrajaya 
respectively; the Pedas Linggi cluster which was announced on  
2 May 2020; a cleaning company cluster on 29 May 2020; and  
several construction site clusters in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor.
8 MalaysiaKini. 1 May 2020. Tenaganita condemns raids on undocumented migrants, refugees in Kuala Lumpur. Available at https://www.malaymail.com/news/
malaysia/2020/05/01/tenaganita-condemns-raids-on-undocumented-migrants-refugees-in-kuala-lumpur/1862190 
9 SUHAKAM. 28 May 2020. Dialogue with Vulnerable Communities: An Assessment of Needs and Next Steps Amid COVID-19 Pandemic. Available at https://www.
suhakam.org.my/dialogue-with-vulnerable-communities-an-assessment-of-needs-and-next-steps-amid-COVID-19-pandemic/ 
10 Ministry of Health (MOH). 7 May 2020 to 12 June 2020. Daily Update on COVID-19. Available at https://kpkesihatan.com 
11 SUHAKAM. 28 May 2020. Dialogue with Vulnerable Communities. 
12 Ibid.
Risk of irregularity
SUHAKAM reported that many migrant workers during MCOs were 
not allowed to work by their employers, and did not receive any form 
of communication from the employers.11 Workers were in the dark 
about their status of employment, and importantly, their immigration 
status since their working pass needs to be annually renewed by the 
employers. This not only raises concern on retrenchment among 
migrant workers but the risk of “irregularity”.
Labour rights violations
SUHAKAM claimed growing labour rights violations during the 
pandemic. Some migrant workers were not being paid their monthly 
salary, with some employers allegedly withholding migrant workers’ 
salaries.12 Similarly, the Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) 
reported common labour rights violations such as unfair termination of 
employment, unpaid wages and poor living conditions. Some workers 
were allegedly required to work during the MCO in non-essential work.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The lack of coordination and consistency in the way the government 
agencies addressed issues affecting migrant workers led to undesirable 
actions and negative consequences facing migrant workers. The 
pandemic has once again revealed the precarity and vulnerability of 
migrant workers, whether it be in the exclusion from, or unintended 
consequences of policy. Similarly, the pandemic has further exacerbated 
workers’ lack of protection, and exploitation committed by employers. 
This calls for serious policy consideration and immediate remediation  
in addressing the rights, welfare and safety of migrant workers.
This article recommends the government to refrain from undertaking 
immigration raids targeting those already in the country during the 
pandemic. Instead, implement a special regularization program to 
legalize their immigration status. The government should also provide 
access to immigration detention centres for independent monitoring 
and humanitarian aid. Finally, the pandemic suggests that it is the right 
time to strengthen current labour laws and policies, ensuring the rights 
and well-being of migrant workers are protected.
ANDIKA WAHAB 
Fellow, Institute of Malaysian & International Studies 
National University of Malaysia
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From the moment COVID-19 was declared an international public health 
emergency by the World Health Organization (WHO)1, it was clear that 
States would need to implement urgent public health measures for 
its detection, prevention, containment, and treatment. COVID-19 was 
eventually declared a pandemic on 11 March 2020.
Although state responses were not homogenous due to the particular 
characteristics of the pandemic, most countries implemented either 
voluntary or obligatory limitations on the freedom of movement and/ 
or on personal freedoms, such as geographical restrictions within or 
between cities, total or partial border closures, preventive isolation, 
curfews, and obligatory lockdowns or quarantines.2 All carried profound 
social, economic and political implications for the various governments, 
and not least, for migrants.
Guarantees and protections of the rights of the migrant – particularly 
irregular migrant- and refugee populations in the face of the 
pandemic, were late in coming and contained intrinsic problems and 
contradictions. If no state was prepared for the pandemic, even less 
were they able to adopt an approach that would deal with the specific 
needs of a heterogenous and vulnerable population, who, in addition, is 
on the move, uprooted and frequently criminalized by restrictive State 
immigration policies. At least, this was the case in Mexico.
Even prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, the violation of rights 
and the vulnerability of people in situations of irregular, transit, or 
destination migration, were already concerning. In May 2019, after a 
brief period during which the federal government had exercised its 
sovereignty and defined its own immigration policies, it gave in to 
pressure and trade threats from the United States.3 Mexico began to 
reinforce control and detention of migrants, with measures such as the 
militarization of the southern border4. Mexico also agreed to accept 
asylum seekers from a variety of countries who were forcibly returned 
from the United States, and to keep them along the northern border in 
accordance with the Migrant Protection Protocols so-called “Remain in 
Mexico” program5.
1 World Health Organization (WHO). Declaration on the second meeting of the International Health Regulations (2002) Emergency Committee regarding the 
outbreak of the new coronavirus, 30 January 2020. Available at: https://www.who.int/es/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-
the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov) 
2 Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA). COVID-19: summary of the main measures, actions and policies. 2 September, 2020.  
Available at: http://www.sela.org/media/3219723/covid-19-resumen-de-las-principales-medidas-estados-miembros-sela.pdf 
3 COLVIN Jill, LONG Colleen. Trump announces new Mexican tariffs in response to migrants. May 30, 2019. Available at: https://apnews.com/
afec271c5f9c4fdb82f57b48cb593add; Michael D. Shear and Maggie Haberman. Mexico Agreed to Take Border Actions Months Before Trump Announced Tariff Deal. 
June 8, 2019, Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/us/politics/trump-mexico-deal-tariffs.html 
4 SEMPLE, Kirk. Mexico’s National Guard, a ‘Work in Progress,’ Deployed to Curb Migration. June 14, 2019. CThe New York Times. Available at:: https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/06/14/world/americas/mexico-migration-national-guard.html
5 US Department of State. U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration. June 7, 2019. Disponible en: https://www.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/
6 Asylum Access Mexico. Information note on Asylum in Mexico. January 2020. Available at: https://asylumaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/HOJA-
INFORMATIVA-SOBRE-EL-ASILO-MEXICANO.pdf 
7 DOF. Monday 30 March 2020. Agreement in which the epidemic caused by the SARS-CoV2 virus (COVID-19) is declared a health emergency due to force majeure.
8 The figure is not exact. It uses, as a point of reference, the number of people detained in February 2020, according to official statistics provided by the Immigration 
Policy Unit. Migration Statistics Bulletin, 2020. Available at: http://www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx/work/models/PoliticaMigratoria/CEM/Estadisticas/Boletines_
Estadisticos/2020/Boletin_2020.pdf
9 Citizens Council of the National Immigration Institute. Migrants in detention in Mexico. Mission for the Monitoring of Detention Centers and Temporary Shelters of the 
INM. July, 2017. P. 42. Available at: https://observatoriocolef.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CCINM-Informe_Final- Monitoreo.pdf. 
10 The figures correspond to the number of asylum seekers in the months of January and February 2020. From December 2019, official figures regarding refugees in 
Mexico are only published in graph format by the Coordinator of the Mexican Refugee Commission on his personal twitter account. (@AndresRSilva_) “COMAR en 
números”, 5 March, 2020, Available at: https://twitter.com/AndresRSilva_/status/1235779099412619265
11 Remain at home is understood as the voluntary limitation on movement, remaining at homes for as long as possible. 
At the same time, the Mexican Refugee Commission (COMAR) was 
experiencing a serious backlog in dealing with asylum seekers. Of the 
little more than 90,000 people who had requested asylum in Mexico 
between January 2018 and October 2019, 70% were still waiting for 
resolution of their cases at the end of 2019.6
Thus, on 28 February 2020, when Mexico registered its first case 
of COVID-19,7 around 8,000 people had already been detained 
for immigration reasons8 in 59 migrant detention centers.9 Just 
over 11,000 asylum seekers had recently arrived in the country,10 
adding to the existing backlog of thousands in process with the 
COMAR. At the same time, a conservatively estimated 10,000 
people awaited their interviews and hearings in the United States 
along the northern Mexican border under the Migrant Protection 
Protocols. Migrants and refugees thus already faced immigration 
and state policies that, by act or omission, systematically 
violated their freedoms and civil, social, and cultural rights.
In March 2020, the situation worsened. The Mexican State’s policies 
and actions regarding migrants oscillated between measures proposed 
by federal health bodies that overlooked the migrant population, 
its characteristics and composition, and immigration policies of 
enforcement and control. This resulted in: increased vulnerability and 
invisibility of the migrant population; fewer possibilities for assistance 
and access to humanitarian services; exposure to the risk of contracting 
COVID-19; violations of the right to health, life, security, integrity and 
personal freedom, among others; and finally, a lack of access to justice 
and effective judicial protection against the violations to which they 
were subjected.
On one hand, on 20 May 2020, the Mexican State began implementing 
measures for the control and epidemiological monitoring of COVID-19. 
These included social distancing and the suspension of non-essential 
activities in the public, private and social sector, as well as voluntary 
“sheltering” at home by the population11, under the slogan of “Remain  
at Home”.
BETWEEN OBLIVION AND CRIMINAL NEGLECT: MIGRANTS  
AND REFUGEES DURING THE COVID-19 HEALTH EMERGENCY  
IN MEXICO
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These measures clearly did not consider an irregular migrant population 
and/or those in transit across the country, nor the impact of such 
measures on this population. Furthermore, those who had not been 
detained and lived in the community generally lacked stable housing 
and the financial resources to guarantee their basic needs. With the 
suspension of non-essential activities, migrants were among the first 
to lose their employment, and both their jobs and housing became 
increasingly precarious, making them more vulnerable to immigration 
detention.
With time, and the official declaration of a health emergency, the 
federal government did eventually create protocols and guidelines for 
vulnerable populations. The “Protocol for the prevention and attention 
of suspected and confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Detention Centers 
and Temporary Shelters of the National Immigration Institute” and the 
“Preventive measures for Detention Centers and Temporary Shelters” 
were developed for the detained migrant population. Subsequently, in 
May 2020, a care and coordination plan was announced that included 
border checkpoints, medical units, shelters, places of refuge and private 
accommodation.
These measures came late and were deficient and widely ignored in 
institutional practice. Thus, for example, the social distancing and 
hygiene health measures established for detention centers, did not take 
account of the prevailing physical conditions of these centers, nor were 
alternative measures considered that would avoid detention in such 
places. The measures therefore served no purpose in guaranteeing and 
effectively protecting either the health, or the physical, emotional, or 
psychological well-being of migrants.
The National Immigration Institute (INM) continued with the 
identification and detention of migrants with a view to deportation. 
However, the regular operation of the immigration system was affected 
by total, partial or intermittent border closures, among which were 
those of the northern Central American countries, and the return to 
Mexico of migrants from various countries under Title 42 of the United 
States Code.12 This resulted in erratic and negligent actions on behalf of 
the INM, that violated human rights and that were aimed essentially at 
getting rid of migrants.
Initially, the INM extended the detention of migrants, amid undignified 
conditions that violated their rights. The resulting desperation led to at 
least five riots in detention centers in the north and south of the country, 
between 26 March and 6 April: in Tapachula, Tenosique, Villahermosa, 
Hermosillo and Piedras Negras. One of these resulted in the negligent 
death of an asylum seeker and several people were injured.
12 CDC. Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine: CDC’s Role. February 24, 2020. Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/
aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html 
13 UNHCR communication: “Concerns regarding transfers from the northern border to the southern one in the framework of the COVID-19 emergency”. Sent to the 
Executive Secretary of the Inter-secretarial Commission for Integral Attention in Matters of Migration (CIAIMM) of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and obtained through 
a request for access to information (INAI) folio:500112720, SRE, 3 June 2020. 
In a second phase, the INM began to transfer people between detention 
centers, abandon them on the border, encourage their irregular 
crossing into Guatemala,13 or simply released them with no provisions 
to protect or guarantee their rights. This occurred within a context in 
which DIF shelters (responsible for receiving unaccompanied migrant 
children) had significantly reduced their operations, as had civil 
society organizations that provide accommodation to migrants and 
refugees. Nevertheless, among other targeted actions for migrants, 
various civil society organizations offered spaces and support for the 
implementation of alternatives to detention in the absence of a response 
from the immigration, health, or any other authorities.
The Mexican State faced limitations and enormous challenges in 
protecting public health in the face of COVID-19. While recognizing 
its intention to respond to the presence and context of migrants and 
detention, including the recent initiative by the health authorities to 
provide statistics regarding numbers of COVID-related cases and deaths 
of migrants, none of these actions really sought to guarantee and 
protect the dignity and human rights of migrants and asylum seekers.
The pandemic has confirmed, once again, that current immigration 
policies, and discrimination and institutional and social xenophobia 
in Mexico, are structural features that constantly inhibit and violate 
migrants’ human rights. In the new, post-COVID reality, it will be worth 
reflecting on and responding to such structural elements that endanger 
people’s lives, liberty, security, and integrity.
ELBA Y. CORIA MÁRQUEZ 
Policy advocate specialized in immigration and asylum
This article has been translated into English from the original in Spanish
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Statelessness in Poland remains a problem that is largely overlooked, 
mostly due to the underreported number of stateless persons, their 
mixed origin and dispersion across the country. As statelessness is 
not typically linked with a specific minority group or a single ethnicity, 
identification of stateless persons is a challenging process, with the 
lack of dedicated and legally prescribed procedures making it even 
more difficult. Statelessness or risk thereof in the Polish context may 
often coincide with irregular stay. Procedural difficulties in establishing 
the citizenship of the person (or their identity) lacking adequate 
documentation may be used as justification for placing them in 
detention. The same rules may be applied in relation to stateless asylum 
seekers. There is, therefore, a clear link indicating a heightened risk of 
detention for stateless persons on Poland. The COVID-19 pandemic, 
on the other hand, has had an impact on the migration processes in 
general, and on the application of detention, their specific needs and 
situation in particular.
With no statelessness determination procedure in place and no legally 
prescribed definition of a stateless person in national law, there may 
be a significant number of stateless persons or persons at risk of 
statelessness in Poland who remain a hidden number, not included in 
any official reports or statistics. Experience of the Halina Niec Legal 
Aid Center and other NGOs providing legal assistance to persons 
seeking protection and foreigners indeed shows that statelessness 
often coincides with irregular status. Such persons are thus reluctant 
to contact the authorities out of fear of being placed in detention. 
According to a study by European Network on Statelessness, the risk 
of detention is an important factor deterring stateless persons from 
approaching the authorities,1 a situation that is neither beneficial for  
the state nor for the persons concerned.
The most recent available data on stateless persons in Poland gathered 
through the Population Census is already outdated, as the census 
was carried out back in 2011. Nevertheless, it provides an interesting 
reference point in terms of the scale of statelessness in Poland. The 
census report recorded a considerably high number of over 8,000 
persons of “unknown nationality” and 2,020 stateless persons. These 
numbers are to be treated with caution, however, as the information 
was gathered from declarations made by the census respondents, 
without any formal verification of their legal status. A mapping study on 
statelessness in the country, providing a more detailed overview of the 
statelessness population has been completed and the final report issued 
in September 2019 (UNHCR)2. As of July 2020, statistics published by 
the Office for Foreigners put the total number of “stateless persons” and 
individuals of “unknown nationality” holding a valid residence permit at 
382, of which 345 people were registered as stateless and 37 individuals 
were of ‘unknown nationality’. No information about the origin of these 
individuals is available3.
1 European Network on Statelessness (ENS), Protecting Stateless Persons from Arbitrary Detention in Poland.
2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Mapping Statelessness in Poland, September 2019, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5da58e7e4.html 
3 Up-to-date statictical information is published on the Statelessness Index website run by the European Network on Statelessness (ENS): index.statelessness.eu 
4 Regulation of the Minister of Health dated 13 March 2020, concerning the introduction of the state of epidemic emergency on the territory of the Republic of Poland; 
Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration dated 13 March 2020, concerning the temporary reintroduction of border control of persons crossing 
state border, being an internal border; Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration dated 13 March 2020, concerning the temporary suspension 
or limitation of border movements in selected border crossing
5 The ban was not applied to citizens of the Republic of Poland, foreigners who are spouses or children of citizens of the Republic of Poland or remain under 
permanent care of citizens of the Republic of Poland, holders of the Pole’s Card, diplomats, persons who have the right of permanent or temporary residence in the 
Republic of Poland or a work permit, foreigners driving a vehicle intended for transporting goods
6 The number of asylum applications lodged in 2020: January – 372, February – 361, March – 166, April – 62, May – 133, June – 210. In comparison to the average 360 
applications per month at the beginning of the year, the numbers have gone down by over 50% in March and by 83% in April.
There is no published and publicly available data on stateless people 
in detention, though some figures are collected by the Polish Border 
Guard. UNHCR estimates for the stateless population in Poland are 
based on data from the 2011 census.
Polish law has no specific regulations dedicated to stateless persons 
and so, those whose nationality was deemed “uncertain”, who may have 
been at risk of statelessness or who are stateless, were undergoing 
the standard identification process as part of other administrative 
procedures they were qualified under (protection or return). According 
to Polish regulations, foreigners identified as “unreturnable” are  
eligible to receive the so-called “tolerated status” which guarantees 
them the release from detention and entitles them to stay in Poland.  
If unreturnability is caused by risk of grave human rights violations upon 
removal, they can be granted “humanitarian stay” instead. During the 
lockdown months, the Halina Niec Legal Aid Center has not recorded 
any decisions, however, where such permits would be issued based  
on the COVID-19 – related impossibility of removal.
In response to the global epidemic of COVID-19, Polish authorities have 
imposed far-reaching restrictions and security measures which bear a 
direct impact on the situation of foreigners, including stateless persons 
and persons at risk of statelessness.
On 13 March 2020, Polish Prime Minister announced the introduction of 
the state of epidemic emergency. On the same date three regulations 
were adopted, followed by a decision to announce the state of epidemic 
resulting in the closing of borders to foreigners.4 International passenger 
air flights and international rail travel were suspended.
However, the ban on entering Poland was not absolute. In particularly 
justified cases5, the commanding officer of a Border Guard outpost, 
upon authorisation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Border 
Guard, can allow a foreigner to enter the territory of the Republic of 
Poland according to the procedure set out in the Act of 12 December 
2013 on Foreigners (Journal of Laws of 2020, item 35). This last 
exclusion from the entry ban remained the only opportunity for 
foreigners trying to enter the territory of Poland in order to seek 
international protection. In practice however, the overall number of new 
asylum applications lodged in Poland has dropped significantly6, while 
the number of applications made at Polish external borders (especially 
the most frequently used Terespol border crossing on the border with 
Belarus) has dropped down to zero in the first months of the lockdown.
The newly introduced legal instruments, prompted by health security 
reasons, held no direct reference to foreigners with irregular status 
or stateless persons. The practice of courts related to the detention 
of foreigners and return procedures continued unchanged. As for 
the carrying out of deportations, the practice varied, depending on 
the country of removal. According to NGO and media reports, some 
THE IMPACT OF PANDEMIC ON THE RISK OF  
DETENTION FOR STATELESS PERSONS IN POLAND
idcoalition.org  |  westernsydney.edu.au/hadri
COVID-19 IMPACTS ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION: GLOBAL RESPONSES
41
deportations were executed seemingly uninterruptedly, especially 
to Ukraine and the Russian Federation7, while in other cases the 
procedures were prolonged8.
As for foreigners placed in detention, NGO practice indicates that 
although protection proceedings were not hindered by the state of 
pandemic, and decisions were delivered in due time, return procedures 
were slowed down, which in some cases resulted in prolonged 
detention.
A direct effect of the lockdown was also the severe limitation of legal 
aid in detention. The Polish state guarantees free legal assistance 
to persons seeking international protection (limited to the appeal 
stage). In practice only several NGOs visit those placed in detention to 
provide legal information and legal assistance there. Legal aid in return 
proceedings is not funded by the state and NGO programs in most 
cases are focusing on protection and humanitarian cases only. Persons 
at risk of statelessness who have not applied for international protection 
may therefore experience significant difficulties in receiving legal 
assistance free of charge. Their unique status and lack of dedicated legal 
procedures make their status vulnerable as they might be threatened 
by prolonged and in some cases arbitrary detention. As part of the 
pandemic restrictions, the Border Guards have imposed a ban on 
visitors to detention centres which was lifted in mid-May. Most NGOs 
have suspended all their visits, and the availability of legal assistance 
was severely undermined. It is unclear how the scarcity of legal aid 
may have impacted the situation of detained stateless persons but 
since they are one of the most vulnerable groups at risk of prolonged 
detention, their cases call for special attention of human rights experts 
and institutions.
Special measures introduced by state authorities in relation to the 
pandemic although not directly concerning foreigners have had an 
undeniable impact on the situation of migrants, among which stateless 
persons are one of the most vulnerable groups. Limited access to legal 
aid, slowing down or suspending of administrative procedures and 
difficulties in carrying out removals have all contributed to exposing 
them to a heightened risk of prolonged detention.
KATARZYNA PRZYBYSŁAWSKA, PHD 
Halina Niec Legal Aid Center
7 “Polska deportuje ludzi w czasie epidemii”, Onet Wiadomości, 12 May 2020, https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/uchodzcy-z-czeczenii-w-polsce-jak-
wyglada-sytuacja-na-granicy/c2ygjh3
8 For example in relation to China.
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Saudi Arabia introduced measures to limit the spread of COVID-19 
beginning in March 2020, including suspending religious pilgrimages 
and halting international and domestic travel. On March 30, King Salman 
announced that everyone in Saudi Arabia would be entitled to medical 
care for COVID-19 regardless of their legal status in the country.1
Infections remained low throughout March but began to spike in 
April and May. Despite government efforts to limit the spread of the 
coronavirus, Saudi Arabia had nearly 330,000 confirmed infections and 
4,485 deaths as of mid-September 2020.2
The spike was seemingly driven by transmission among foreign migrant 
workers. In April, the Saudi Center for Disease Prevention and Control 
issued new guidelines to prohibit overcrowding in migrant housing. 3 
On May 5, the health minister announced that non-Saudis made up 76 
percent of new cases recorded in Saudi Arabia. 4
Saudi authorities released 250 immigration detainees in March but has 
not otherwise addressed the risks of locking large numbers of migrants 
in detention centers. The United Nations has called for alternatives to 
immigration detention during the pandemic,5 given the increased risk 
of contracting the novel coronavirus in the crowded and unhygienic 
conditions in most detention sites. But in Saudi Arabia, the detention 
of migrants during the COVID-19 pandemic has continued. And while 
it is difficult to find out what is happening inside those centers, a 
recent Human Rights Watch report indicates that the precautions and 
treatment for COVID-19 are minimal.
ETHIOPIAN MIGRANTS IN SAUDI ARABIA
An unpublished 2019 study6 found that over 90 percent of the migrants 
passing through Yemen to reach Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries 
for work opportunities come from Ethiopia. A combination of factors, 
including economic difficulties, drought, and human rights abuses have 
driven hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians to migrate over the past 
decade, most traveling irregularly by boat over the Red Sea and then 
by land through Yemen to Saudi Arabia. The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) estimated that nearly 140,000 migrants arrived in 
Yemen in 2019.
Migrants who cross irregularly into Saudi Arabia usually do so in the 
mountainous border area separating Yemen’s Saada governorate 
and Saudi Arabia’s Jizan province. Many are apprehended crossing 
the border or in the country’s interior. About 260,000 Ethiopians, an 
average of 10,000 per month, were deported from Saudi Arabia to 













The detention of migrants in deplorable facilities in Saudi Arabia is a 
longstanding problem. In 2014, Ethiopian nationals in the Saudi capital, 
Riyadh, told Human Rights Watch that thousands of foreign workers 
were being held in makeshift detention facilities without adequate 
food and shelter before being deported.8 In 2019, Human Rights Watch 
identified approximately 10 prisons and detention centers where 
migrants were held for various periods.9
While deportations from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia have been ongoing 
during the pandemic, the sheer numbers of Ethiopian migrants across 
the world who want to return makes it very difficult for Ethiopia to 
receive and process its nationals in quarantine in the capital, Addis 
Ababa10.
SAUDI ARABIA’S DETENTION OF ETHIOPIAN 
MIGRANTS DURING THE PANDEMIC
In April 2020, while most countries were in the middle of nationwide 
lockdowns, the Houthi armed group forcibly expelled thousands of 
Ethiopian migrants from northern Yemen using the COVID-19 pandemic 
as a pretext, forcing them to the Saudi border and killing dozens. Saudi 
border guards then fired on the fleeing migrants, killing dozens more, 
while hundreds of survivors escaped to a mountainous border area.
Ethiopian migrants told Human Rights Watch that after they spent days 
stranded without food or water, Saudi officials allowed hundreds to 
enter the country. The Saudis then arbitrarily detained hundreds if not 
thousands of Ethiopian migrants for months in unsanitary and abusive 
facilities without the ability to legally challenge their detention or 
eventual deportation to Ethiopia.11
The three prisons most often cited by detained Ethiopian migrants 
among the 10 detention centers that 12 Human Rights Watch identified 
in 2019 were Jizan Central Prison in Jizan city, the Shmeisi Detention 
Center east of Jeddah, where migrants are processed for deportation, 
and a center near the town of al-Dayer in Jizan province along the 
border.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN SAUDI ARABIA DURING COVID-19: 
A CASE-STUDY ON THE TREATMENT OF ETHIOPIAN MIGRANTS
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Migration routes between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia.  
© Human Rights Watch
Satellite imagery recorded on 9 August 2020, shows new buildings  
in the possible detention center of al-Dayer, Jizan Province,  
Saudi Arabia. Some of the buildings were completed in April 2020.  
Satellite imagery © 2020 Planet Labs
Ethiopian migrants described being taken in small cars and pickup 
trucks from the Saudi border to a detention facility in al-Dayer. Human 
Rights Watch has identified through open source technology a prison 
complex in al-Dayer that matched the descriptions of those interviewed.
Human Rights Watch spoke to women and girls who estimated that 
300 to 500 of them were held in one room in severely overcrowded 
conditions after they were separated from the men. Human Rights 
Watch reviewed video footage sent by a person held in al-Dayer that 
depicts hundreds of women under a wire mesh roof, ankle deep in filthy 
water, screaming and crying.
Women and girls said their situation generally improved when they were 
taken to a detention facility in Jizan. Human Rights Watch analyzed 
satellite imagery together with witness accounts and found a complex in 
Jizan city. For men, the conditions deteriorated when they got to Jizan.
13 https://www.iom.int/news/iom-ethiopia-assists-hundreds-returning-covid-19-affected-migrants 
Satellite imagery showing the complex of the Jizan Detention  
Center in Jizan Province, Saudi Arabia. Satellite imagery  
© 2020 Maxar Technologies
Both men and women consistently described poor detention conditions 
including overcrowding, blocked, inadequate, and overflowing toilets, 
lack of beds and blankets, lack of medical care including prenatal 
care for those who were pregnant, and inadequate food and water. 
They described serious skin problems they said were caused by the 
unhygienic conditions. Photo images and videos of detainees in al-Dayer 
and a detention center in Jizan corroborated the accounts.
Men described sleeping in the same clothes they had worn since they 
arrived with limited access to water to wash and no medical care. They 
said that their temperatures were taken when they entered Jizan, but 
that they have had no other COVID-19-related testing, prevention 
measures or guidance, or care. Three men said that prison guards 
beat them for asking for medical attention or complaining about the 
conditions. Given the lack of COVID-19 testing, Human Rights Watch 
was not able to verify if any of the Ethiopian migrants in detention 
contracted the novel coronavirus.
Human Rights Watch spoke to six women who had been transferred 
from Jizan to the Shmeisi Detention Center, near Jeddah, where 
conditions were described as better but still inadequate and from which 
some of the female interviewees were returned to Ethiopia.
IOM’s office in Ethiopia registers migrants upon arrival in Ethiopia 
from Saudi Arabia. On June 913 the organization had registered 3,000 
Ethiopian returnees from Saudi Arabia since April. Based on migrant 
accounts gathered since the release of the statement in August, Human 
Rights Watch estimates that there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, 
of Ethiopian migrants pushed out of Yemen in April who remain in 
deplorable detention conditions in Saudi Arabia.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The Saudi government should investigate and appropriately discipline 
or prosecute security personnel responsible for firing upon Ethiopian 
migrants at the Yemen border. Any “shoot on sight” order should be 
immediately revoked.
The authorities should also investigate allegations of abuse at migrant 
detention centers, and appropriately discipline or prosecute those  
found responsible. Immigration detention should be an exceptional 
measure of last resort, for the shortest period, and only if justified by  
a legitimate purpose. Children should never be detained for migration-
related reasons.
In the interim, Saudi authorities should transfer migrant detainees 
to centers that meet international standards and should work with 
international agencies to bring migrant detention centers in line with 
international standards under the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners (“Mandela Rules”).
The Saudi authorities should urgently identify and release children along 
with their family members, and provide safe alternatives to detention 
to which humanitarian agencies have regular access. They should 
also identify and release pregnant and nursing women in line with 
international guidelines on the detention of asylum seekers.
Those released from detention facilities should undergo adequate 
medical screening to ensure they receive, if necessary, proper care  
and follow-up.
Beyond the immediate crisis of Ethiopian migrants in detention, Saudi 
Arabia should ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and establish asylum 
procedures consistent with international standards for stateless people 
and foreign nationals at risk of persecution in their home countries. 
Saudi Arabia should immediately allow the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees to exercise its mandate by allowing it to determine asylum 
seekers’ refugee status and facilitate durable solutions, including 
integration in Saudi Arabia, for those recognized as refugees.
NADIA HARDMAN 
Refugee and Migrant Rights Researcher, Human Rights Watch
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INTRODUCTION
Singapore’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been mixed. 
Initially seen as one of the better examples of managing the pandemic 
early on with efficiency and decisiveness, that reputation has now been 
marred with her handling of the country’s migrant population. Once 
deemed the “gold standard of near-perfect detection” by Harvard 
epidemiologists1, initial praise for the country’s efforts at containing 
the virus have unfortunately not reached all sectors of society in an 
equal way. This paper will be structured in a way that focuses on the 
country’s social security responses, including any changes in policies 
and regulations around enforcement and immigration detention during 
the pandemic. Given the predominance of the migrant worker issue 
in Singapore, the rest of this paper will heavily focus on the state’s 
response, to the handling of the pandemic among the migrant  
worker population.
IMMIGRATION AND POLICY RESPONSES
Immigration policy has also not fundamentally altered in light of 
the pandemic, but measures have been taken for travellers who are 
authorised to travel to Singapore under current conditions. All travellers 
entering Singapore, which includes citizens, permanent residents, and 
long-term pass holders, are required to quarantine in government-
designated facilities or in their homes (depending on whether they are 
entering from a select list of approved countries). Singapore citizens 
and permanent residents returning home will have their costs of staying 
in these government-designated facilities covered by the government, 
given that they departed Singapore before 27 March 2020, the date on 
which the country issued a travel advisory to not leave. If found guilty 
of an immigration-related offence, offenders are expected to remain in 
Singapore for the duration of the investigation, and serve prison time 
if relevant to the offence, and would be required to purchase their own 
ticket home at the end of the investigation.
Work permit holders make up approximately 1 million out of nearly  
6 million people in the country, however, more than half of the people 
who contracted COVID-19 have been work permit holders in Singapore. 
However, there have not been any changes to immigration detention 
policy, or none have been publicly communicated by the government 
to date. The policy in Singapore remains that people who are liable on 
immigration-related offences can be detained in any police station, 
immigration depot, prison, or any other place that has been appointed 
for such a purpose by the Controller of Immigration.2
On the issue of refugee-related detention, Singapore is not a signatory 
to the 1951 Refugee Convention.3 There is also no domestic legislation 
for the protection of refugees or asylum seekers. Those guilty of 
immigration-related offenses such as still being in Singapore irregularly 
are usually overstayers, such as those who legally entered the country 











be imprisoned, and male overstayers aged under 50 found guilty of this 
offence may also be caned4. Work permit holders are usually not eligible 
for citizenship, and maximum terms for employment are commonly 
clearly laid out. These policies have not changed during this pandemic. 
It is rare that those seeking asylum have been able to enter Singapore 
legally except on a tourist visa and would be found guilty of overstaying, 
and Singapore has not accepted those seeking asylum through boat 
arrivals (such boats have not been allowed to enter Singapore territorial 
waters). Such cases, even though possible, have not been reported.
In the Singapore prison system, no cases have been reported thus 
far, and this can be credited to the government undertaking several 
measures to ensure the virus does not spread in prisons. All inmates 
have had to undergo daily temperature checks, and safe distancing 
measures have been put in place. Those who may be feeling unwell 
are given masks to wear and immediately separated from the rest of 
the inmates and monitored. Newly admitted inmates are also housed 
separately and monitored for the first 14 days.5
PANDEMIC RESPONSES TO  
MIGRANT WORKERS
Migrant workers and Singapore’s treatment of them during the 
COVID-19 pandemic now appears to dominate discussion on the 
country’s handling of the pandemic. Singapore has 43 migrant worker 
dormitories that house an approximate 280,000 male work permit 
holders.6 Employing companies, often construction companies, pay 
for their workers to be housed in these privately-owned and run 
dormitories. A majority of work permit holders who have contracted 
COVID-19 did so in these dormitories.
The dormitories have long been criticised for being substandard and 
overcrowded, with less than sanitary conditions. Several civil society 
organisations, especially those working closely with migrant workers, 
had previously warned of the potential for infection or disease to spread 
in these dormitories. In late March 2020, Transient Workers Count Too, 
a migrant rights group in Singapore, warned that the “risk of a new 
cluster among this group remains undeniable”7 While the government 
did take preventative steps to curb the possible spread of the virus in 
the dormitories by closing communal spaces and staggering meal times 
and recreation hours, it has been criticised for not being enough. This is 
especially because the bunk-bed dormitory rooms can sleep up to 20 
people (several other reports say 12 people), and maintaining any social 
distancing would be impossible.8 The government also announced other 
measures to contain any outbreak in dormitories, such as gazetting and 
locking down the S11 and Westlite Toh Guan dormitories, which house 
19,000 workers among them.9 This locking down was extended to all 
dormitories in April 2020, separating infected clusters with those not 
infected, and moving out the approximately 7,000 workers who worked 
in essential services. They were moved to alternative accommodation 
such as vacant apartments, floating hotels or military camps. Officers 
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from Singapore’s armed and police forces helped to implement these 
measures, including enhancing medical support and facilitating testing 
for the virus.
The treatment of migrant workers, by locking them down in dormitories 
for what has now been almost six months has gained criticism from 
civil society. While citizens and residents living under the lockdown (or 
circuit-breaker as it was called) have benefitted from greater leniency 
such as being able to go to shops to purchase necessities and be 
outdoors for exercise, these workers have effectively been confined 
for this duration of time, with most unable to leave the confines of 
their rooms or dormitories at most. Reports have already emerged of 
deteriorating physical and mental health among these workers due to 
their prolonged isolation in these rooms which they share with up to  
12 people.10 With many migrant workers locked down in their 
dormitories, with many not even being allowed to come out of their 
shared rooms, this is hardly surprising. Regrettably, there have been 
several reports of attempted suicides, self-harm or deaths.11
CONCLUSION
Singapore’s response to, and global acclaim for her handling of this 
pandemic, while initially precedent-setting, has now largely been 
shaped by the country’s poor response to dealing with outbreaks within 
the migrant worker community. The physical, emotional and mental cost 
of this pandemic among the migrant worker community in Singapore 
unfortunately remains incredibly high. However, the pandemic has also 
shed new light on the conditions migrant workers have been living in, 
and this attention has seen an increase in charitable donations, along 
with dorm operators working to improve living conditions. Belated as it 
might be, at least one possible development to emerge from Singapore’s 
pandemic response will be finally prioritizing and treating the migrant 
worker community with the dignity and respect they deserve.
SANGEETHA YOGENDRAN 
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The COVID-19 pandemic brought about an onset of challenges on 
a global scale for many states and citizens alike, particularly for the 
refugee, undocumented migrant, and stateless communities residing 
in the Republic of South Africa. This paper examines how the COVID-19 
pandemic has affected South Africa’s approach to dealing with 
immigration detention. 
INTRODUCTION
Immigration detention in South Africa has long been riddled with both 
substantive and procedural irregularities, which have been exacerbated 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. On 15 March 2020, President Ramaphosa 
declared a state of disaster under the Disaster Management Act, and 
announced that the government would be taking urgent and drastic 
measures to manage the disease. A few days later, on 21 March 2020  
a nationwide lockdown was instituted under the Disaster Management 
Regulations. The Regulations limited certain rights and freedoms and 
led to the halting of service provision at a number of state departments, 
including Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and Refugee Reception 
Offices (RRO’s) responsible for migrant permit renewals1 and birth 
registration. 
In January 2020, the Refugee Act from 1998 was amended through 
the Refugee Amendment Acts of 2008, 2011 and 2017, which came into 
force with the publication of the accompanying lockdown regulations. 
Under the new laws, refugees and asylum seekers are given five days 
to process a claim once they have entered the country and register at 
a RRO with their transit visa. Asylum seekers are then given a limited 
Section 22 permit, which is to be renewed every six months while 
awaiting the adjudication process. The holder of a section 22 permit  
has the right to work and study and is protected against deportation  
to their country of origin. The asylum process can be long and onerous 
in South Africa with RRO’s often lacking the capacity to process asylum 
claims swiftly.
The commencement of South Africa’s nationwide lockdown was 
accompanied by the suspension of services at RROs. Furthermore, 
the DHA has failed to comply with the statutory limits of detention. 
However, this compliance has since improved. Moreover, matters 
pertaining to immigration violations lack consistent and effective judicial 
oversight. Immigration policies have become increasingly restricted 
physically as well as administratively under the guise of health concerns. 
For example, during the pandemic, South Africa constructed over  
40 kilometers of emergency barriers along its border with Zimbabwe 
to ensure that no undocumented or infected person crosses into the 
country. This imposed greater challenges for refugees and migrants 
along different stages of the immigration process for access to basic 
needs and risk of detention. 
COVID-19 RESPONSE:  
STATE ACTIONS AND POLICIES
From the South African State’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
three key policies can be highlighted as essential to the operation of 
immigration detention during these unprecedented times: (i) regulations 
governing the lockdown and border closure, (ii) regulations governing 
1 Pre-COVID-19 and the national lockdown, the Department of Home Affairs was already overwhelmed with a backlog of administering permits which made life for 
asylum seekers even harder. 
2 (GG 43107 GN 318), https://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/notices/2020/20200331-gg43191-GoN440_COGTA.pdf
3 (GG 43292 GN 512), https://edit.laws.africa/works/akn/za/act/gn/2020/512/media/publication/za-act-gn-2020-512-publication-document.pdf 
law enforcement responsibilities and (iii) closure of RRO’s and non-
renewal of permits. With RRO’s remaining closed and not renewing 
permits, births are not being registered and access to places of detention 
by lawyers is limited. On 25 March 2020, the government announced 
that asylum seekers whose visas expire after 16 March 2020 would not 
be penalized or arrested. Yet, security forces continued to arrest and 
deport undocumented migrants, justifying this as a measure to contain 
the spread of the virus. Xenophobic prejudices held by security officials 
have also led to the targeted harassment and arrest of foreign nationals 
and asylum seekers for petty offences, placing them in overcrowded 
detention centers where social distancing remains near impossible. 
The purpose of the lockdown is to curb the spread of the virus; further 
congesting already densely populated areas such as detention centers, 
police holding and correctional facilities circumvents that very purpose. 
As a result of some of the lockdown restrictions, courts are not able 
to serve the effective oversight role as they usually do and remand 
prisoners are often stuck indefinitely without judicial oversight. However, 
on 31 March 2020, Directions were issued in terms of Regulation 10 of the 
Regulations under the Disaster Management Act, 20022 which provided 
that “an accused person arrested for a petty offence must be released 
and warned to appear in court on a future date”.
Lastly, a subsequent policy emerged in the Immigration Act 13 of 20023, 
“Determination of Correctional Facilities as Places of Detention of Illegal 
Foreigners Pending Deportation”, which designated various correctional 
facilities/centers as places of detention of “illegal foreigners pending 
deportation” for purposes of COVID-19. This policy is particularly 
problematic as South Africa’s borders are closed thereby preventing 
deportations from occurring and once again, contradicted the cause  
of decongesting places of detention.
DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF COVID-19 
POLICIES ON UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS
The implementation of the above-mentioned policies has been applied 
unevenly among South African citizens and non-nationals. Civil society 
organizations have since become aware of the disproportionate 
impact that the lockdown and the Regulations have had on migrant 
communities; this has been largely due to the criminalization of foreign 
nationals and asylum seekers who have violated the COVID-19 related 
Regulations which has resulted in a slew of human rights violations 
and deprivations. Further, the lack of accountability mechanisms has 
been highlighted through countless reports written on misconduct 
by law enforcement. These reports documented arbitrary arrests 
of validly documented non-nationals and the arrest and remand of 
undocumented non-nationals. Further concerns have since been raised 
such as the indefinite detention/remand of non-nationals as well as 
their continued detention after scheduled release dates. This has been 
observed in contrast to South African citizens who, upon arrest for 
violation of the Regulations, have since been released. 
On the other hand, in line with the prescribed Directions, almost 20,000 
low risk inmates have been released from prison in order to curb the 
spread of the virus in prisons due to overcrowding, yet parallel to this, 
and as mentioned, there has been an increase in detention for migrants 
for petty crimes. Furthermore, there have been significant barriers in 
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accessing detention facilities, as well as limited capacity to monitor 
such detention facilities. This proves that the preventative measures 
that were put in place in prisons and detention facilities were tailored 
only towards natural citizens of the state and further amplifies the 
dehumanization of migrants in South Africa. According to civil society 
organization Sonke Gender Justice, there have been concerns regarding 
detainees contracting COVID-19. When the first case was detected in 
March 2020, prisons and detention facilities were operating at roughly 
at 200-300% capacity, with inmates sharing beds or sleeping on the 
floor. These conditions are worsened by the occurrence of other issues 
in prisons such as assault, sexual violence, and high rates of HIV. 
Another prevalent example of how policies often disproportionally 
affect undocumented migrants is through birth registration. As 
mentioned earlier, the closure of RROs during lockdown has led to births 
not being able to be registered and with ports of entry being closed and 
many asylum seekers being detained, this poses challenges particularly 
for unmarried parents. On 1 September 2020, the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa heard an application from the Centre for Child Law to 
declare section 10 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 
invalid and unconstitutional as it excluded unmarried fathers from 
registering their children under the father’s surname in the absence of 
the mother or the mother’s consent. They contended that there is an 
insurmountable barrier if the mother’s consent or presence is required 
where it is impossible to do so. The court further highlighted how the 
DHA’s lack of recognition in the civil birth registration system exposes 
the children to the risk of being excluded from the educational system 
and from accessing social assistance and healthcare. 
Finally, there have been very few relief schemes available to non-
nationals during the lockdown, which has resulted in an increased 
number of human rights concerns. Many South African citizens have 
qualified for economic relief schemes to assist with the economic 
consequences that the pandemic and subsequent lockdown have 
brought on. However, because migrants are not citizens, they have 
been excluded from the majority of effective relief. For example, the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), the primary relief plan for workers 
who have lost their jobs due to the virus, prevents migrants from 
receiving any income, as it is limited to South African nationals. The 
immigrants that are employed by South African nationals are at the whim 
of their employers, where it is largely up to their discretion as to apply 
for the UIF. In conjunction with the harmful conditions migrants have had 
to live under during the pandemic, the systemic discrimination against 
migrants has resulted in deprivation of their most basic needs such as 
food, water, income, healthcare and most importantly, their liberty. 
CONCLUSION
In the wake of a global health pandemic, rigid lockdown orders have 
highlighted concerns over the manner in which immigration detention is 
used as a tool to criminalize non-nationals at a time where no effective 
judicial oversight is possible. The surge of arrests and detention of 
non-nationals illustrates the urgent need to address and reform 
alternatives to detention for petty, administrative crimes. The continued 
harassment of non-nationals feeds into xenophobic biases that lead to 
the unnecessary and prolonged detention for migrants, along with its 
deplorable conditions, during a public health crisis that has claimed the 
lives of many.
CHARNÉ TRACEY AND PALESA MALOISANE  
Lawyers for Human Rights
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Spain has led the way in releasing migrants from immigration detention 
facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic. And it did so due to the ever-
present pressure of civil society organizations, who counted with the 
Spanish Ombudsman as a powerful ally. The government and the 
competent judges reacted and emptied all detention facilities within 
weeks, but bearing in mind that it was an exceptional and temporary 
measure compelled by the emergency situation. That is, the release 
of all migrant detainees is solely a consequence of the pandemic, but 
never part of a strategy aiming to reduce or end detention. This has 
not been a priority of the Spanish authorities, who even announced 
the construction of a new detention facility some months before the 
coronavirus struck the country. Now that the country is temporarily  
free from immigration detention, it is time to take this opportunity  
to implement alternatives.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN SPAIN
International law mandates that detention must only be used as a last 
resort. European Union law, by virtue of the Return Directive1, asserts 
the same principle. It is unclear whether the Spanish legislation complies 
with international or EU law. Spain’s Immigration Act includes detention 
as an interim measure within a list that includes different alternatives 
on the same footing. Thus, the law does not state that detention can 
only be applied if no other less coercive means can be used. On top of 
that, according to the same law, detention must be used when removals 
cannot be enforced within the first three days in cases of “devolución”2. 
In practice, however, detention in these cases is not always enforced if 
there is no prospective removal, and third-country nationals are usually 
sent to reception programs run by civil society organizations, such as 
Fundación Cepaim, in coordination with the Ministry of Inclusion, Social 
Security and Migrations. In the so-called “expulsión”, detention may be 
used, and it is actually enforced over the different alternatives available. 
Research shows that, in practice, alternatives are rarely implemented 
and therefore, detention is the only measure applied. Measures such  
as surrendering passports and documents are not used as alternatives 
per se, as they are only implemented once migrants must be released 
when the maximum period of 60 days in detention has been reached.3
In Spain, immigration detention is therefore one of the measures that 
competent judges have at their disposal to ensure deportations. No 
other reason justifies the detention of third country nationals in the  
so-called Foreigners Internment Centers (Centro de Internamiento  
de Extranjeros, also known as CIE). After the maximum period of  
60 days, migrants must be released and cannot be detained again  
for the same reason.
1 Directive 2008/115/EC, also known as the Return Directive sets forth the standards for returning third-country nationals to their home countries. Article 15 states 
that “unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country 
national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process”.
2 The Spanish law establishes a separate disciplinary procedure for third-country nationals. The term devolución refers to the removal order issued against a  
person who has been intercepted while entering Spain’s territory without an authorization. This is the case of migrants who are intercepted at sea or at the border. 
On the other hand, expulsión is used to describe the procedure initiated against a third-country national who is found on the territory without a permit to stay in  
the country. 
3 European Commission (2013). Evaluation on the application of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC). Final Report. European Commission – DG Home Affairs, p. 31-32.
4 For a better understanding of life inside a CIE, see reports by the Jesuit Migrant Service in Spain. The latest one, Informe CIE 2019: Diez años mirando a otro lado,  
is available at: https://bit.ly/3ic0sbj.
5 Defensor del Pueblo (2019). Informe anual 2018. Mecanismo Nacional de Prevención. Available at: https://bit.ly/3haLxwT. 
6 Las Provincias (16 April 2020). Los países que prohíben la entrada a españoles por la crisis del coronavirus. Available at: https://bit.ly/3byV7bG.
7 Fiscalía General del Estado (2020). Nota interna de extranjería núm. 1/2020. Del internamiento cautelar administrativo de extranjeros; de la sustitución total de las 
penas privativas de libertad por la expulsión; y de la sustitución del proceso penal por la expulsión. Available at: https://bit.ly/2R0ZaEe. 
8 Juzgado de Instrucción nº. 8 (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria). Procedure 455/2020, 31 March 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/3c6wDqm.
DETENTION DURING THE PANDEMIC: THE 
RESPONSE BY CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE
Civil society organizations have been continuously reporting and 
warning about the heinous conditions inside the CIE,4 and even 
the Spanish Ombudsman denounced the shameful circumstances 
surrounding immigration detention.5 When the state of alarm was 
declared by the government on 14 March 2020, the voices against 
immigration detention for reasons relating to the poor, inadequate and 
unsafe situation of detainees grew stronger as the pandemic posed 
life-threatening consequences to anyone inside. News about migrant 
detainees and workers who tested positive proved civil society right 
about the CIE as being completely unsuited to prevent the spread of  
the virus within their walls.
Moreover, detention had lost its legal basis altogether as it could no 
longer ensure deportations. By the time Spain closed its borders on  
18 March, over 60 countries had already announced some kind of travel 
restriction to people arriving from Spain. By the beginning of April, the 
number of countries which either banned their entry or canceled air and 
maritime connections with Spain rose to over 150.6 Therefore, travel was 
severely restricted, pending removals were canceled, and prospective 
ones were ruled out. For that reason, migrant detainees had to be 
released. And they were. Not as early as civil society organizations and 
activists demanded, but within six weeks, every CIE was empty for the 
first time in history.
Judges are the competent authorities to issue both detention and 
release orders of third-country nationals. They detain migrants when 
public prosecutors ask for such interim measures. Detentions stopped 
soon, as the Public Prosecutor’s Office issued an internal note on 31 
March ordering public prosecutors across the country to refrain from 
seeking the detention of migrants who were to be expelled from the 
country.7 The number of migrant detainees started to drop as judges 
found that detention could not be sustained as an interim measure  
to ensure deportations that no longer were feasible. In addition, one 
judge also announced the release of migrants from one particular  
CIE on humanitarian grounds,8 as its facilities were not fit to prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 and to keep detainees safe from any threat to public 
health, just as social organizations and the Spanish Ombudsman had 
previously concluded on several occasions. The judge further noted that 
the conditions inside the CIE favored the transmission of the virus and 
that he based his decision solely on reasons relating to public health, 
public order and humanitarian grounds. That is, even if removals could 
be enforced, migrant detainees had to be released.
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The release process followed a similar pattern across the country. 
Migrants who had a home to go to were the first ones to be set free. 
If they lacked any relatives in the country, they were sent to social 
organizations running reception projects, such as the humanitarian 
assistance program for undocumented migrants at Fundación Cepaim, 
a nationwide organization focusing on social inclusion and intercultural 
coexistence, which received 46 migrant detainees in Madrid, Valencia 
and Murcia.
THERE IS AMPLE ROOM FOR ALTERNATIVES
Civil society organizations and activists have welcomed this approach, 
although they feel it is a measure that has been compelled by the 
situation and the lack of legal basis for immigration detention while 
deportations cannot be enforced, instead of being part of a wider 
strategy by the government to gradually reduce detention. In practice, 
detention occupies the whole spectrum of applicable interim measures, 
and there is room for alternatives to fill the big gap left during the 
pandemic.
As the former Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights 
put it after his visit to Spain in early 2020, civil society in this country 
is “one of the most vibrant” he had ever encountered.9 Indeed, social 
organizations have the capabilities, the experience and the willingness 
to pilot alternative-to-detention programs first, and to ultimately 
manage established community-based alternatives in the future. For 
instance, the aforementioned nationwide humanitarian assistance 
program managed by the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and 
Migrations and implemented by organizations such as Fundación 
Cepaim has been running for over a decade. It provides accommodation 
and covers the basic needs (food, hygiene and local travel) of its 
beneficiaries, who are assisted during three months by a team of social 
workers and, sometimes, even by lawyers and psychologists. The 
programme provides migrants released from CIE with skills that would 
support their social inclusion in Spain. Social organizations have the 
staff and tools needed to ensure successful pilot programs.
9 OHCHR (2020). Statement by Professor Philip Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, on his visit to Spain, 27 January –  
7 February 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/2R75tWG. 
IT IS TIME FOR ALTERNATIVES
There are no migrant detainees now in Spain for reasons relating 
to their immigration status. Detention is not a measure that can be 
taken to ensure deportations in the near future due to the pandemic 
and its uncertain nature. It is now the time for the Spanish competent 
authorities to make use of this moment as an opportunity to implement 
community-based alternative-to-detention pilot programs. Spain led 
the way releasing migrants from detention, and it should at least give 
way to alternatives in order to comply with human rights standards in 
this field. The pandemic has shown that alternatives to detention are  
the only way out and a shift away from detention is needed now more 
than ever.
NACHO HERNÁNDEZ 
International Affairs Department, Fundación Cepaim
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INTRODUCTION
Thailand is home to approximately 5,000 urban refugees and asylum 
seekers (collectively, refugees), with over 200 refugees detained in 
immigration detention centres.1 A rights-based assessment of the 
country’s social security response to the COVID-19 pandemic reveals 
the continued sidelining of the needs of refugees who experience 
marginalisation in Thai society.2
During the pandemic, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) has continued 
arresting and detaining refugees for immigration-related offences. 
Further, while some precautions have been implemented to prevent the 
risk of an outbreak in detention, these precautions fall short of human 
rights and public health standards. This is despite repeated advocacy 
from various human rights groups for the RTG to halt arrests of 
refugees, consider alternatives to detention for detained refugees,  
and improve conditions in detention facilities.
COVID-19 INFECTIONS IN THAILAND
The RTG has generally managed to contain local transmissions of the 
COVID-19 virus better than its neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia. 
At the time of writing (12 September 2020), the country has reported 
3,461 cases.3 UNHCR Thailand reported in June 2020 that there were 
2 reported cases of COVID-19 amongst refugees.4 These numbers do 
not include the 65 detainees in Songkhla immigration detention centre 
who tested positive for COVID-19 in May 2020.5 According to Human 
Rights Watch, these 65 detainees include 18 ethnic Rohingya women 
and children.6
1 These numbers are current as of 15 June 2020: UNHCR, Protection Working Group – COVID-19 Response Coordination Sub-group for Urban Asylum-seekers and 
Refugees, 15 June 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/th/wp-content/uploads/sites/91/2020/08/Urban-Dashboard_for_COVID-19-15062020.pdf. These numbers do 
not include refugees living in the nine temporary shelters along the Thai-Myanmar border. It also does not include groups of individuals who are unable to officially 
register with UNHCR Thailand, including ethnic Rohingya persons.
2 This is despite Thailand’s obligation under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to take into special consideration the needs 
of the most vulnerable or marginalised, such as refugees. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf. 
3 Today, Thailand finds second Covid-19 infection after long absence, 11 September 2020, https://www.todayonline.com/world/thailand-finds-second-covid-19-
infection-after-long-absence. 
4 UNHCR, Protection Working Group – COVID-19 Response Coordination Sub-group for Urban Asylum-seekers and Refugees, 15 June 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/
th/wp-content/uploads/sites/91/2020/08/Urban-Dashboard_for_COVID-19-15062020.pdf. 
5 Human Rights Watch, Thailand Should Free Detained Migrants Amid Pandemic, 8 May 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/08/thailand-should-free-
detained-migrants-amid-pandemic. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Daron Tan and Manachaya Yankittikul, A Looming Catastrophe: COVID-19, Urban Refugees, and the Right to Health in Thailand, 11 May 2020, https://rli.blogs.sas.
ac.uk/2020/05/11/a-looming-catastrophe-covid-19-urban-refugees-and-the-right-to-health-in-thailand/. 
8 UNHCR, COVID-19 Impact Assessment: Urban Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Thailand, July 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/th/wp-content/uploads/
sites/91/2020/08/UNHCR-Thailand-Urban-COVID-19-Impact-Assessment_July-2020.pdf, at 16.
9 CESCR, Concluding observations on the combined initial and second periodic reports of Thailand, UN Doc. E/C.12/THA/CO/1-2, 19 June 2015, at para 29. 
10 Daron Tan and Manachaya Yankittikul, A Looming Catastrophe: COVID-19, Urban Refugees, and the Right to Health in Thailand, 11 May 2020, https://rli.blogs.sas.
ac.uk/2020/05/11/a-looming-catastrophe-covid-19-urban-refugees-and-the-right-to-health-in-thailand/. See also UNHCR, COVID-19 Impact Assessment: Urban 
Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Thailand, July 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/th/wp-content/uploads/sites/91/2020/08/UNHCR-Thailand-Urban-COVID-19-
Impact-Assessment_July-2020.pdf, at 23 – 24. 
11 Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979). An English translation is available at: https://web.krisdika.go.th/data/outsitedata/outsite21/file/Immigration_Act_B.E._2522.pdf. 
12 James Morris and Son Nguyen, Stranded foreigners must get embassy letter, new visa or leave Thailand to avoid arrest by police, 14 September 2020, https://www.
thaiexaminer.com/thai-news-foreigners/2020/07/13/stranded-foreigners-letter-from-embassies-or-leave-thailand-to-avoid-arrest/.
13 Ibid.
SOCIAL SECURITY RESPONSE TO COVID-19
The RTG’s social security response to the pandemic has not sufficiently 
included the needs of urban refugees. All foreigners, including refugees, 
can access free COVID-19 testing and treatment if they meet the RTG’s 
criteria.7 However, many refugees fear accessing testing and treatment 
due to financial reasons if they do not meet the RTG’s criteria, fear of 
being arrested, and lack of adequate information.8 These challenges are 
consistent with the observations by the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) that refugees in Thailand “still face 
obstacles in accessing basic health care services”.9 Further, the RTG 
has not secured the underlying determinants of health for refugees, 
including the interrelated rights to work, adequate standard of living, 
housing, water, and sanitation.10 The advent of COVID-19 has done little 
to shift the RTG’s perception of refugees in Thailand.
ARRESTS
Refugees continue to be arrested and detained under the Immigration 
Act B.E. 2522.11 These arrests have continued despite attempts at 
advocacy and interventions from UNHCR and NGOs. Further, the 
majority of refugees have not benefited from the RTG’s leniency in 
granting visa amnesties to foreigners whose visas expired from 26 
March 2020, as these amnesties do not apply to refugees who already 
entered Thailand before January 2020.12 On the contrary, they are at a 
higher risk of arrest, as the immigration authorities have warned that 
there will be a crackdown for overstaying.13
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DETENTION PROCEDURES FOR  
NEW DETAINEES
The RTG have put in place precautions to avoid the introduction of the 
virus into detention centres from newly admitted detainees. These 
include ensuring that immigration officers who work closely with new 
detainees wear personal protective equipment, face masks or face 
shields, and gloves. The officers will check the temperature of new 
arrivals and observe whether they display any relevant symptoms. 
If new detainees have a fever above 37.5°C or display any COVID-19 
symptoms, the officers will send them directly to the hospital.  
New detainees are then detained in a reception cell for 15 days to 
observe whether they display any COVID-19 symptoms, separate  
from existing detainees.14
FURTHER PRECAUTIONS TAKEN
The RTG has also introduced other measures to stem the risk of an 
outbreak in detention. All officers are required to take their temperature 
before entering the facility and to wear masks at all times. At the time 
of writing, immigration detention centres have closed for visitors to 
avoid infection to the detainees. When visitation was permitted, all 
visitors had their temperatures checked and were required to wear 
masks at all times. The authorities also limited the number of visitors to 
20 people at one time and enforced social distancing restrictions for 
visitors.15 However, the RTG’s ban on visitors to detention centres has not 
eliminated the risk of infection, because there is still a constant flow of 
detention staff in and out of the centres.16
DETENTION CONDITIONS
Conditions in detention remain extremely unpleasant and overcrowded. 
According to reports received from individuals who have been detained, 
immigration officers routinely clean the detention areas with salt and 
water. Further, detainees who display COVID-19 symptoms will be 
immediately sent to the hospital.
14 Thai Immigration Bureau, Department of Youth and UNICEF, Manual for prevention operation and the child protection in the immigration detention centre under the 
COVID19 situation, 3 June 2020. 
15 Ibid.
16 Daron Tan and Manachaya Yankittikul, A Looming Catastrophe: COVID-19, Urban Refugees, and the Right to Health in Thailand, 11 May 2020, https://rli.blogs.sas.
ac.uk/2020/05/11/a-looming-catastrophe-covid-19-urban-refugees-and-the-right-to-health-in-thailand/. 
17 This MOU is signed by the Royal Thai Police, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Labour on 21 January 2019. This MOU is implemented to protect the rights of the child, especially for the alternative to 
detention to certain types of children, including unaccompanied minors, separated children, refugee children, children who are victims of human trafficking, and 
vulnerable children. See Thai Immigration Bureau, Department of Youth and UNICEF, Manual for prevention operation and the child protection in the immigration 
detention centre under the COVID19 situation, 3 June 2020.
18 Human Rights Watch, Thailand Should Free Detained Migrants Amid Pandemic, 8 May 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/08/thailand-should-free-
detained-migrants-amid-pandemic. 
19 Ibid. See also, Urgent call for COVID-19 response for Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 22 May 2020, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/ 
06/200522%20Letter%20Thailand%20Prime%20Minister_0.pdf. 
20 UNHCR, COVID-19 Impact Assessment: Urban Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Thailand, July 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/th/wp-content/uploads/
sites/91/2020/08/UNHCR-Thailand-Urban-COVID-19-Impact-Assessment_July-2020.pdf, at 8.
21 Daron Tan and Manachaya Yankittikul, A Looming Catastrophe: COVID-19, Urban Refugees, and the Right to Health in Thailand, 11 May 2020, https://rli.blogs.sas.
ac.uk/2020/05/11/a-looming-catastrophe-covid-19-urban-refugees-and-the-right-to-health-in-thailand/. See also, The Coalition for the Rights of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Open Letter, 18 May 2020, https://www.facebook.com/crsp.thailand/posts/2796172823946244. 
However, our reports indicate that social distancing is not observed 
in detention and is virtually impossible because of the overcrowding 
in cells. Additionally, detainees are not provided with masks, soap, or 
hand sanitisers. According to our reports, this is the case in various 
immigration detention centres across Thailand, including Suan Phlu, 
Prachuap Kirikhan, Maesot, and Ranong.
BAIL AND ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION
The RTG has not released all refugees from detention, and has not 
increased their use of non-custodial alternatives to detention. This 
is in spite of attempts from NGOs and the detainees’ families to 
apply for bail on the basis of COVID-19. Thus, the bail policy remains 
the same as before COVID-19: only those with serious medical 
conditions, and mothers and children can be successfully bailed out 
of detention. Mothers and children are allowed to be bailed out under 
the Memorandum of Understanding among various ministries of the 
RTG (“MOU”).17 We are heartened by reports that there have been no 
children who are persons of concern to UNHCR in immigration detention 
since May 2020. However, this does not include ethnic Rohingya women 
and children who are detained in Songkhla detention centre, as reported 
by Human Rights Watch in May 2020.18
ADVOCACY EFFORTS FROM HUMAN RIGHTS 
ORGANISATIONS
Human rights organisations have been advocating for the RTG to 
take a more refugee-inclusive and rights-based approach to its 
COVID-19 response. For instance, Human Rights Watch urged the 
RTG to release detained refugees and migrants, ensure adequate 
social distancing in detention, ensure access to health services, and 
consider a temporary moratorium on police checks for migration 
documents.19 UNHCR Thailand recommended civil society organisations 
to continue advocating for the RTG not to penalise refugees for illegal 
stay, particularly those seeking health care.20 Several refugee rights 
advocates called for the RTG to halt arrests of refugees for immigration-
related offences, ensure non-discriminatory access to healthcare, 
safeguard refugees’ underlying determinants to health, implement 
alternatives to detention for refugees, and ensure an adequate standard 
of living in immigration detention centres.21
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In particular, we noted in March 2020 that halting visitors to detention 
is insufficient as the constant flow of detainees and staff in and out of 
the centres may still result in infections.22 This concern later manifested 
in Songkhla detention centres, where 65 detainees tested positive for 
COVID-19 about two weeks after an immigration officer who tested 
positive for COVID-19 visited the facility.23
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite these advocacy efforts, the RTG’s COVID-19 response regarding 
refugees can be characterised as reactive rather than proactive, and 
falls short of international human rights and public health standards. On 
the one hand, we commend the immigration authorities’ attempts to 
implement safeguarding measures in detention. In particular, the RTG’s 
undertaking of risk assessments of new detainees, including collecting 
information on their medical history, their recent travel history, and 
possible contact with confirmed cases in the last 14 days, is in line with 
WHO guidelines.24
On the other hand, the RTG’s response can be improved further to 
eliminate the risk of an outbreak in these detention centres, especially in 
the event of a second wave of the virus in Thailand. We recommend that 
the authorities provide new and existing detainees with masks, gloves, 
soap, and hand sanitiser, and ensure that they are able to observe 
physical distancing, in line with WHO guidance.25 The RTG should also 
consider heeding the CESCR’s recommendations in 2015 to ensure 
“adequate living conditions in detention centres”,26 which are even more 
relevant now in the face of the pandemic.
Further, in line with guidance from the UN agencies,27 we encourage 
the RTG to consider releasing all refugees from immigration detention, 
or, at the very least, increase the use of alternatives to detention for 
particularly vulnerable groups of detainees. This will also assist in 
easing the overcrowding in detention centres and reduce the strain 
on immigration authorities to implement adequate social distancing 
measures.
We reiterate the calls on the RTG to respect, protect, and fulfill the right 
to health of refugees during this pandemic. This will ultimately have an 
overall positive impact on the public health of the whole country. We 
further urge the RTG to see through its implementation of the national 
screening mechanism, which will hopefully regularise the legal status 
of individuals who cannot return to their countries because they fear 
danger from persecution.28
22 Daron Tan and Manachaya Yankittikul, A Looming Catastrophe: COVID-19, Urban Refugees, and the Right to Health in Thailand, 11 May 2020, https://rli.blogs.sas.
ac.uk/2020/05/11/a-looming-catastrophe-covid-19-urban-refugees-and-the-right-to-health-in-thailand/. 
23 Human Rights Watch, Thailand Should Free Detained Migrants Amid Pandemic, 8 May 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/08/thailand-should-free-
detained-migrants-amid-pandemic. 
24 World Health Organization, Preparedness, prevention and control of COVID-19 in prisons and other places of detention, 15 March 2020, https://www.euro.who.int/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0019/434026/Preparedness-prevention-and-control-of-COVID-19-in-prisons.pdf?ua=1, at 8. 
25 Ibid, at 19. 
26 CESCR, Concluding observations on the combined initial and second periodic reports of Thailand, UN Doc. E/C.12/THA/CO/1-2, 19 June 2015, at para 28. 
27 International Organization for Migration, OHCHR, IOM, UNHCR and WHO – Joint Press Release, 31 March 2020, https://www.iom.int/news/rights-and-health-
refugees-migrants-and-stateless-must-be-protected-covid-19-response. 
28 Thailand: Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on the Screening of Aliens who Enter into the Kingdom and are Unable to Return to the Country of Origin B.E. 
2562 [Thailand], 25 December 2019, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e675a774.html. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In mid-March 2020, despite very low numbers of people in the country 
being infected with COVID-19, a nationwide lockdown was imposed 
in Tunisia: all recreational venues, catering outlets and non-essential 
workplaces were closed, while non-essential journeys on foot and 
by car were banned. These measures, along with others, have had 
a particularly severe impact on migrants. Many work in precarious 
conditions in the informal sector and saw their incomes drop to zero for 
several consecutive months. This situation was compounded by the other 
problems faced by migrants, such as the language barrier, making it 
harder for them to access information about health and safety; difficulties 
obtaining health care due to their irregular status; living conditions which 
did not always allow them to take precautionary measures to protect 
their health; and having to contend with rising discrimination. During 
the COVID-19 crisis, the usual economic, legal and social difficulties 
experienced by migrants have become increasingly acute.
IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
COVID-19 CRISIS ON MIGRANTS IN TUNISIA
The measures taken by the Tunisian government to address the 
pandemic have had a huge impact on many migrants’ lives. According 
to several civil society and international organisations, including Terre 
d’Asile Tunisia, the Association for Leadership and Development 
in Africa, the Tunisian Red Crescent, the International Organisation 
for Migration, Médecins du Monde and By Lhwem, despite very few 
migrants suffering from COVID-19 in spring 2020, the social crisis was 
already more than apparent by that time.
Terre d’Asile Tunisia observed the following direct consequences of the 
crisis on migrants: loss of employment and income during and after the 
lockdown, exacerbating precarious living conditions and causing some 
migrants to lose their housing. Requests for voluntary return assistance 
rose as a result of these difficulties and have yet to return to normal 
levels due to ongoing restrictions and sporadic boat departures to 
Europe.
Terre d’Asile Tunisia has also witnessed an increase in discrimination 
towards migrants, especially black migrants, both in their everyday 
lives and in their access to health care, as noted by the Mixed Migration 
Centre (MMC)1. Migrants have been automatically associated with 
COVID-19 and viewed as potentially contagious. Other consequences 
of the crisis include a rise in community violence and an increase in the 
number of pregnant single women.
In legal terms, there have been problems registering births with the  
local authorities and following up on court cases, as the courts have 
been closed for several months.
A RAPID, TAILORED RESPONSE FROM CIVIL 
SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS ACROSS TUNISIA
A range of initiatives were quickly launched to mitigate this situation: 
some were organised spontaneously by citizens, while others were 
put in place by established civil society organisations or local and 
national authorities. Despite being largely invisible in Tunisian society, 
1 http://www.mixedmigration.org/resource/4mi-snapshot-refugees-and-migrants-access-to-health-services-in-tunisia-a-focus-on-discrimination-and-covid-19/
2 An overview of some local and national initiatives launched is available here: https://www.terre-asile-tunisie.org/index.php/38-actualites/actualites-mdm/588-
consequences-de-la-pandemie-pour-les-migrants-et-initiatives-solidaires
migrants were the target of a wave of solidarity. They were therefore 
able to benefit from emergency aid overseen by national or community 
bodies. For example, in Grand Tunis, several community associations 
grouped together to create the COVID-19 African Solidarity Unit. 
The unit gathered requests from people in difficult circumstances, 
launched a fundraising appeal and managed the distribution of food 
to beneficiaries2. In Sfax, several associations (including Terre d’Asile 
Tunisia, Association Innocence, and Green Crescent) also identified the 
needs present among migrants and jointly organised distributions of 
provisions, with coordination and facilitation from the Sfax municipal 
council. However, levels of mobilisation varied between regions in 
Tunisia and the restrictions on mobility in place prevented people on the 
ground from reaching affected groups in some regions, especially those 
in rural areas and in the south of the country.
Very little public material assistance was available to foreigners. This 
is why fundraising appeals were launched so quickly. Donations from 
individuals, embassies and consulates, associations, town councils, 
banks and companies provided funding for food and helped with 
healthcare costs. Assistance with rental payments also helped to 
protect people from eviction and potential detention, among other risks.
Other services offered to migrants by civil society organisations 
included counselling and psychological support, mediation (in particular 
with landlords), awareness raising and mobilisation of community 
structures, information campaigns and translation of decisions made  
by the government (which were unavailable to those who did not  
speak Arabic).
Coordination mechanisms were quickly put in place between different 
support structures to ensure equitable distribution of available 
resources. There were significant difficulties involved, especially when 
it came to sharing beneficiaries’ personal information: data protection 
became an obstacle to effective aid distribution.
Nevertheless, this emergency aid made a major impact. Situations  
of extreme precarity were generally evaded. Evictions were rare.  
The public sector, national organisations and community associations 
quickly coordinated with one another and organised themselves as the 
weeks went on. Community actors were among the main providers 
of aid, despite being offered very limited inclusion in decision-making 
mechanisms prior to the crisis.
COLLABORATION BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANISATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 
AUTHORITIES
One of the most notable aspects of the emergency initiatives taken 
during the spring 2020 crisis was the unprecedented practice of 
collaboration between civil society organisations and government 
authorities. Spearheaded by several associations and local collectives,  
a ‘Committee to Monitor the Humanitarian Situation of Foreigners Living 
in Tunisia’ was quickly founded, led by the Minister of Human Rights. 
This initiative culminated in the creation of an online platform allowing 
migrants’ needs to be surveyed and aid received from private sector 
donors to be distributed to them.
COVID-19 AND THE MULTI-ACTOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
IN TUNISIA: AN EFFECTIVE STEP FOR A MORE AWARE AND 
INCLUSIVE DEBATE ON MIGRATION?
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The authorities’ efforts to assist migrants during the crisis are without 
parallel and represent a significant step forward for migrants’ inclusion 
in Tunisian society more generally. However, these efforts were 
impacted by several factors: the need to collect personal data to avoid 
multiple donations to a single person; the irregular status and risk of 
detention and expulsion of many beneficiaries; the insufficient amount 
of private funds raised and the almost complete absence of public 
money; and the failure to apply this aid mechanism in regions outside 
the capital. Finally, the presence of multiple public actors working 
with migrants and the absence of a single, central body to manage the 
national migration strategy hindered the implementation of a faster, 
more effective response to the crisis.
SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO ASSIST MIGRANTS  
IN DETENTION
Migrants in detention were the target of specific action by several 
associations in Tunisia. This was part of a broader international appeal 
to provide assistance to migrants held in detention centres where their 
lives are endangered by poor sanitary conditions. In the country, people 
subject to expulsion are held in a detention centre (the ‘Ouardia Centre’) 
until they are able to find a way of funding their repatriation. During this 
period, field missions to the Ouardia Centre were organised to provide 
emergency aid and to ensure that migrants’ rights were being protected. 
This allowed Terre d’Asile Tunisia, for example, to help 50 detainees 
by distributing hygiene and protection kits, as well as food, and to 
record their testimonies in order to raise wider awareness and improve 
coordination between associations. Several associations working 
together as a coalition (Terre d’Asile Tunisia, Lawyers without Borders, 
World Organisation against Torture, and Tunisian Forum for Economic 
and Social Rights) lobbied for improved measures to protect the health 
of the people held in Ouardia, demanding the immediate release of 
the detainees in view of the exceptional circumstances. However, the 
emergency situation also acted as a trigger for broader, more far-
reaching legal and political advocacy to highlight the irregularities 
of migrant detention, considered to be abusive,3 by this coalition of 
associations, who called for an immediate end to the practice.
In early June 2020, the coalition of organisations helped a group of  
22 migrants detained in Ouardia to take their cases to the administrative 
court. On 16 July, the court issued a historic ruling, ordering their 
detention to be suspended on the grounds that it contravened Tunisian 
law and the country’s international commitments. The migrants were 
released several weeks later.
Besides the specific outcome of this action, it is also relevant to note 
the collaboration between civil society organisations and public bodies, 
in this case the National Authority for the Prevention of Torture (INPT), 
which helped to make the lobbying campaign a success.
3 Indeed, there are no legal grounds for this practice in Tunisian law. Detainees do not receive written notification of their confinement and are also unable to challenge 
the deprivation of their liberty. Moreover, the Ouardia Centre is not legally registered as a detention centre. Officially speaking, it is a ‘reception and orientation 
centre’, which is currently under the oversight of the Ministry of the Interior. In practice, however, it is a place of incarceration.
CONCLUSION: WHAT NEXT?
The response to the COVID-19 crisis in spring 2020 was beset by 
obstacles and difficulties. Nevertheless, it saw the emergence of new, 
promising dynamics for the future of migration in Tunisia. There was 
a clear sense of solidarity towards the migrant population, migrants 
were included in the decisions affecting them within associations, and 
unprecedented levels of collaboration emerged between civil society 
organisations and the authorities. The COVID-19 crisis also provided 
an opportunity for lobbying for an improved response to migration by 
the authorities and better conditions for work and stay for migrants, as 
well as challenging existing practices that restrict individual freedoms, 
such as detention. To varying extents, this lobbying appears to have 
made an impact on the Tunisian authorities, who have been open to 
more inclusive discussions with civil society organisations, including 
community associations. The efforts of civil society organisations to 
transform these intentions into action must continue in the future, 
in collaboration with town councils which are becoming more and 
more sensitive to their responsibility for local migration governance. 
These organisations must also continue to closely monitor changes 
in the discourse and perceptions towards migrants to ensure that the 
discrimination they suffer, which worsened in spring 2020, is brought  
to an end.
ELISA CLAESSENS 
Advocacy and Partnerships Officer, Terre d’Asile Tunisie
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UK civil society engagement on immigration detention is dynamic and 
responsive. Several NGOs regularly deliver support and services inside 
detention centres1, and there are many more involved in advocacy and 
campaigning for detention reform2. As a result, there was a robust 
civil society response at the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
advocating on behalf of people in detention and making widespread 
calls for release. Inside detention, effective social distancing was 
impossible, with restricted facilities and limited hygiene measures 
putting people at increased risk3. There were also a number of concerns 
about effective quarantine and prolonged periods of isolation, and the 
impact this might have on mental health, particularly in the context of 
the UK having no time limit on immigration detention.
The UK Government ‘lockdown’ effectively also shut down all support 
within immigration detention: legal and social visits were suspended, 
and people in detention were given limited access to elements of 
the daily regime. NGOs in contact with people at this time reported 
higher levels of anxiety, stress and most worryingly, cases of self-
harm4. Volunteer visitor groups – part of the Association of Visitors 
to Immigration Detainees (AVID) national network – began offering 
telephone or skype support where possible. This ensured that there 
was at least some level of continued support for people in detention 
during the crisis. As the crisis progressed and the Government began to 
facilitate release on an unprecedented scale, some groups also began to 
offer support for those leaving detention, frantically working to fill a gap 
as many were released into effective destitution and further risk.
Throughout the crisis, information from the Government and detention 
centre management was sparse. Groups who had previously delivered 
services inside centres noted a downturn in communication and the 
absence of any clear information or guidance became an increasing 
problem, making it difficult for groups to prioritise support and to 
be able to identify those who may be most vulnerable. As the crisis 
deepened, despite collective attempts by NGOs to monitor numbers 
and share information, it became increasingly difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which the COVID- 19 crisis had reached inside detention.
With borders closing and flights suspended across the globe, the 
necessity and lawfulness of continued detention were also called into 
question. This was especially pertinent at the peak of the pandemic, 
as the prospect of imminent removal from the UK for people pending 
deportation reduced significantly. Human rights charity Detention 
Action launched two legal challenges in March 2020 requiring the 
Home Office to identify and release all those with underlying health 
conditions and to review the lawfulness of detention of all others given 
the impossibility of removals5.
1 See www.aviddetention.org.uk 
2 See www.detentionforum.org.uk 












While this legal challenge did not achieve its intended outcome of 
release for all, it certainly added great pressure to the Government and 
resulted in mass releases of people from immigration detention. As of 
May 2020, there were only 368 people in immigration detention, which 
is the lowest number within the past decade6.
Alongside these two major legal challenges, civil society voices from 
across the spectrum continued to exert pressure on the Government 
to release people from detention. Central to this was the contribution 
made by people with lived experience of immigration detention. For 
example, the ‘These Walls Must Fall’ group in South Yorkshire wrote 
to the Home Secretary adding much needed lived experience voice 
to the debate7. They used their first-hand experience of detention to 
highlight that it is impossible to have spatial distancing or self-isolation 
in detention due to people having to share cells and rooms, multiple 
people sharing toilets, shower rooms, dining facilities, exercise yards 
and other spaces. The advocacy group Freed Voices made similar calls 
to the Home Secretary in a letter drawing attention to the ‘risk to life’ 
of continued removals8. Several other NGOs voiced their frustrations 
and concerns in writing, including a coalition of NGOs and lawyers 
coordinated by Bail for Immigration Detainees who highlighted the 
‘very real risk of an uncontrolled outbreak of COVID-19 in immigration 
detention’9.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE ‘NEW 
NORMAL’: AVOIDING BUSINESS AS USUAL?
Despite numbers reaching an all-time low in April 2020, immigration 
enforcement resumed as the UK emerged from lockdown. Even by 
the end of June 2020, numbers were slowly crawling back up again, 
with 698 people once again in detention across the UK10. While these 
numbers are still relatively low, it remains to be seen whether the 
suspension of some elements of the hostile environment and the 
facilitation of large-scale releases at the peak of COVID-19 will lead 
to any long-term changes. Many are worried that the UK is returning 
to “business as usual”, ignoring the opportunity to consider how this 
reduction in numbers in detention may be maintained.
To this end, 32 organisations have written collectively to the Immigration 
Minister to emphasise that the present situation provides an opportunity 
for collaborative thinking around some of the long-standing problems 
within the immigration detention system, including substantive 
issues with bail accommodation; flaws in pre-detention screening for 
vulnerability; ongoing issues with the Adults at Risk policy and other 
safeguards to identify and protect vulnerable people in detention11. 
UK: CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
AMID COVID-19
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NGOs are asking for the opportunity to meet with Government and to 
use this juncture as a chance to strategically consider the necessity of 
detention. At the time of writing there has been no response from the 
UK Government.
Against this backdrop, some recent changes to the UK’s detention 
centres are worth noting. In July 2020 it was announced that a large 
facility in Lincolnshire, Morton Hall, would be re-roled from a detention 
centre to a foreign national prison12. In August 2020 the notorious Yarl’s 
Wood, the UK’s only dedicated detention centre for women, changed 
its status to a short-term holding facility for people reaching the UK 
via Channel crossings13. These developments have created uncertainty 
amongst civil society, with initial celebrations about closures almost 
immediately followed by an unease about immigration detention in 
other forms.
The challenge now for civil society is to ensure that the learnings from 
the reduction in numbers in immigration detention during COVID-19 
can be captured and utilised. It could also be an opportunity for the 
Government to consider more broadly how it might manage people 
subject to immigration control in the community rather than via 
indefinite detention, building on the alternatives to detention pilots 
it has already committed to. Whether either will rise to the challenge 
remains to be seen.
ALI MCGINLEY 
Director, Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees (AVID)
MISHKA PILLAY 
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The United States maintains the largest immigration detention 
infrastructure in the world.1 Since the first person contracted COVID-19 
in U.S. immigration detention in March 2020, Freedom for Immigrants 
has been monitoring the U.S. government’s incompetent and lethal 
response to the pandemic in this supposed civil form of imprisonment.2
THE PANDEMIC HIGHLIGHTS PROBLEMS  
WITH PRIVATE PRISONS
Over 70 percent of people in U.S. immigration detention are caged 
in private prisons.3 In addition, many government-run facilities have 
components of their services managed by private contractors.4 We 
have found significant deficiencies in the responses to the pandemic by 
both private and public facilities, underscoring that the problems are 
systemic. However, the influence of private prisons and private prison 
contractors in compounding the effects of COVID-19 in U.S. immigration 
detention cannot be overstated.
The U.S. government has refused to track or make public information 
on the number of positive COVID-19 cases among Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement (ICE)’s third-party contract staff. In April, an 
ICE spokesperson said that the agency does not have an obligation to 
report instances in which private contract staff test positive for COVID-
19.5 Later that month, two guards at a private immigration detention 
facility in Louisiana died from COVID-19.6
Essentially, the U.S. government has decided to adopt a head-in-the-
sand approach to tracking the origins of COVID-19 cases in immigration 
detention. This is aggravated by the unwillingness of private prison 
contractors to test people in immigration detention.
For example, after an apparent suicide at the Mesa Verde 
Detention Facility in California,7 ICE lawyers advised the agency to 
initiate COVID-19 testing for everyone detained there.8 However, 
representatives of the private health care company Wellpath—which 
contracts with ICE at Mesa Verde—expressed concern that mass testing 
would result in high numbers of positive COVID-19 cases and that the 
GEO Group-run facility was not equipped to implement quarantines.
1 Global Detention Project, available at https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/united-states. 
2 Freedom for Immigrants, available at https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/covid19.
3 The Sentencing Project, available at https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/private-prisons-united-states/.
4 See, “Prison Companies Are Profiting Off of COVID-19: We Must Hold Them Accountable.” IMM-Print. March 26, 2020, available at https://imm-print.com/prison-
companies-are-profiting-off-of-covid-19-we-must-hold-them-accountable/.
5 Madan, Monique O. “Two workers at ICE Detention Center in Miami-Dade Test Positive for Coronavirus.” Miami Herald. April 6, 2020, available at https://www.
miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article241791511.html. See also Gardiner, Sarah. “Real Time Conditions Report, April 15, 2020 – April 29, 2020.” Freedom 
for Immigrants, available at https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/s/FFI-April-29-COVID-19-Updated.pdf. 
6 https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2020/04/29/2-ice-jail-guards-louisiana-die-coronavirus/
7 Castillo, Andrea. “ICE said a 74-year-old was too dangerous to release. He died of apparent suicide.” Los Angeles Times, May 20, 2020, available at https://www.
latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-20/immigrant-ice-detention-suicide-coronavirus.
8 Gardiner, Sarah. “Real Time Conditions Report, July 17, 2020 – August 13, 2020.” Freedom for Immigrants, available at https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/s/
FFI-August-13-COVID-19-update_FINAL-s9hs.pdf. See also https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.358452/gov.uscourts.cand.358452.489.7.pdf.






13 http://cepaim.org/en-la-epoca-de-la-covid-19-espana-ofrece-al-mundo-una-via-para-poner-fin-al-internamiento-migratorio/ (Spanish); For English see also 
https://imm-print.com/in-the-age-of-covid-spain-offers-the-world-a-pathway-to-detention-abolition/




As a result, ICE chose not to administer testing at Mesa Verde. It is 
tragically unsurprising, then, that when a federal court judge ordered 
testing, more than half of the people detained at the facility tested 
positive.9
Mesa Verde is not an outlier. Since March 2020, approximately 5,640 
people of the over 32,500 tested in immigration detention have been 
confirmed positive for COVID-19. This 18 percent infection rate is 
outrageously disproportionate to national and global averages, and at 
least six people have died.10 Of these deaths, five occurred at a private 
prison, and the sixth death occurred at the Glades County Detention 
Center that relies heavily on private correctional services.11
We know that there is no way to social distance in immigration 
detention, which is why Freedom for Immigrants has urged the U.S. 
government to free all people from immigration detention12 as Spain has 
accomplished.13 We also know that not properly testing, tracking, and 
preventing with personal protective equipment (PPE), combined with 
continued use of inter-facility and inter-agency transfers, needlessly 
accelerates the proliferation of COVID-19.
For instance, in early August at the privately-run El Valle Detention 
Facility in Texas, people who had tested positive for COVID-19 were 
transferred into the facility and held in housing units with people who 
had not been tested and did not display COVID-19 symptoms.14 Recent 
investigations show that ICE continues to move people from centers 
with COVID-19 cases to centers with no known cases and vice versa.15 
These transfers are usually accomplished through private companies, 
such as GEO Group and Trailboss Enterprises.
PRIVATE PRISONS EXPAND  
DETENTION WORLDWIDE
Evidence suggests that the negative impact of private prison companies 
on the pandemic is not exclusive to the United States. For example, staff 
have tested positive at the GEO Group-run Wolston Correctional Centre 
in Australia, and like the United States, staff are not being required to 
wear PPE when in contact with detained people.16
HOW PRIVATE PRISONS ARE EXACERBATING COVID-19  
IN THE UNITED STATES AND BEYOND
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We should not be surprised. U.S.-headquartered multinational 
private prisons companies have been exporting their failed practices 
for decades. The world’s first private prison company CoreCivic/
CCA formed in 1983, followed by GEO Group in 1984. This is when 
immigration detention began its rapid expansion.17 The first government 
contracts for both companies were for immigration detention facilities in 
the United States.
These publicly-traded companies then began to pursue other English-
speaking countries. For example, after European member states signed 
the Schengen agreement in 1990 to abolish border controls between 
member states, private prison companies began lobbying member 
states to secure the external borders by detaining immigrants.18 In 
the United Kingdom—the first European country to have outsourced 
detention to private companies19—a U.S. citizen died at a GEO-run 
immigration detention facility in 2011 due to medical neglect.20
Likewise, Australia’s first private prison was operated by Corrections 
Corporation of Australia, an international venture of the U.S.-based 
CCA/CoreCivic. South Africa’s and New Zealand’s first private prisons 
were operated by GEO Group.
The “success” of these publicly-traded, U.S.-based multinational prison 
corporations have inspired the founding of others, such as Management 
& Training Corporation, LaSalle Corrections, G4S, Mitie, Serco, Tascor, 
GEPSA, Emerald Correctional Management, and Community Education 
Centers. Despite thousands of lawsuits against private prisons 
worldwide—ranging from sexual battery to medical neglect to wrongful 
death—private immigration detention continues to expand.
A WORLD WITHOUT DETENTION  
IS WITHIN REACH
But this might soon be changing. While the pandemic is ravaging our 
communities, it also is exposing how immigration detention is not a safe 
or reasonable response to migration. Even GEO Group’s shareholders 
are starting to question the company’s efficacy. In July 2020, 
shareholders brought a securities class action lawsuit against GEO, 
alleging that the company misled investors about the effectiveness of 
its COVID-19 response and subjected people to significant health risks.21
17 Freedom for Immigrants. “Map, subsection on History of Immigration Detention,” available at https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/map. See also Freedom for 
Immigrants. “Detention Timeline,” available at https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/detention-timeline. 
18 See Transnational Institute. “Expanding the Fortress,” May 2018, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/expanding_the_fortress_-_1.6_
may_11.pdf. See also
19 The Sentencing Project, “International Growth Trends in Prison Privatization, August 2013, available at https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
International-Growth-Trends-in-Prison-Privatization.pdf.





23 Freedom for Immigrants. “Map, subsection on COVID-19 Reporting,” available at https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/map. 
24 Wessler, Seth Freed. “Fear, Illness, and Death in ICE Detention.” New York Times, July 10, 2020, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/magazine/
covid-ice.html.
25 Fialho, Christina. “Let Us In: An Argument for the Right to Visitation,” in Immigration Detention, Risk, and Human Rights (Springer, 2016).
In August, a federal judge halted the expansion of two new private 
immigration detention facilities in California.22 Freedom for Immigrants 
and the Immigrant Legal Resource Center brought this novel legal 
challenge under a 2017 California state law called the Dignity Not 
Detention Act. The Dignity Not Detention Act is the first law in the 
country to outlaw private immigration detention contracting. Now other 
states such as Washington and Maryland are following California’s lead.
Even inside U.S. immigration detention, people are organizing against 
the system. Freedom for Immigrants has tracked over 100 protests, 
sign-on letters, and hunger strikes led by people inside since the start of 
the pandemic.23 For example, people at the privately-run Irwin County 
Detention Center in Georgia organized a labor strike. They refused to 
work in the laundry room, kitchen, and commissary to protest transfers, 
lack of PPE, and continued detention.24
It should be clear by now that immigration detention is an archaic 
institution that only benefits the companies profiting off of this failed 
experiment. As the pandemic continues to reach inside immigration 
detention and across borders so too should our moral outrage.
Multi-national prison corporations do not want immigrant rights 
advocates working in international solidarity with one another. Our work 
together threatens their stability and growth.
We cannot and should not stand for this. Moreover, we have an 
opportunity to do something about it. International law has enshrined 
the right to community visitation in immigration detention,25 and we can 
enforce this right.
Community volunteers who visit people in immigration detention with 
groups such as Freedom for Immigrants have the power to consistently 
expose abuses rampant in immigration detention systems worldwide.
It is time for advocates to work across borders so that we can build  
a world where no person is imprisoned for crossing one.
CHRISTINA FIALHO 
Co-founder/Executive Director, Freedom for Immigrants
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 ≥ Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) https://aprrn.org/
 ≥ Association of Visitors to Immigration Detainees (AVID)  
http://www.aviddetention.org.uk/
 ≥ Asylum Access Thailand https://www.facebook.com/aatthai/
 ≥ Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) 
 ≥ Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre Detainees’ Rights Concern 
Group, Hong Kong https://www.facebook.com/CIC-Detainees-
Rights-Concern-Group-108829650717736/
 ≥ Chinese University of Hong Kong
 ≥ European Network on Statelessness https://www.statelessness.eu/
 ≥ Freedom for Immigrants https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/
 ≥ Fundación Cepaim http://cepaim.org/
 ≥ Ghent University 
 ≥ Halina Niec Legal Aid Center https://www.pomocprawna.org/
 ≥ HOST International https://www.hostinternational.org.au/
 ≥ Human Rights Watch https://www.hrw.org/
 ≥ Justice Centre Hong Kong https://www.justicecentre.org.hk/
 ≥ Lawyers for Human Rights https://www.lhr.org.za/
 ≥McGill University
 ≥Mekelle University
 ≥Migration and Asylum Project (M.A.P)  
https://www.migrationandasylumproject.org/
 ≥Nanyang Technological University
 ≥National University of Malaysia
 ≥ SUAKA https://suaka.or.id/
 ≥ Tangaza University College
 ≥ Terre d’Asile Tunisie https://www.terre-asile-tunisie.org/
 ≥ Thinking Forward Network  
https://www.thinkingforwardnetwork.org/
 ≥ York University
 ≥ Tilburg University
 ≥ University of Manchester
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